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BODY AND MIND

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

NATIONAL WELFARE AND NATIONAL DECAY

PRIMER OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

PSYCHOLOGY, THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOUR

THE GROUP MIND

IN CONJUNCTION WITH DR. C. HOSE

THE PAGAN TRIBES OF BORNEO

# SOME MODERN WORLD AND ETHICS PROBLEMS

BY

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Not God Himself can make man's best  
Without best men to help Him.

—GEORGE ELIOT

What we must desire in the interests of mankind at large is that the more highly civilized races should increase faster than the more backward, so as to enable the former to prevail not merely by force, but by numbers and amicable influence.

—VISCOUNT BRYCE

The prospect of improving the relations of States and peoples to one another depends ultimately upon the possibility of improving human nature itself. . . . Can it be raised to and sustained at a higher level than it has yet attained? That is the great question.—VISCOUNT BRYCE



### THE N. W. HARRIS LECTURES

were founded in 1906 through the generosity of Mr. Norman Wait Harris, of Chicago, and are to be given annually. The purpose of the lecture foundation is, as expressed by the donor, "to stimulate scientific research of the highest type and to bring the results of such research before the students and friends of North-Western University, and through them to the world. By the term 'scientific research' is meant scholarly investigation into any department of human thought or effort without limitation to research in the so-called natural sciences, but with a desire that such investigation should be extended to cover the whole field of human knowledge."

## PREFACE

**A**N eminent and genial critic has recently described me as "an American Nietzschean reactionary." I do not wish to dispute the accuracy of this classification ; nor do I complain against it ; for I am not one of those who are carried away by every newest fad and fashion in science or philosophy or politics. I am well aware that the publication of this short series of lectures will provoke renewed outpourings of scorn from some of those who figure as exponents of the democratic principle, and that this little book will be described by them as an attack upon Democracy. I have learnt also that, in these days when all of us are beset by the difficulty of reading more than a small fraction of the interesting matter that pours from a thousand presses; even sympathetic readers too often fail to seize the essential import and intention of an author.

I therefore take this opportunity to assert explicitly that I am, in principle and sympathy, a democrat. I do not regard democratic government as an end in itself ; nor do I regard it as the only possible form of good government. For I have observed at close quarters within the British Empire that the working of a paternal autocracy may display justice, wisdom, and benevolence with

more consistency than any democracy hitherto can claim to have achieved. Nor do I forget the judgment of Gibbon on the age of the Antonines : "The vast extent of the Roman Empire was governed by absolute power under the guidance of virtue and wisdom."

I am a democrat, because I see clearly that democracy, or government by public opinion, with all its faults and all its dangers, is the only form of government under which the nations of the earth can hope to go onward to higher levels of civilization—levels at which a life of reasonable dignity and happiness shall be within the reach of the great majority of mankind. But I do not believe that such progress may be ensured by the simple expedient of giving one vote to every adult human being and leaving the rest to Nature. The day may come when that simple formula may suffice ; to hasten and ensure the coming of that day must be the supreme purpose of every sincere and not wholly selfish person.

Before the advent of that day of triumph for the democratic principle, our civilization must fight, in a life-and-death struggle, with many opposing forces, with the self-seeking of ruthless men and nations, with greed and cruelty, with sloth and levity, and dishonesty in private and in public life.

The tragedy of our situation is that the greatest danger threatening our civilization arises from the working within us of the altruistic or benevolent impulse—that impulse which (as I have argued at

length elsewhere) is a deeply rooted element of all normal human nature and the essential and only source of all true morality, of all truly ethical conduct, whether of men or nations. For the altruistic impulse prompts us to desire that every human being shall be free to exercise and satisfy every strong impulse proper to the human species, especially that strongest of all our impulses, the impulse to procreate our kind. Yet it is one of the ultimate and ineradicable disharmonies of human life (and the fact cannot be too strongly insisted upon at the present time) that such exercise and satisfaction are not compatible with the maintenance and progress of any civilization of a high type.

\* In those civilizations in which this "natural right" has been exercised without restraint, it has been, with rare exceptions, at the cost of an immense mass of human suffering and degradation, more especially on the part of women and children, of which suffering and degradation the leading features have always been infanticide, abortion, and a tremendous infant mortality. Only under the rarest conditions, which can never again be realized (such as those under which the early colonization of North America was effected), has the shadow of this disharmony been partially lifted from a fraction of civilized mankind.

But the suffering and degradation of a multitude of human beings is not the whole of the price to be paid for that free exercise of this "natural right"

which our equally natural altruism prompts us to demand for every man and woman. In the present age such exercise threatens to demand an even higher price, namely, the progressive deterioration of the intellectual and moral fibre of the human race. This is the great danger which besets our civilization; and will beset it, no matter how successful may be our efforts to abolish war and cruel oppression.

For the enduring success of democratic institutions in any country presupposes a high level of intelligence and morality on the part of all, or the great majority, of the citizens of that country. It is doubtful whether any existing population has achieved the required level; and it is certain that none can afford to suffer any actual deterioration, if its hopes of continued progress are to have any prospect of realization.

Nor will a high average level of intelligence and morality in any people suffice to secure for it continued progress or even continuance on the plane already achieved. It is necessary also that every generation shall produce its due quota of men of exceptional endowments—men who in every sphere of national life shall be the leaders and inspirers of their fellows; men and women who, as the "salt of the earth," shall preserve it from corruption, and who, by their creative activities, shall improve, refine, and increase the sum of human culture. For, as George Eliot has said, "Not God Himself can make man's best, without best men to help Him."

Some of the existing peoples have shown themselves capable of attaining a modest average of intelligence and morality, and of producing in fair numbers men and women of such great natural endowments as enable them to play the creative rôle of leaders ; and it is a fair presumption that these peoples are more capable of these two essential achievements than most of those that hitherto have not displayed these capacities in an equal degree. Hence, as Lord Bryce has said, "What we must desire in the interests of mankind at large is that the more highly civilized races should increase faster than the more backward, so as to enable the former to prevail not merely by force, but by numbers and amicable influence."

Further, the future of civilization depends upon the attainment by the leading nations of a higher level of international morality than any hitherto established. And it remains doubtful whether any existing people is capable of rising to and of steadily maintaining the required level of international morality. Hence, to quote Lord Bryce again, "The prospect of improving the relations of States and peoples to one another depends ultimately upon the possibility of improving human nature itself. . . . Can it be raised to and sustained at a higher level than it has yet attained? That is the great question." The thesis of this book is that any system of ethics which ignores this great question is inadequate to the needs of our time.

That is the large topic which I have discussed

very briefly in these pages. The full treatment of it would require several volumes. My excuse for publishing a discussion of it so condensed and inadequate is that, in the present distracted state of the world, any publication that may stimulate thought or contribute however slightly to a better understanding of the parlous state in which we find ourselves is justified and should not be delayed by considerations which, in a more tranquil age, might well demand a more deliberate procedure.

The briefer the treatment of a vast topic the more necessary is some aid to the reader in following the course of the argument. I therefore attempt to present here the content of the six following lectures in briefest possible outline. In the first and second lectures I draw attention to a fact which seems to me of the first importance for the understanding of our western civilization, and especially of its present world-problems, and which nevertheless has not, I think, been sufficiently recognized by philosophers or historians : the fact, namely, that our civilization has developed on a dual ethical basis, has been governed by ethical principles of two very different systems which have never been harmonized, but rather have been in perpetual conflict. These two conflicting systems of ethics are here called the National and the Universal Systems.

In Lectures III and IV I go on to show that neither system alone will suffice as the basis of our civilization ; that the National system, unsoftened and unchecked by its rival, must lead to such

disasters as the recent World War; that the Universal system, unmodified by the recognition of the validity of the National system, must lead to universal stagnation and decay; that, therefore, the great need of our time is some rational and effective synthesis of the two systems.

In the concluding chapters I make certain suggestions towards such a synthesis, insisting that any such system must make two principal demands or political prescriptions: first, it will prescribe a true Internationalism—an Internationalism consisting in a society or family of strong<sup>er</sup> and stable nations, each of which shall conduct itself as a moral organism, sensitive and benevolently sympathetic to the just claims of each member of the family; secondly, it will prescribe for each nation such political organization as will enable it effectively to play its proper part among its fellow-nations—an organization which, while wholesomely democratic, in accordance with the dictates of Universal Ethics, shall yet give due recognition to the aristocratic principle, as required by the teaching of National Ethics.

The lectures are here printed substantially as they were delivered. I have added a number of footnotes and an appendix containing two suggestions towards the better establishment of international justice. Some readers who may not care to read the philosophical discussions of the lectures may nevertheless be interested in these two practical suggestions. In the thinking out of this



appendix I have enjoyed the collaboration of my friend and former pupil, Mr. N. D. Hirsch.

I heartily thank the North-Western University, which, by its invitation to the Harris lectureship, stimulated me to attempt to put in order some reflexions that had long occupied my mind, and also the audience which listened, in a manner very gratifying to me, to six lectures delivered in the space of one week.

To readers unacquainted with my previously published books I would point out that this book is the ethical supplement to my psychological study of "The Group Mind," a book published by G. P. Putnam's Sons in the year 1920.

W. McD.

SILVER LAKE

NEW HAMPSHIRE

*September 1923*

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# ETHICS AND SOME MODERN WORLD PROBLEMS

## LECTURE I

### THE TWO SYSTEMS OF ETHICS—THE UNIVERSAL AND THE NATIONAL

IN this short series of lectures I propose to invite your attention to certain ethical and political problems which are already confronting the modern world and which promise to become very rapidly more urgent. They are problems which will have to be met by political action on the widest scale in the near future—political action which, if it is to be carried through successfully and confidently for the settlement of the problems I speak of, must conform to principles recognized as right or ethical. Yet they are problems in the face of which the ethical principles commonly accepted by civilized mankind give us no sure guidance. This is true, not only of Christian or Western civilization, but also of most other civilizations of the present and the past.

The ethical principles of all these civilizations have had much in common, in spite of differences in detail and of emphasis. We like to claim, and

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I believe the claim is not without all foundation, that the civilization of Christendom has, thanks to the influence of its religion, accepted and in some measure practised a higher ethical code than any other. Yet, if we compare the Christian code with the moral codes of ancient Egypt, Greece, or Rome, of China, of Japan, of the Moslem world, or of the Buddhist peoples, we find that in all these codes the most essential and effective precepts are substantially identical, in so far as they bear upon the personal relations of man to man.

To speak the truth, to be mutually helpful and loyal, to be compassionate, to do no violence to the persons or property of our neighbours, to practise moderation and self-discipline—these are the common stock of ethical precepts, without the cultivation of which, as a strong and effective moral tradition, no civilization can rise above a very crude level. No doubt the various civilizations have emphasized differently these main precepts; each may have insisted upon certain detailed applications in a manner peculiar to itself; and such special features of its moral code may have profoundly affected the course and destiny of each civilization. Perhaps we do not commonly realize how great a part such peculiarities of the moral codes have played in determining the fates of nations and of civilizations. Yet, in the main, the differences, as regards personal conduct of man to man, have been differences of the moral sanctions rather than differences of precept.

A further common feature of all the historic moral codes is that they have been (with certain partial exceptions to be noted presently) codes regulating the conduct of individuals in their intercourse with one another, and have had little or nothing to say concerning the relations of group to group, the intercourse of tribe with tribe, of nation with nation.

If we turn from the codes of practical ethics by which men have lived, and by which civilizations and nations have risen and fallen, to the reasonings and speculations of the moral philosophers, we find a corresponding state of affairs. In the main, the moral philosophers have been concerned to define more exactly the true ethical end, the nature of that good which is assumed to be the final goal of ethical endeavour, to refine the current precepts and practices which are the means towards that goal, and to discover the rational sanctions for such precepts and practices. They also, with few exceptions, have been content to discuss the relations of man to man and of the individual to the society into which he is a born member, neglecting those larger ethical problems which arise as soon as one well-defined human group comes into active relations with another.

In short, ethics, both practical and theoretical, popular and philosophical, has been in the main the ethics of the individual.

It is true that some of the ethical systems of the past have given prominence to the relations of the

individual to his group considered as a whole, as a living entity with a life, a history, and a destiny of its own, an organism that is more than the sum of the individuals who compose it at each moment of time. And here we find the one important feature that differentiates all ethical systems into two great classes. In this respect, I say, we may properly divide all ethical codes and systems, both popular and philosophical, into two classes, the class of Universal Ethics and the class of National Ethics, ethics of the group, of the tribe, nation, or State. To the former class belong the ethics of Christianity and of Buddhism, and less strictly the ethics of Mohammedanism. Each of these codes is bound up with a religion that aspires to universal dominion; each therefore claims that its rules of conduct are valid for and binding upon all men, and seeks to bring all mankind under the sway of such rules.

On the other hand, the ethical systems of Judaism, of Japan, of China, of Brahmanism, have been national systems; the outlook of each of these systems has been confined to a particular race or nation. And their aim has been not only to control the conduct of men in relation to one another and for the sake of the welfare and happiness of individuals, but also to regulate the lives of men in relation to the nation or the State; their prescriptions, aiming at the welfare of individuals, have been modified and complicated by others designed to promote the welfare and the stability of the national group.

This difference may be described by saying that the systems of the one class are universal and individualist, while those of the other are national and political. The difference, the contrast, is illustrated vividly when we compare the ethics of Christianity with the ethics of Judaism.

The Jewish State was a theocracy, and the Jewish people worshipped a national God; their ethical precepts aimed not only to regulate the conduct of men to one another, in their private relations as individuals, but also and especially to secure the prosperity and the perpetuation of the chosen people, as a national group distinct from all others. The ethical principles of Judaism were ethico-political. On the other hand, the non-political character of the ethics of Christianity was prescribed by its Founder in the command, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." And, though the various Christian Churches have in later times become affiliated with various States, and though their ethical teaching has been in consequence complicated in some degree by political considerations, the non-political character of the earlier and purer form of Christianity was so well marked as to provoke the resentment of the Roman State.

In this respect the ethics of Greece and of Rome were peculiar. In both cases the popular, the practical, ethical code by which the mass of men lived was essentially ethico-political; for their gods were national gods, and popular ethics and



its sanctions were national. The moral philosophers of those States, on the other hand, taught ethical principles and precepts of universal validity ; yet they were so far influenced by the spirit of nationality or statehood, by the spirit of national exclusiveness, that they seldom sought to apply their universal principles to the relations of men outside the limits of their own group. Their ethical principles claimed to be generally valid for all men ; but the only men generally recognized as men in the full sense were their free fellow-citizens. Their slaves, even those of similar race, as well as the men of other races and nations, remained for the most part outside their purview.

Hence these philosophers failed to achieve any synthesis of ethical and of political principles that could have general validity.

In the most famous of the philosophical writings of antiquity, the " Republic of Plato," ethics and politics were treated as inseparably combined in a single philosophical discipline. And, since the revival of learning, the " Republic " has been widely celebrated and studied. Yet the political ethics of Plato was gravely defective by reason of the restriction of his outlook to the free men of the Greek city-States ; and the influence of the non-political Christian ethics had become dominant throughout western civilization during the Middle Ages. Hence, in spite of the protests of so great a man as Edmund Burke, who boldly proclaimed that " the principles of true politics are but those

of morals enlarged," the western world has in the main continued to regard ethics and politics as two distinct studies;<sup>1</sup> and the whole world has

<sup>1</sup> The fact is illustrated by the division customary in our universities, where ethics and politics are represented by distinct Chairs, and are not uncommonly assigned to two distinct faculties or divisions of the university. In his "History of Ethics," Henry Sidgwick, after defining Ethics as "the study of the ultimate Good of man," wrote as follows: "In the definition above given, Ethics is not yet clearly distinguished from Politics; for Politics is also concerned with the Good or Welfare of men, so far as they are members of States. And in fact the term Ethics is sometimes used, even by modern writers, in a wide sense, so as to include at least a part of Politics, viz., the consideration of the ultimate end or Good of the State, and the general standard or criterion for determining the goodness or badness of political institutions. It is, however, also current in a narrower sense—equivalent to the qualified term "Private Ethics," which is sometimes preferred—as a study of the Good or Wellbeing of man, so far as this is attainable by the rational activity of individuals as such. This latter is the meaning to which the term is, in the main, restricted in the historical sketch that follows, at the same time I have not tried to draw a sharp division between the two subjects, the connexion of which, in many at least of the systems with which we have to deal, is conceived as very close and intimate. The difficulty of separating them is easily seen, whether we approach the boundary between them from the ethical or from the political side. . . . Still we may, to a great extent, study the elements and conditions of the good of individual men, so far as it is attainable by the rational activity of themselves or other individuals acting as private persons, without considering the manner in which the structure and functions of government should be determined with a view to the same end; it is, then, to the former of these subjects, as distinct from the latter, that attention will be primarily directed in the following pages" (page 3).

The foregoing passage shows how this eminent authority, who wrote political treatises hardly less famous than his two books on Ethics, continued to observe the artificial conventional distinction between Ethics and Politics which had long been accepted by most European philosophers, and which has been a great source of weakness in so much ethical discussion. The persistence of the distinction is grounded in the prevalence of

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continued to be divided between the two kinds of ethical systems—the universal individualist systems and the national or ethico-political systems.

Let us pause here to contemplate the influence of ethical systems of these two opposed types upon the fate of peoples. A national or political ethical system makes for extreme conservatism, for national stability and endurance. It tends to the preservation of the national type, not only by inculcating respect and reverence for the national gods and other national institutions, but also by preserving in some degree the racial purity of the people ; for such a system is indifferent to the making of converts, it inspires no missionary enterprises ; it is adverse to intermarriage with aliens, and generally adverse also to the admission of aliens to the privileges of citizenship. These effects we see illustrated by the history of China, of Japan, and of Judaism.

China is the supreme example of endurance among nations ; and of that endurance the ethical creed, with its worship of the emperor, its reverence for ancestors, its cult of the family and its hostility to foreign influences, has been, we may feel sure, a main condition—a condition which has preserved the people as a great nation, with all the essentials of its culture, through many centuries, in spite of vast natural calamities of plague and flood and individualistic psychology and the neglect to recognize the fact that a nation is a mental and moral organism, a state of affairs which I have attempted to remedy by writing "The Group Mind."

war, and in spite of the lack of natural science and the correlative of that lack, the flourishing of many gross superstitions. Japan repeats the history of China on a smaller scale.

Even more striking illustration of the same influence is afforded by the history of the Jewish people. For there, in the absence of every other condition favourable to national survival, the influence of a strictly national ethical code, backed by strong religious sanctions, has sufficed to preserve the people; and although they were few in numbers, were scattered widely over the face of the earth, and had no national home, it has kept for them something of the character of a nation.

If Greece and Rome failed to maintain their national life for periods comparable to the long endurance of those other peoples, was it not just because the national system of ethics was in each case undermined and fatally weakened by the speculations of philosophers, who taught effectively ethical doctrines incompatible with the rigid conservatism of the old systems? Was it not just for such teaching that Socrates was condemned to drink the hemlock bowl? And, if the old Roman religion and ethics owed their decay less to the speculations of philosophers, was not the downfall of the Roman civilization nevertheless due in the main to other influences of similar tendency? Of these influences, two seem to have been most powerful. First, Rome's success as a conquering power brought her into contact with, and into

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rulership over, so many peoples of diverse creeds and codes, and ultimately to the absorption of these multitudinous diverse elements within her system, that the old creed and the old ethico-political code, peculiar to and traditional to the small nucleus only of the vast empire, were inevitably swallowed up and their power to guide the conduct of the Roman citizen fatally weakened. Secondly, the spread of Christianity within the empire effected a radical transformation of the ethical system; or, rather, it substituted for the national system one essentially universal and non-political. These two processes of change favoured each the other; and together they destroyed the ethical basis on which ancient Rome had founded and built up her political power. Rome, in short, attempted to assimilate, to Romanize, an immense mass of population of diverse races, creeds, and codes; and in this attempt her ethical system, the source of her power and the foundation of all her greatness, was destroyed.<sup>1</sup>

Systems of national ethics are, by their intrinsic nature, incapable of extension to alien peoples without losing their effectiveness to guide the lives

<sup>1</sup> In my "National Welfare and National Decay" I have accepted the view that a principal factor in the decline and fall of Rome was the deterioration of the population of the heart of the empire. This view (which, I note, has been substantially accepted by a great authority, Mr. W. E. Heitland, in his recently published "The Roman Fate") is not at variance with the statements made in the text; for the deterioration of the population and the decay of morals are two inseparable aspects of the one process of national degeneration.

of men. Hence those that have endured have done so only by remaining true to their intrinsic principles, by remaining strictly national and exclusive.

The universal systems and the peoples that have lived under their sway have had a very different history. These systems are by nature assimilative and missionary, seeking to extend themselves over all the world. The three great systems of this type have been so successful that they now include all peoples, save those few which had developed strong national systems before coming into contact and free rivalry with the universal codes. And in the main they have spread by destroying or supplanting the lesser national codes. Since their appearance, each initiated by a single great teacher, the history of the world has been essentially the history of the struggle between these universal systems and the multitude of national systems that had slowly developed during the long ages of the prehistoric period.

India, the original home of Buddhism, saw its rapid spread. For a time it must have seemed as though the universal ethics of Buddhism was destined to supplant the national Brahman code. But the latter, being bound up with and founded on caste, the most rigidly conservative of all systems, was already firmly set: it proved too strong to be displaced by the universal system. The latter faded from India and spread eastward among the peoples whose national systems were still small and primitive; and in China, where the

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national system was neither stimulated and hardened by caste nor tempered by war and by contact with other peoples, it was able to compromise with it and to spread by a process of infiltration. Its southward spread was checked by contact with one of its two great rivals, the more aggressive Moslem system. By this contact Buddhism was thrown back from its southern outposts in the island world and confined to the continent.

The tendencies of a universal ethics are illustrated most clearly by the history of the Moslem world. The ethical system of Mohammed was planted by him among a people whose tribal creeds and cults were locally restricted and very primitive. It spread with astonishing rapidity, showing a tremendous power of assimilation. Peoples of the most diverse races—white, yellow, and black—and of the most diverse creeds and codes, yielded before its onslaught and were welcomed within the fold ; for it accepted all men without question, destroying race-prejudices and national sentiments. It abolished caste and ignored colour, and broke down all barriers that divide man from man ; and, what is more important and has been of greater effect in determining the history of the Moslem civilization, it broke down all the barriers that divide man from woman. The Arab mated freely with the Negro and with the yellow races, with the Malay, the Mongol, and the Tartar.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In " The Future of Islam " Sir Wilfrid Blunt wrote : " It is there [Africa], indeed, that Islam has the best certainty of

The immensely rapid spread of the Moslem system was due no doubt, in part, to the simplicity of its code and to the relatively simple nature of its sanctions ; for these enabled it to appeal effectively to all men. Its code was not too lofty for human attainment ; its sanctions were not too remote and ethereal for effective appeal to common human nature. But, most of all, its success was due to the real equality it gave to all its converts. All were made equal in the eyes of God and man, and the career was opened to all the talents. Such multiplicity of contacts of diverse elements of race and culture, such manifold crossings and blendings of human stocks as were thus effected, could not

expansion and the fairest field for a propagation of its creed. Statistics, if they could be obtained, would, I am convinced, show an immense Mohammedan progress within the last hundred years among the negro races, nor is this to be wondered at. Islam has so much to offer to the children of Man that it cannot fail to win them—so much more than any form of Christianity or European progress can give. The Christian missionary makes his way slowly in Africa. He has no true brotherhood to offer the negro except in another life. He makes no appeal to a present sense of dignity in the man he would convert. What Christian missionary takes a negress to wife or sits with the negro wholly as an equal at meat ? Their relations remain at best those of teacher with taught, master with servant, grown man with child. The Mohammedan missionary from Morocco meanwhile stands on a different footing. He says to the negro, ' Come up and sit beside me. Give me your daughter and take mine. All who pronounce the formula of Islam are equal in this world and in the next.' In becoming a Mussulman even a slave acquires immediate dignity and the right to despise all men, whatever their colour, who are not as himself. . . . Central Africa may then be counted on as the inheritance of Islam at no very distant day." Since this opinion and this forecast were published, many other observers have found reason to accept and confirm them.



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fail to be immensely stimulating to human productivity. And so the rapid spread of the Moslem system was followed by the rise of a civilization astonishing both by the rate of its development and by the richness and variety of its achievements.

In a brief space of time Moslem learning, Moslem science, and Moslem art became predominant on the earth ; they covered a broad belt of the old world, from eastern Asia to Spain, with splendid mosques and libraries and universities ; while all of Europe that lay beyond their influence still weltered in the chaos left by the breaking down of the Roman civilization.

But this rapid success was followed by a no less rapid decline. The destruction within the Moslem world of the old systems of national ethics rendered possible this rapid flourishing ; but it removed at the same time their conserving, stabilizing influences. Soon the brilliance of Moslem civilization was dimmed, a fatal inertia replaced its pristine vigour ; and, though its religion still spreads among the more primitive peoples, worsting Christianity wherever they come into direct and fair competition as missionary powers, it has long ceased to add anything of note to the sum of human culture.

It has sometimes been assumed that the Moslem ethos is essentially opposed to progress in the higher things of the Spirit. But, in the face of the great and rapid achievements of its early period, we can hardly accept that view. Rather, the history of Moslem civilization implies that a rapid develop-

ment, soon to be followed by stagnation or actual decay, is its intrinsic tendency. And this twofold tendency, which its history so clearly displays, is inherent in its ethical system. The universal character of that system and of its religious sanctions, which led it to welcome all comers on equal terms, to override and ignore or destroy all barriers of race and nationality and caste, made for a multitude of stimulating contacts and set free the powers of all its converts from the constricting bands of local and narrow cults and of national or tribal codes.

But the Moslem ethos was lacking in conservative influence. And here we must distinguish widely between influences which are conservative and those which merely clog the wheels of progress and stifle the movements of the mind. Conservation is not the antagonist of progress and of liberalism; it is rather their proper and necessary complement, without which progress and liberalism lead only to early dissolution and decay. The essential expressions of conservatism are respect for the ancestors, pride in their achievement, and reverence for the traditions which they have handed down; all of which means what it is now fashionable to call "race prejudice" and "national prejudice," but may more justly be described as preference for, and belief in the merits of, a man's own tribe, race, or nation, with its peculiar customs and institutions—its ethos, in short. If such preferences, rooted in traditional sentiments, are swept away from a people, its component indi-

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viduals become cosmopolitans ; and a cosmopolitan is a man for whom all such preferences have become mere prejudices, a man in whom the traditional sentiments of his forefathers no longer flourish, a man who floats upon the current of life, the sport of his passions, though he may deceive himself with the fiction that he is guided in all things by reason alone.

Such a universal code breaks down also the traditional groupings of mankind ; it sets free each man from the control of the group-spirit, which, more than any other influence, renders men loyal members of society, ready to spend and sacrifice themselves for the good of the group, obedient to its laws, and regardful of its future welfare.

In yet a third way, perhaps of greater effect than these other two, the Moslem ethos prepared the stagnation of its own culture. It happened that the Arab people, among whom the Moslem culture took its rise, inhabited a land which lay at the juncture of three continents, the historic homes of the three most distinctive races of mankind—the white, the yellow, and the black—and which was in touch also with the island homes of the Malay race. The breaking down of the barriers of national and racial exclusiveness led to the intermarriage of Moslem converts of all these races. This may have contributed to accelerate the blooming of the Moslem culture, as it certainly contributed to accelerate the spreading of its influence. But the Arab founders freely mixed their blood with that

of many other races, and especially with that of the Negro race—a race which never yet has shown itself capable of raising or maintaining itself unaided above a barbaric level of culture. It seems to me probable in the highest degree that this miscegenation, and especially perhaps the large infusion of Negro blood into the peoples bearing the Moslem culture, was a principal factor in bringing about the rapid decline of that civilization.<sup>1</sup>

Now let us consider, from this point of view, the history of the European peoples who became the heirs of the Græco-Roman civilization. We have noted how the national ethics of Greece and of Rome were sapped and were supplanted by the universal ethics of Christianity. We have now to notice that the peoples of northern and western Europe who came into contact with, and in various

<sup>1</sup> The Arabs are not devoid of pride of ancestry. Perhaps no people has attached so much importance to descent in the male line or kept so faithfully the records of such descent. Mohammed is believed to have bequeathed his mantle to members of his own tribe, the Koreysh, and to have said: "As long as there remains one man of the Koreysh, so long shall that man be my successor," and also to have declared: "If the Arab race falls, Islam shall fail." And the Arabs are said to look down upon the Turks as barbarians. Yet, in spite of the high value attached to Arab ancestry in the male line, they seem to have had little or no care for purity of race, and no objection to mating with the women of other races. Probably the legitimacy and common practice of polygamy and concubinage have played a leading part in bringing about this anomalous combination, intense pride of race and careful record of descent in the male line combined with indifference to racial purity. This combination is found not only in Africa and Arabia, but in all the regions into which the Arab influence and blood has spread, from Borneo to Bokhara; and indeed traces of it may be found as far as Timbuktu and Morocco, Cordova and Budapest.

degrees under the influence of, the decaying Roman power and the rising power of the Christian Ethics, were for the most part organized in strong tribes and rudimentary nations, having their own strong systems of national ethics. And when these contacts took place the Roman civilization was already on the wane ; its ethical system was in transformation ; the national system that had been the foundation of the civil and military power of Rome was already largely destroyed by a system essentially incompatible with, and adverse to, the continuance of that power. This disharmony within the Roman civilization rendered it incapable of dominating the European peoples in the complete way in which Moslem conquerors have dominated their converts. The new converts were only partially converted. They became Christians ; but they retained in large measure their national codes and cults. The Englishman became a Christian convert ; but he continued to be primarily an Englishman and only secondarily a Christian ; and where the dictates of the two systems conflicted those of the national system generally prevailed. The same was true in greater or less degree of all these new bearers of the civilization of Europe. So there grew up the strange anomaly of Christian Europe, a society of nations all of which had accepted the religion of peace and brotherhood, with its universal ethics, yet which were constantly at war with one another.

In the age of the Crusades these nations made a

short-lived attempt to sink their national differences and to combine in the defence of the Cross against the Crescent, of Christendom against the Moslem world. The success of this attempt was very partial only; the participating nations soon fell again into hostile groups; by the persistent rivalry of the nations within Christendom their national differences became accentuated and their national peculiarities confirmed. And though for a time they all gave allegiance to the head of the Christian Church, this allegiance was never more than nominal; the Church never effected the unification of Europe by securing the undisputed sway of the Christian ethics. If such unification had been achieved, European culture, untroubled by the series of national wars that make and mar so much of the history of Europe, might have bloomed as rapidly and as brilliantly as the culture of the Moslem world: and, possibly, its decline would have been equally rapid.

But it was not to be; the national divisions continued, the various nations took more definite shape, each developing its national culture on an ethical basis that was an imperfect and uneasy compromise between the national system and the universal system of Christianity. And to the present day this state of affairs continues. The European nations are characterized by the conglomerate nature of their ethics, an imperfect blend of the national and the universal systems.

Nowhere has this duality of the ethical basis

been more clearly displayed than in England. There the national system has in the main prevailed over the universal. The King of England was exalted to be the head of a peculiar Church, which separated itself in frank hostility from the universal Christian Church ; thus the influence of the universal ethical code was subordinated to, and made the instrument and servant of, the national code. The highest duty of the Christian Englishman was to serve God by serving his king and country. And, when he began to spread his influence over a large part of the surface of the earth he was always an Englishman first and a Christian secondarily. The heathen might rightly be converted to his Christian creed ; but, unlike the Moslem conqueror, he never accepted his converts as his equals, or regarded them as members of one great community equal before God ; and he consistently disdained to mix his blood with theirs in marriage.

Is these respects the English are typical of the more northern peoples of Europe. The peoples of the South, the southern French, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the South Italians, partly perhaps because they were more completely Romanized, partly owing to their racial constitution, were more completely Christianized ; among them the national code was less resistant to the universal code ; consequently, the course of their history has run more nearly after the pattern of the Moslem world.

In spite of these differences, it remains true that all the nations of Europe have developed on this twofold ethical basis, have developed ethical codes in which are mixed the incompatible precepts of the universal and of the national ethics. This disharmony of their ethical bases has had profound effects; it has brought certain advantages as well as great disadvantages. Among the advantages we may place first the stimulus to thought and discussion that comes from the conflict of the incompatible elements of the dual code. Where the national ethics holds undisputed sway, as in early Rome, men have no occasion to question its precepts. And where, as in the Buddhist or the Moslem world, a universal code alone rules the conduct of men, there also discussion of ethical principles finds no occasion. But where, as in Athens in its prime, in the later Roman world, and in modern Europe, the two systems are current in imperfect combination, there doubt, questioning, and interminable discussion of ethical principles inevitably occupy men's minds, stimulating them to habits of sceptical enquiry, the effects of which are carried far beyond the bounds of strictly ethical speculation. The progress of European thought and culture has been, no doubt, largely due to this influence.

The imperfect combination of the two ethical systems has been favourable to the progress of European culture in another way. The influence of the universal system has played a great part in



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bringing about the diffusion of men of European origin over the surface of the globe. Missionaries of Christianity have been, in nearly all cases, very active in the opening of new territories to European colonization. The story of the efforts of the Jesuit missionaries in Canada, Louisiana, South America, Asia, and the Pacific, striking and heroic as it is, reveals only a small part of this vast influence in shaping the present phase of world-history. The colonization of North America was largely due to the conflict between the two systems; for it was this conflict that drove the Pilgrim Fathers to seek new homes across the ocean. They were men in whom the conflict between the two systems became acute and in whom the universal prevailed over the national system. Thus the dual ethics played a great part in bringing about those contacts with strange lands and strange peoples which have reacted so strongly upon the European nations, feeding the appetite for further knowledge, for better means of communication, and for all that was novel, and enriching European civilization with a thousand things and practices brought from the remotest parts of the earth.

In yet a third way the duality of the ethical basis was favourable to progress. While the universal system worked as a liberalizing influence that set men's thoughts and actions free from the bonds which a strictly national system maintains, the persistence beside it of the national systems was a conservative influence which rendered possible the

growth of stable nations, each developing its own peculiar variety of institutions and culture, each entering into a stimulating rivalry with the others. Thus was produced that diversity of culture within the bounds of a common civilization which has been a main condition of European progress. If Christian Rome had been strong enough to assimilate completely the tribes and nations within and around the Christian Empire, and had made of Christendom a single great empire based only on Christian ethics, it is probable that its civilization, though it would have bloomed more rapidly, would, like that of the Moslem world, equally rapidly have sunk into apathy and stagnation, if not into actual decay. For, like the Moslem world, it would have lacked the national codes which, while maintaining diversity of cultures, gave strength and stability to the nations as they developed, each acquiring its own peculiar ethos and political structure.

Against these advantages of the dual system we must set off certain grave drawbacks. The penalty of progress is unrest and a discontent, which, whether we call it divine or merely distressing, contrasts strongly with the peace and wholeheartedness of the saint, whether Buddhist, Moslem, or Christian, and is equally far from the unquestioning devotion of the Samurai warrior, who, in single-hearted acceptance of his national ethics, goes cheerfully and unquestioningly to meet death in the service of his emperor and country.

In the soul of the European two voices have con-

tended for mastery ; two claimants for his undivided allegiance have struggled within him, the one proclaiming the duties of the universal Christian code, the other urging obligations of service to his city, his State, his king and country, his nation. And the wars and bloody persecutions which have figured so largely in the history of Europe have been in the main the outcome of the rivalry between the two ethical systems.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Friederick Naumann, a sincere Christian and an acknowledged leader of Christian thought, has vividly expressed this conflict of the Christian soul in the following passage : " It is impossible to attempt to erect the entire development of mankind upon compassion and fraternal disposition. . . . This Gospel of the poor is one of the standards of our life, but not the only standard. Not our entire morality is rooted in the Gospel, but only a part of it, although an extremely important and easily despised constituent. Beside the Gospel there are demands of power and of right, without which society cannot exist. I myself do not know how to help myself in the conflict between Christianity and other tasks of life, save by the attempt to recognize the limits of Christianity. That is difficult, but it is better than the oppression of half-truths which I have had to bear. . . . Primitive Christianity attached no value to the preservation of the State, Law, Organization, Production. It simply does not reflect on the conditions of human society. This is in no sense a reproach, it is nothing but the determination of a limit : there exist human problems, of the greatest size and greatest difficulty, which are not essentially touched by the New Testament. By the occasional assurance of obedience towards the Roman Emperor, the question, as to how Christianity stands towards the State, is in no way solved. The State requires rulers, the democratic State as well as the aristocratic. . . . The State can, when it perfects itself, be impregnated with the motives of brotherly love, at least one can attempt it ; but according to its nature, the State is not love, but constraint. The State does not belong to the sphere where, if a man takes away my coat, I am to let him have my cloak also ; nor to that where sins are forgiven as soon as they are repented of. The State has no right to reckon with the end of the world, nor even with the

The persecution of the Christians in the Roman Empire was the first phase. There the national spirit was dominant; the Christians were persecuted, not because they held certain religious beliefs, but because, inspired by the universal ethics of Christianity, they refused to acknowledge

voluntary goodness of all men. It forms part of the struggle for existence . . . a compound of human wills, of soldiers, of paragraphs and oppressions. This compound is, in all its harshness, the pre-requisite of culture. And it found its pattern form in Rome, not in Nazareth. . . . We possess a knowledge of the world, which teaches us a God of power and strength, who sends out life and death, as simultaneously as shadow and light, and a revelation, a faith as to salvation, which declares the same God to be Father. The following of the world-God produces the morality of the struggle for existence, and the service of the Father of Jesus Christ produces the morality of compassion. And yet, they are not two Gods, but one God. Somehow or other their arms intertwine. Only, no mortal can say where and how this occurs. That is indeed a pain, and religion without pain does not exist, has never existed. . . . Military power is the foundation of all order in the State and of all prosperity in the society of Europe. Say all that you know against the military! It will all be correct; for the description of battles cannot be more awful than the reality. And then go with me to where military power existed in the past, and where it now exists no longer—to the countries by the Mediterranean. The man who does not see what the collapse of the Roman military government involved is beyond cure. All the evils of military power are slight compared with the misery of a country in which no such rule exists. Dearth of soldiery means, in reality, ruins, decline, beggary, and war of all against all.

"An armed peace is not beautiful, but it is better than all past conditions known to us through history. All our culture would go the way of the Arabian culture, were we to grow weak in a military sense. . . . Hence, we either dare to aim at being without a State, and thus throw ourselves deliberately into the arms of anarchy; or we decide to possess, alongside of our religious creed, a political creed as well."—"Briefe über Religion."

the claim upon their allegiance made by the ethics of the Roman State.

With the conversion of the Roman world to Christianity the two systems of ethics came into open conflict or hardly disguised rivalry in all parts of the empire. The universal system rapidly gained the upper hand. The Church, asserting its claim to be the supreme temporal power, effected a partial synthesis and co-operation of the universal and the national systems of ethics ; and, supporting its claim with the tremendous sanctions of the Christian religion, it dominated Europe for more than a thousand years. During this period it suppressed the manifestations of the spirit of nationality, and achieved in large measure a unity of Christendom in which national distinctions seemed in a fair way to disappear.<sup>1</sup> But the spirit

<sup>1</sup> "In consequence of this opposition between the Church and the World, patriotism and the sense of civic duty, the most elevated and splendid of all social sentiments in the pre-Christian civilization of the Greco-Roman world tended, under the influence of Christianity, either to expand into universal philanthropy, or to be concentrated on the ecclesiastical community. 'We recognize one commonwealth, the World,' says Tertullian ; 'We know,' says Origen, 'that we have a fatherland founded by the word of God.'"—(H. Sidgwick, "History of Ethics," p. 120.) The difference between the Ethics of early Christianity and the national Ethics of Greece and Rome appears in nothing more clearly than in their estimations of the functions of parenthood. While by the latter (as by all other systems of National Ethics) these functions were regarded as sacred duties ; by the former they were deprecated as mere consequences of the fact that marriage is the smaller of two evils, that it is better to marry than to burn. This radical change of view had been to some extent prepared by the teaching of the Stoic philosophers, the more extreme of whom had taught a universal Ethics, and by the asceticism of the Neo-Platonists.

of nationality and the old national systems were not dead, though slumbering ; and as the spirit of enquiry began to move again in Europe men's minds attained to a greater independence, became less subject to the influence of the awful sanctions wielded by the Church. Then the national systems began to assert themselves again, and a tremendous conflict began. The so-called wars of religion were incidents of the resistance offered by the national systems to complete absorption and destruction, of the endeavour to check and throw off the increasing dominance of the Church of Rome.

A contemporary historian has summarized the story in the following passage : " In a futile attempt to arrest the decay of religious ascendancy, the Papacy had sanctioned a system of persecution of the heretical adherents of the Reformation, more terrible than that suffered by the early Christians at the hands of the Romans. In the ferocity of the methods used, and in the number of victims resulting therefrom, it far distanced its earlier prototype. For a century and a half Europe was racked by internecine religious wars and persecutions, which spared no man, no land. Throughout the seventeenth century these convulsions continued. Civil wars in England, the Thirty Years' War in Germany, the Dragonnades in France, the Inquisition in Portugal and Spain, the massacres in Holland—all had as their apparent motive the suppression of Protestant heresy. In reality they were phases of a bloody struggle for the supremacy of a new

ideology. The latent forces of politics had pushed upward. Politics was about to supplant religion as the motive force of social life, and Politics prevailed. Politics left as much of the religious doctrine intact as did not interfere with its fundamental requirement of allegiance. The Church remained, but it became in theory the subservient tool of the State."<sup>1</sup>

What Mr. Wallace has here called "politics" was the spirit, the ethics, of nationality; and what he calls "religion" was the universal ethics of Christianity. The bloody conflict he describes was not, as he asserts, a struggle between religion and politics. For the sanctions of religion were invoked on both sides. It was a new phase of the struggle between the two ethical systems. And, in the struggle, the spirit of nationality, in order to meet on equal terms its great rival, in order to support its claims with religious sanctions no less strong than those of the Roman Church, devised and adopted the theory of the divine right of kings; for at that time kings were the symbols of the spirit of nationality. Thus the Reformation was essentially political and ethical rather than religious. It was the triumphant rejection by several of the national systems of the claim to dominance made by the Roman Church in the name of universal ethics.

The spirit of nationality, whose victory in the Reformation ushered in the modern period of

<sup>1</sup> W. K. Wallace, "The Trend of History," p. 8. N.Y., 1922.

European history, has continued to prevail more and more throughout Europe up to the present day; and, more than any other factor, it has shaped the history of the modern world.

The Great War was the culmination of this modern tendency. It was provoked by a nation in which the universal ethics had become completely subordinated to the ethics of nationality, in which the influence of Christian ethics had fallen so low that it failed to restrain and mitigate the boundless aspirations of an unbridled nationalism.

And the Great War has brought no solution of the problem, but rather has accentuated it everywhere. Everywhere, in private conduct and in national policy, we are confronted by the perplexities arising from our dual system of ethics, from the conflict between the claims of nationality and citizenship on the one hand and of the brotherhood of man upon the other.

This unresolved conflict is the essential ground of the present intolerable situation in Europe. France stands out as the embodiment of the spirit of nationality; and most of those who deprecate and condemn her present action are moved in some degree by the spirit of universal ethics. The perplexities of individuals arising from the same source are no less great than the perplexities of nations. The position of the conscientious objector during the Great War was but the clearest illustration of such personal perplexities and dilemmas.

The Boer War, waged by England at the close of



the nineteenth century, illustrated the same truth even more vividly. For, in that war, the British nation was acutely and almost evenly divided, between those who gave precedence to the national system and those whose opinion was moulded by the universal ethics of Christianity.

## LECTURE II

### OUR NEED OF SOME SYNTHESIS OF THE TWO SYSTEMS

**I**F we turn now to enquire, What has been the influence of the speculations of moral philosophers upon the ethical basis of European civilization during the Christian era? we see that, with few exceptions, they have thrown their influence on the side of the universal code. This has been true, not only of the great Christian moralists, but also of those who were not specifically Christian. The formula of Kant—"Treat no man as a means, but every man as an end in himself"; the formula of Bentham and the Utilitarians—"Act for the greatest good of the greatest number"; the formula of Schopenhauer, which acknowledges acts of loving kindness as the whole sum of moral action—all these are clearly universalist formulas. They take no account of the great fact of nationality; they ignore the obligations and duties that arise therefrom; they are formulas fitted only for a world that has passed beyond the need for civil government, for national defence, for patriotic self-sacrifice, for loyalty to fellow-citizens or fellow-tribesmen, and to national or tribal institutions. It is true that a few thinkers, notably Machiavelli,

Bodin, and Hobbes, have sought to justify and establish the principle of nationality. But they were regarded as political rather than as ethical philosophers; for the world had forgotten the lesson taught by Plato, that the principles of ethics and of politics are inseparable.

The modern world has produced one striking exception to the rule that the moral philosophers have thrown their influence on the side of the universal code, namely, the ethical system of which the philosopher Hegel was the great exponent. Here we have an ethical system propounded by philosophers which threw its whole weight against the universal ethics and on the side of the ethics of nationalism. It was essentially a worship of the State as the highest expression in our world of the Universal Mind or Reason. It taught that the State was that for the sake of which men exist; that each man is before all things a citizen; and that all his ethical obligations derive from his status as a citizen, a member of a larger whole apart from which he is of no value, and has no ethical rights or duties. According to the teachings of this system, a man's conduct is right or moral in so far as he obeys the State, serves it, promotes its welfare, plays a part as a faithful cog in the great machine; but, in so far as his acts may have no relation to the welfare of this larger whole, they are morally indifferent, without ethical significance. The Kantian doctrine is reversed; each man is no longer an end in himself, but solely a means to an

end, namely, the welfare of the State. This moral philosophy, being a revival and extreme development of the nationalist system of ethics<sup>1</sup> was eagerly accepted by the Prussian State, in which it took shape; and this State, having elaborated a very efficient system of public instruction, assiduously propagated this code so acceptable to its ambitions; until, after little more than half a century, the national ethics preponderated greatly in influence over the universal system.

We have witnessed and Europe has suffered the terrible effects that may be produced in the modern world by a system of strictly National Ethics, unsoftened, unrestrained by an admixture of Universal Ethics. The nation thus prompted and thus unrestrained broke loose like a wild beast within the community of Christian nations, slaughtering and destroying with a ruthlessness that shocked the rest of the western world and provoked it to combine in moral censure and armed resistance.

This episode of recent history has brought to the front, in public discussion and in private reflection, the great ethical problem that confronts the modern

<sup>1</sup> It was also a perversion of the national ethics, in so far as the State was regarded by it, not as identical with the nation, nor as the nation viewed in one of its several aspects, nor as the instrument of the nation, but as a metaphysical entity superior to and presiding over the people whose duty only was to obey and serve it. This was the earlier form of this philosophy of the State. Later exponents, notably Treitschke, identified the State with the nation; and the British Hegelians have done much to purge the system of this perverse and inhuman feature.

world. It has made obvious to all men the fact that the most urgent need of the present age is an adequate ethical system. It has shown that our civilization can no longer endure upon the dual ethical basis, an ethical hodge-podge of elements mixed from two conflicting and unreconciled systems. The conscience of mankind is profoundly disturbed. Western civilization is sick ; its condition is similar to that of the neurotic patient who is torn by conflicting and irreconcilable desires ; its moral energies are wastefully consumed by the internal conflict, instead of being devoted to profitable work that would carry our civilization onward to higher levels. The patient suffers from aboulia, or lack of will power, from various anæsthesias and amnesias, from paralysis, from bad dreams of calamities to come, and from a vague but acute distress. He sees no way of escape, no way in which his conflict may be resolved and his energies once more directed, in harmonious co-operation, towards some clearly envisaged goal. Just as the neurotic patient can be cured only by a complete readjustment of his moral basis, by frankly facing and analysing his problem, by going down to his moral foundations and laying them anew ; so also our civilization can be cured, not by any tinkering with symptoms, by moral exhortation, or by sporadic acts of charity to starving peoples, on however great a scale, but only by facing our moral problem, diagnosing its true nature, and thinking out a real solution of it.

The natural unthinking reaction of the earnest Christian or of any man of humane sentiments, in face of the distracted and deeply troubled world, is to denounce the ethics of nationalism as accursed, and to demand that it be wholly swept away to give immediate and undisputed sway to the universal ethics of Christianity. Such a man is apt to assert that, if only all men and all nations would follow strictly the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount, all would be well with the world. And, misled by the narrow teachings of the greater number of the moral philosophers, who, ignoring the claims of national ethics, have taught almost exclusively the principles of universal individualist ethics, the greater part of civilized mankind has learnt to regard the universal system as alone ethical or moral, and, while yet practising in various ways the principles of national ethics, never realizes that these also are moral principles that have their valid claim upon our allegiance.

The civilized man of to-day gives a theoretical allegiance to the universal system only ; but when the two systems conflict he follows in the main the principles of national ethics, justifying such practices, if he at all seeks to justify them, on the ground of urgent practical necessity. And so he repeatedly and constantly finds his practice inconsistent with his professed and consciously accepted ethical principles. And, in the practice of the national ethics under the plea of practical necessity, he lacks the guidance of any mature reflection upon

the ethical problems involved. Further, in the advocacy and execution of all national policies, he finds himself hampered, not only by the lack of such deliberately reasoned principles, but also by the fact that such policies are perpetually attacked and opposed by all those who, claiming to speak in the name of morality, urge against such policies the precepts of universal ethics, the only ethics officially recognized and taught as such among us.

Thus the citizen of any one of our modern nations finds himself involved in a situation which is both perplexing and demoralizing. He finds himself supporting national policies which are widely denounced as immoral and which are unmistakably opposed to the generally recognized principles of universal ethics. Yet his good sense forbids him to abandon or to oppose these policies ; though he cannot reconcile them with his ethical principles, the only ethical principles that he has been taught to recognize as such.

The earnest Christian who finds himself supporting his nation in war, and perhaps shouldering a rifle in the ranks, illustrates most strikingly this perplexity of the modern mind and this discrepancy between men's practice and their acknowledged ethical principles.

Let me point to some other similar perplexities which confront more especially the citizen of the United States of America. Shall America join the League of Nations ? Universal Ethics bids him

with no uncertain voice join the League without hesitation or reservation. But National Ethics says "No"; and in the main he obeys the latter, with an uneasy sense that, though he is acting wisely and patriotically, he is acting wrongly.

Again, hordes of semi-destitute people from Southern Europe and the Near East are clamouring for admission to the United States. Universal Ethics says unmistakably that they must be freely admitted; that the American citizen has no right to claim as his alone the immense economic resources of his land; that he must be prepared to share them equally with all comers; and that the more numerous and ignorant and poverty-stricken and barbarous these claimants may be the stronger is their claim to share in the economic and cultural advantages which he so copiously enjoys. Yet, in the main, the American citizen agrees to put up the bars and to narrow the gates, feeling that he is compelled by good sense to do what his ethical principles forbid.

A very similar problem confronts him on his western coast. The good sense of the inhabitants of California and of the other western coast-States prompts them strictly to forbid the entry and naturalization of any further thousands of the natives of Asia; and, while their eastern critics condemn them in the name of universal ethics, they stoutly maintain their position; though they may not know how to justify it in the court of ethics,



and cannot but feel uneasy and perplexed at finding themselves steadily set upon a course of action inconsistent with their own accepted moral principles.

Another illustration : the principles of universal ethics and their northern exponents in this country demand that the American negro shall be given social and political equality ; yet, though for sixty years the Federal law, determined by these principles and these exponents, has prescribed such equality, the good sense of the southern white man still steadily forbids him to obey these precepts and impels him in a course of conduct inconsistent with his acknowledged ethical principles.

I need hardly point out that the Englishman is confronted by similar perplexities of equal gravity and greater number. There is no citizen of the countries comprised under Western Civilization that is exempt from similar moral difficulties.

Yet one last illustration, which is perhaps more likely than the others I have cited to appeal directly to the academic mind. The principles of universal ethics demand that all citizens of this country shall enjoy equal opportunities and equal advantages of education. To go through the college and university, continuing academic studies up to the age of twenty-two or even twenty-five years, has undoubtedly proved to be a great advantage and opportunity to many of those who have taken such courses of prolonged study. It follows from the principles of universal ethics that the country must

accept, as its settled ideal and practical policy, the putting of every boy and girl through a college and university course. And this ideal, which results with logical necessity from the universal principles, is already widely proclaimed, and some steps have been made towards its realization.<sup>1</sup> Yet, although this programme is hitherto in practice on a very small scale only, we hear already on every hand the voice of good sense protesting against it, in the light of the experience gained in the last few years. Almost every day the attentive observer may note that some experienced educator raises his voice in protest. We are told broadly that too many people are going to college; that the universities are seriously overcrowded; that the machinery of higher education cannot cope with the flood; that university education is giving place to a quasi-mechanical process of instruction which bears an uncanny likeness to the process of fattening fowls by machinery. Or, more enlighteningly, we are told that a large proportion of the young people who are even now crowding the universities are not fitted to profit by university education, that they are not of the intellectual and moral calibre that must be presupposed in its clientele by any true university system.

Why, then, cannot we escape from our perplexities by courageously putting into practice the

<sup>1</sup> A similar claim is now finding voice within the Labour party in England. The claim includes, not only free access to all universities, but also entire material support of all university students by the State.

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officially and generally accepted principles of universal ethics ? <sup>1</sup>

The answer in brief is that the good sense which, in all the foregoing and in many other instances, finds itself opposed to the precepts of universal ethics is not, as so commonly alleged, the expression of mere selfishness and immorality. It is rather the expression of the rival ethics, the system of National Ethics, which, though now unformulated and unacknowledged by our moral philosophers, has nevertheless played an essential part in the progress of civilization and still has a very essential part to play in the future ; which in fact is required now, as never before in the history of the world, to exert a conservative influence, mitigating and correcting the principles of Universal Ethics.

This brief answer needs to be developed at some length. The verdicts of common sense or good sense, which, in the instances I have mentioned and in so many others, are directly opposed to the

<sup>1</sup> These principles may be defined concisely as the practice of a universal and strictly impartial philanthropy. The demands of such philanthropy are well stated by Prof. R. B. Perry in the following passage : " Though there may be no express hostility to the more developed cultural activities, nevertheless the motive of philanthropy is to bring up those who have fallen behind, *even if it be necessary to halt the vanguard* of human attainment. So long as there is a single human being starving, every other consideration is to be subordinated to getting that man fed [and, it might fairly be added, well clothed and educated]. It will be time to think of perfection—such is the feeling of the philanthropist—when those who are in deadly peril have been brought to a place of safety "—" The Present Conflict of Ideals."

precepts of universal ethics, need to be philosophically justified and defended against the host of critics who claim to speak in the name of morality. For so long as the champions of good sense are plausibly represented as striving for immoral ends or as using immoral means, their hands are weakened, their resolution is apt to be sicklied o'er with the pale cast of doubt, and their cause is in danger of defeat.

What I have to say is, then, in the first place a defence of some of these verdicts of good sense and an attempt to show that they are the verdicts of the neglected national ethics ; secondly, the demonstration that national ethics is a necessary moral complement of the universal ethics of Christianity ; thirdly, an attempt to harmonize, reconcile, or synthesize in some degree the principles of the two systems of ethics which hitherto have remained in open conflict.

Let us go back to the question of the humane man and the sincere Christian, who says, Why not solve our perplexities by boldly and strictly following the precepts of Christian Ethics, applying them to the solution, not only of our private personal problems, but also to all public and political problems ?

This demand, when it is translated into terms of political action, takes two principal alternative forms. And I do not know of any other form under which it could take political expression. The one form is the ideal of the philosophic anarchists, of

Tolstoi, of Kropotkin, and their fellows ; the ideal of a world that should need no government, because every man and woman would obey with perfect self-suppression and perfect wisdom the dictates of the universal ethics of human brotherhood. No doubt, if this revolution could be brought about, the state of the world would be improved. But the experience of nearly two thousand years shows that this demand and this hope cannot be fulfilled. They could be fulfilled only if human nature could be radically transformed, in a manner and degree that we know to be impossible. Human nature, the constitution which each of us inherits, the innate endowment of the species *Homo Sapiens*, is the product of a long, slow process of evolution ; this native basis can be changed only very slowly.

Our innate constitution is not, as John Locke said, and as the optimistic philosophers of the nineteenth century believed, a *tabula rasa*, a clean wax tablet, plastic to receive and to retain whatever form and impress may be given to it. If this doctrine were true, it would follow that we need only to improve the environment in order to transform the whole human race into perfect beings. This was the false philosophy upon which the hopes and the practices of the philanthropists of the nineteenth century were mainly founded.

Human nature, the innate constitution of the species, may more truly be likened to a palimpsest, a tablet that bears the deep and ineradicable impressions of the experience of the race—impressions

made during the millions of years in which the race struggled slowly and painfully upward from the intellectual and moral levels of our animal ancestry.<sup>1</sup>

The mass of mankind cannot be made into angels in the course of a few years, nor in the course of a few generations, by any natural process. We must cut our coat according to our cloth ; we must seek to develop such an ethical and political system as will effectively harmonize for social ends those energies of human nature that are common to the whole race of man, those ancient instinctive energies that are the very foundation of our being, the springs of all our activities. In short, the ideal of the Christian or philosophic anarchist, of Tolstoi or Kropotkin, the ideal that would do away with all government and all political institutions is, we know, an impossible one. Men need to be governed, need to be members of an organized polity, if they are to realize the best potentialities of their nature. Only by partaking in the life of an organized political community, held together by ancient, firmly rooted traditions, ethical and political, has man risen from savagery ; and only by further

<sup>1</sup> I am aware, of course, that at the present time a school of reactionary psychologists in this country is trying to persuade us that Locke's old doctrine of the *tabula rasa* is true. I cannot here set forth the overwhelming weight of evidence against this view. Nor need I refer you to my own published discussions of this topic. It suffices to appeal against this academic freak doctrine to the good sense and universal experience of mankind. The doctrine is a product of the cloistered academic mind, and, in its contemporary form, of minds cloistered in psychological laboratories.

development and improvement of his ethical traditions and political institutions can he hope to rise above the very modest level he has so far attained.<sup>1</sup>

A large part of mankind does live under the sway of the universal ethics of Buddhism; and though in some regions, as in China and Tibet, this universal system does not reign alone, but, as with Christian ethics in Europe, is modified by some infusion of national ethics, there are regions in which such modification is but slight; there we may observe the influence of the universal system as exercised in relative purity. Such a region is Burma. And we may fairly turn to Burma to learn what consequences may be expected from such undisputed sway of universal ethics. What, then, is the spectacle presented by the people of Burma? In many respects it is attractive. It has been asserted that the Burmese are the happiest people in the world. They are mild-mannered and gentle, mutually tolerant and forbearing, and singularly free from the more violent vices and crimes, as befits the followers of Buddha. But against this we have to set off their indolence and their intellectual sloth, which have kept the whole people in a condition of stagnation, preventing the development of their civilization beyond a rudimentary level in the spheres of art and literature, and forbidding even the rudiments of scientific culture; so that gross superstition abounds, and the people

<sup>1</sup> The reader to whom this truth is not a truism may find a reasoned exposition of it in "The Group Mind."

remains without power to protect itself against the major accidents of nature and the hostility of other peoples. Contemplating such a people we may well be tempted to exclaim with the poet—  
“Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay!”

The second prescription, widely advocated and less remote, perhaps, from the realities of life than the anarchic ideal, is that of a Cosmopolitan government, under whose mild rule all national frontiers and national governments should be swept away and mankind should settle down as one happy family to live peacefully for evermore.

By a strange confusion of thought this ideal is often spoken of and advocated as Internationalism. This implies, I say, a strange and puerile confusion of thought, a gross failure to distinguish between two very different systems or ideals, the Cosmopolitan and the International ideals. For surely it needs no deep reflection to discern the difference between these two ideals. There can be no Internationalism, that is, no settled regime of friendly rivalry and considerate dealing between nations, when all national boundaries shall have been swept away, when nations shall have been abolished and national governments shall have abdicated in favour of one universal parliament of mankind.

This ideal of a Cosmopolitan government superseding the functions of national governments and embracing in one great nation all the peoples of the



world, is perhaps, unlike the anarchic ideal, not impossible of realization. It even seems possible that, if Germany had achieved the success towards which she came so near in the late war, if, let us say, Marshal Foch had died of measles when a child or had been killed by a stray shell in the early stages of the war, then the cosmopolitan system might have been established and might be even now in pretty good running-order.

But, though it may be a possible system, we have to face the question, Is it a desirable system? Would mankind flourish under any such system, bringing forth the highest and finest fruits of human endeavour?

I have attempted to give a reasoned answer to that question in my "Group Mind." And I may repeat here very concisely the conclusion to which that investigation led me. The answer is No—mankind could not continue to flourish and progress under such a cosmopolitan system. In spite of all the drawbacks and dangers inevitably involved in the existence of nations and the flourishing of the spirit of nationality—drawbacks and dangers that are obvious to the meanest intelligence—nations are necessary institutions; for the following reasons:

1. Man is a social being; he cannot live and thrive alone; and he can be induced to work consistently for the good of his fellow-men, and in harmonious co-operation with them, only by participation in the life of an enduring organized group

—a group that has a long history in which he may take pride and an indefinitely long future on which he may fix his larger hopes. Identification of the individual with such a group is the only way in which the mass of mankind can be brought to live consistently on a plane of altruistic effort and public-spirited endeavour, observing high standards of social conduct such as must be accepted and must prevail in any community, if it is to flourish on a high plane, if it is to maintain and develop a culture worthy in any sense to be called civilization.

2. Only a group that is completely individualized and self-contained can effectively subdue and turn to the higher uses of social life the egoistic impulses of men in general. Only such a group can find a place and a function for the talents and ambitions of every man who is born into it, making each individual a member of its vital organization; only such a group can give scope and effective stimulus to all the potentialities of each of its members. Any group less than the nation, any such group as a professional or trade association, or a league of socialists or reformers of any kind, even if it be world-wide in its scope, is incapable of doing for its members what the nation can and in various degrees does do for its citizens, in the way of raising their lives above the animal plane of self-seeking or of merely family altruism.

3. The universal, world-wide, or cosmopolitan State cannot replace the nations in the performance of these elevating functions of nationality, for two

good reasons. First, such a cosmopolitan group would be too vast and too heterogeneous to call effectively into play the social potentialities of men in general; men cannot effectively conceive so vast a group, cannot envisage its needs, cannot trace in imagination the effects upon its life of their own efforts and their own sacrifices; they cannot sympathetically share the desires and emotions, the joys and sorrows, of so vast a multitude, most of whom live under conditions which they cannot even remotely imagine, have needs which they cannot understand, and aspirations which they cannot share.

Secondly, even if all this were possible, there would remain a different and equally fatal weakness inherent in the cosmopolitan system. Just as individuals need the stimulus of example, of emulation, and of contact with a variety of types, if their highest powers are to be evoked, so nations and all other groups require similar stimulus; they need the appeal of emulation to evoke their best efforts. And civilization as a whole requires, if it is to progress, the variety of social and political experiment, the varied specializations of collective function and effort, which can be provided only by the rivalry of a number of nations, each developing, under its own peculiar conditions and in accordance with its peculiar racial genius, its own unique, historical process.

In addition to these inherent weaknesses, any cosmopolitan system that might replace the nations,

if it were organized upon any principle that could claim to be democratic in any appreciable sense or degree, would suffer a fatal weakness from its mere size. We know now, from the experience of the last century, how great are the difficulties of representative democracy, even when adopted as the working politics of the most stable and experienced nations ; how difficult it is to secure any effective voice to minorities ; how easily abuses and distortions of the political process arise, and how difficult it is to rectify them when once they have become established. All these difficulties would be magnified immensely under the cosmopolitan system. Such a system could be maintained only as an autocracy ; and that, as we know, would offer not the feeblest guarantees, not the faintest prospect, of continued and harmonious development.

The foregoing paragraphs are a highly condensed statement of the argument for Nationalism, and for the sentiment of patriotism or national loyalty, as essential conditions of the good life for the masses of mankind. It is fashionable, among those intellectuals who claim for themselves a monopoly of enlightened liberalism and humane sentiment, to decry patriotism as a barbarous survival which, whatever excuse or justification it may have had in the past, can now and in the future work only harm to mankind. This belittling of patriotism is one of the stock features of the repertoire of the Cosmopolitan in his attacks upon Nationalism. But the more the influence of religion

wanes, the more urgently and obviously do we need the influences of enlightened patriotism and of group loyalties of every sort.

If one had to attempt to compare religion with patriotism as influences making for morality throughout the history of mankind, I, for one, should not hesitate to give patriotism the higher place. Fortunately, throughout the development of European civilization, with its dual system of ethics, the dominance of sentiment over logic, so natural to the mass of mankind, has permitted these two great sources of moral effort, religion and patriotism, to co-operate in large measure, in spite of the logical incompatibility of patriotism with the universal ethics.

In order to realize the immensely beneficial influence of patriotism in this *mélange* of religion and patriotism, we have only to turn to the history of a country saturated with religion but devoid of patriotism. Such a country (I speak of the past, not of the present and very recent past) is India. Let us hear what a great critic has to say of this matter. Mr. William Archer, pondering the problems of India's future in the light of its past, writes as follows, in a book which has never been surpassed, I think never equalled, for clarity of vision and humane wisdom on this baffling topic: "It is not through religion alone that morality can be raised to the temperature at which it passes into our blood and nerve—into the very fibre of our being. All that is needed is to kindle a senti-

ment . . . of loyalty to something higher than our own personal or family interests—‘ something, not ourselves, that makes for ’ or rather demands, ‘ righteousness.’ ”<sup>1</sup> He then writes of “ patriotism as an inspiring principle ” as follows : “ Where are we to find in India this ‘ something not ourselves ’ ? To appeal to the Indian masses on the ground of world-citizenship—of their participation in the onward march of humanity—would be so premature that the suggestion sounds ironic. But may not the necessary stimulus be found in that very idea of India, of the Motherland, which a timorous or merely selfish policy would have us proscribe as seditious ? . . . the loyalty of the Indian school-boy of the near future should be encouraged to attach itself, not merely to his caste or sect, but to his country. Whether we like it or not, this is what will happen—nay, is happening in certain parts of India. It seems to me that the only true wisdom for the Government is to recognize that the inevitable is also the desirable, and to seek in patriotism that reinforcement of character which is falsely declared to be the peculiar property of religion. ‘ Bande Mataram ’ should no longer be the watchword of sedition, but should be accepted as the inspiring principle of a great effort of national regeneration. It should be the motto, not only of the schoolroom, but of the secretariat.”

These are wise words. India illustrates most forcibly the fact that, where nationalism does not

<sup>1</sup> “ India and the Future.”

exist, or is but feeble, it is necessary to develop it, in order to render a people capable of self-government, to inspire in them the spirit of public service, of devotion to a community wider than the family. The difference between the recent histories of Japan and China has been in the main determined by the fact that the sentiment of patriotism has long been cultivated in Japan much more effectively than in China. In consequence, while the one people seems to be on the road which will lead it to the highest place among the nations, as a leader in civilization and international morality, the other, remaining inert and helpless in all dealings with the outer world and a prey to civil war and to internal disorders of all kinds, is threatened with universal decay.

Nationalism, then, is a great force, the greatest force in the modern world; and, like other great forces, it is capable of doing much good or much harm, according as it is directed wisely or unwisely. Love of one's country, or patriotism, does not necessarily involve or tend to generate chauvinism, the hatred of other nations; though the two utterly unlike sentiments are often confused through lack of precision of thought and language. It must be admitted also that much of current nationalism is rooted in chauvinism as well as in patriotism. When humanitarians, cosmopolitans, and anarchists denounce nationalism they have in mind, no doubt, that kind of nationalism in which chauvinism plays a prominent part. But their crusade against nationalism is unwise, not only

because nationalism (founded in patriotism) is the greatest of forces capable of elevating the masses of mankind, but also because, as all history shows, no such crusade has the faintest prospect of success. In the face of this tremendous and world-wide moral force it is the part of wisdom, not to attempt to oppose or to eradicate it, but to guide it to noble ends, and to purify, with sympathetic understanding, the sentiment of patriotism which should be, and is, its main root and stem.

A system of universal ethics, expressing itself either as a universal anarchy or as a single cosmo-

<sup>1</sup> George Eliot, with that wonderful wisdom which repeatedly evokes our admiration, stated the essence of this matter in the following lines :—

“ An individual man, to be harmoniously great, must belong to a nation. . . . A common humanity is not yet enough to feed the rich blood of various activity which makes a complete man. The time is not come for cosmopolitanism to be highly virtuous, any more than for communism to suffice for social energy. I am not bound to feel for a Chinaman as I feel for my fellow-countryman : I am not bound to demoralize him with opium, not to compel him to my will by destroying or plundering the fruits of his labours on the alleged ground that he is not cosmopolitan enough, and not to insult him for his want of my tailoring and religion, when he appears as a peaceable visitor on the London pavement. It is admirable in a Briton with a good purpose to learn Chinese, but it would not be a proof of fine intellect in him to taste Chinese poetry in the original more than he tastes the poetry of his own tongue. Affection, intelligence, duty, radiate from a centre, and nature has decided that for us English folk that centre can be neither China nor Peru. Most of us feel this unreflectingly ; for the affectation of undervaluing everything native, and being too fine for one's own country, belongs only to a few minds of no dangerous leverage. What is wanting is, that we should recognize a corresponding attachment to nationality as legitimate in every other people, and understand that its absence is a privation of the greatest good.”



politan world-embracing State, is then not a tenable ideal, not an ideal that can reasonably be made the goal of our endeavour. For, as we have seen, it would, if it were realized under either form, fail to develop or maintain a civilization under which human nature would flourish and put forth its best fruits, realize its potentialities to the full. Under either form, civilization would stagnate; because men would lack conditions essential to the realization of their highest potentialities, both moral and intellectual.

It may be added that not only would either system prove very unsatisfactory, if it could be established, because unsuited to bring out the best that is in human nature, but also human nature is such as to offer immense, perhaps insuperable, difficulties to the perpetuation of any such system. Man is so constituted that he inevitably develops attachments to those of his fellows who are nearest to him, who most resemble him in their customs, their ways of thinking and feeling; with them he finds himself in sympathy and strongly desires to be in sympathy. He prefers their company to that of men less like himself; he is prejudiced in their favour as against all other men; he understands their point of view, because he sympathizes with them. In other words, men in general are incapable of that strict impartiality which the universal ethics requires of them. It is only a rare individual here and there who achieves a truly universal or cosmopolitan attitude; and he generally

achieves his impartiality, not by extending his warmer sympathies to all men, but rather by withdrawing from all more intimate relations and becoming equally indifferent to all men with great loss to his own moral nature and development.

The immense force and wide spread of the spirit of nationality in the modern world illustrate this fundamental trait of human nature. For its rise has coincided with the great improvements in means of communication which have multiplied a thousand-fold the contacts between men of different races and nations. And this multiplication of contacts, instead of destroying or weakening the barriers of nationality, the "prejudices" of race, the partiality of men for their own kind, has but accentuated these things, fostered their growth, intensified their influences throughout the world; until now these national partialities, these national prejudices and preferences rooted in national sentiments, have become the most powerful political forces of the modern world and, more than any other factors—more even than the immense economic forces of the industrial age—have shaped the history of the Western world throughout the last century. The operation of these "irrational" forces has falsified again and again the economic interpretation of history, and is accountable for the fact that the prophecies of the economists have generally been so wide of the mark.<sup>1</sup> Against these

<sup>1</sup> The prophecies of economists made before the Great War in respect to the possibilities of European war are only the most

"irrational" forces the exhortations of the moralists, the lessons of the historians, the prescriptions of the economists, have battled in vain. Human nature has continued to clasp to its bosom its "Great Illusion" and to be governed by its "irrational prejudices." How, then, in face of this leading feature of the history of the modern world, can we rationally hope that a still greater freedom of intercourse and multiplicity of contacts should reverse the tendency to increasing strength of the national spirit? It remains true in general that the more we know of other peoples the more we prefer our own.

striking illustration of the fact, among many others. It was generally asserted by them that a European war was fast becoming impossible or "unthinkable," or that, if it broke out, it could not last more than a few months; because of the economic chaos that must ensue, and the economic exhaustion of the nations at war. If men had continued to be governed in the same degree as in peace by strictly economic motives, these prophecies would have been justified. But the economists had failed to take into their calculations the all-important fact that, on the outbreak of war, the balance of motives sustaining the activities of men would be at once profoundly altered. In vast numbers of men, the economic motive, so dominant in peace, fell to a very subordinate position, and capitalists, professional men, artisans, and labourers alike were dominated (with, of course, many exceptions) by patriotic and other war-sustaining motives. Viscount Milner writes: "The general conviction certainly was, and it was strongest on the part of men versed in economic studies, that, if nothing else brought the war to an early close, the impossibility of financing it must do so. In view of the enormous costliness of modern warfare, it was argued, and reasonably argued, that no great civilized country could long endure the financial strain." And he cites other instances in which, as he says, "actual experience, in and after the war, has confounded even the best-reasoned economic anticipations."—"Questions of the Hour."

### LECTURE III

## THE INADEQUACY OF UNIVERSAL ETHICS TO THE NEEDS OF THE PRESENT AGE

**T**HE Anarchic and the Cosmopolitan ideals, then, are alike in that they both are compatible with a universal code, and more especially with the Christian code ; the formulation and advocacy of them have been mainly due to the promptings of Christian ethics.

Both these ideals, which demand for their realization the complete repudiation of national ethics, have, like the universal ethics out of which they spring, one very grave defect, not hitherto mentioned, which we must now consider at some length—namely, they assume that all men and all races of men are for all practical purposes essentially alike ; they accept literally as an axiomatic truth the dogma that “all men are created equal” ; and they interpret the dogma, not only in the sense that all existing men have equal claims upon their fellows for justice, for humane and considerate treatment, but also in the much more questionable sense that all men and all races of men are endowed in an equal degree with the same capacities and tendencies, that all alike have by nature the same potentialities. They assume that the immense

differences we observe between men and races of men are due only to differences in the degrees to which these identical native potentialities are realized ; these differences of degree of realization being in turn due to differences of circumstance and opportunity. The advocate of universal ethics, starting with this dogmatic assumption, and contemplating instances in which individuals have risen to lofty heights of moral and intellectual achievement, deduces from these premises the belief that all men are equally capable of attaining similar heights ; and he is apt to believe and to assert that only the prevalence of the spirit of nationality prevents the universal elevation of mankind to these same moral and intellectual levels. On this belief he founds his indictment of national ethics and his demand that it be wholly swept away in favour of the universal system.

The objections that, up to this point, I have raised against the universal system would all be valid, even though this basic assumption of the system were true. That is to say, even if it were literally true that all men are created equal, are endowed with exactly similar potentialities of moral and intellectual development, those difficulties and weaknesses which I have already pointed out would remain inherent in any universal or cosmopolitan system. My argument has been one of deduction from the nature of man as a social being, from those features which are common to men of all times and all races. In answer, it might be urged that,

in spite of those objections to any and every universal system, whether anarchic or cosmopolitan, some such system must be accepted as our ethical ideal—an ideal which should shape and govern all political endeavour. For, it may be argued, though the innate bases of human nature are relatively fixed and immutable, yet man is a rational being and is, during his long period of youth, very plastic, very susceptible to the moral influences about him—is, in fact, liable to be moulded by them to a degree which renders the innate factors of his constitution well-nigh negligible. In support of this contention, the universalist may point, with Benjamin Kidd, to the remarkable success of the German State in moulding, by the aid of the Hegelian philosophy, all its citizens to the moral (or a moral) pattern desired and designed by it. He may point also to the golden age of the Antonines, when all the many tribes and races within the Roman Empire dwelt peacefully and prosperously together.

Let us grant a considerable force to such arguments; let us admit that in the moral sphere man is very plastic, if only he be brought under the exclusive influence of a consistent and harmonious moral tradition; and that, therefore, if the universal system could once be established in undisputed sway, it might maintain itself for a considerable period.

We have now to enquire whether, granting this moral plasticity of men to be great enough to render possible a universal system, such a system would be the truly desirable or best.

The phase of the argument upon which we now enter aims to show that, even if the universal system of ethics could be established and maintained throughout the world, in either its anarchic or its cosmopolitan form, and even if the system so established should be found to add greatly to the happiness and prosperity of the mass of mankind, it still would not be one of which we could approve. If, under such a regime, the precepts common to all the universal ethical systems were faithfully observed by all men ; if we all obeyed strictly the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount ; if we all treated every man, not at all as means, but only as an end in himself ; if all of us always acted for the greatest good of the greatest number of our existing fellow-men ; still I say we should not have achieved a morality which our reason could approve. Our morality would be fatally defective. In other words, I wish to show that any and every strictly and purely universal ethical system holds up a false ideal.

Here let me admit that this demonstration rests upon an assumption which is by no means accepted by all moral philosophers, namely, the validity in ethics of the Utilitarian principle broadly and rightly conceived. Many of the moralists, perhaps the majority of them, have rejected the Utilitarian principle as the foundation of ethics. They have maintained that the precepts of ethics can and must be deduced from some a priori principle, some moral axiom or axioms, which in virtue of some

factor of our constitution, we are compelled to accept, or do naturally or supernaturally and inevitably accept. This alleged factor of our constitution has been very variously described, by some as "the moral sense," by others as "the conscience," by others as "Reason," and in various other ways too numerous to be mentioned here. In spite of these differences between the moral philosophers I speak of, they all have this one feature in common, namely, they repudiate the Utilitarian principle—that is to say, they repudiate the view that ethical precepts must be judged and evaluated in terms of the consequences which result from the practice of them. Few of the opponents of the Utilitarian principle have made this repudiation explicitly; they have not singled out for criticism and rejection this essential feature of Utilitarianism; rather they have avoided this essential feature and have indulged in elaborate criticism of the errors which, unfortunately, have been so generally mixed in with the Utilitarian principle by its exponents. For most of the exponents of the Utilitarian philosophy have followed its founder, Jeremy Bentham, in incorporating with it, in addition to its essential principle, two very serious errors.

Its essential principle is that ethical precepts must be judged in the light of the consequences which result from the practice of them. To this Bentham and his followers added, first, that the only consequences thus to be taken into account



are the increase or diminution of the quantity of human happiness; secondly, they added the hedonist error—the assertion that the motive of all human action is the desire to secure pleasure or to avoid pain. The Utilitarians of the strict school usually committed themselves to yet a third serious error, namely, they identified happiness with pleasure or a succession of pleasures. I have no space here to expound the enormity of this error and the great difference between happiness and pleasure. I must refer the reader to my discussion of this topic in, "Introduction to Social Psychology."

The critics of Utilitarianism, instead of examining its essential principle, have concentrated their attacks upon these two adventitious supplements, the second of which, as is now generally agreed, is simply a false though plausible assertion, while the former is a highly questionable presumption.

And, though so many moral philosophers have pretended to reject the Utilitarian principle, by far the greater number of these rejectors accept it implicitly and surreptitiously; for they discuss the nature of the Good or the highest Good, conceived as the goal of moral endeavour; and, in attempting to define the Good, they clearly are seeking to define that state of mankind which moral endeavour must strive to realize, they are seeking to define ethical conduct and ethical precepts in terms of their consequences for human life.

It is inconceivable that any sane man, however sophisticated, would approve ethical precepts of a

kind which must tend to the general degradation of human nature and to the destruction of civilization and of all higher culture. But just that must be the tendency of universal ethics, if strictly applied and generally practised, as I now proceed to show.

We may best ascertain the natural tendencies of any ethical system by imagining it to have attained to complete dominance over all rivals and to have exerted its influence to the fullest extent possible throughout a considerable period, say a century.

Let us, then, imagine a universal system to have been established and to have worked in the most harmonious and successful way throughout the world. All national boundaries and distinctions have been, we suppose, abolished, and, with them, all the irrational preferences and prejudices of race and nationality. With the abolition of nationality, war and the danger of war have been removed, and the world is profoundly at peace. All countries of the world are open equally to all men; and the precepts of universal ethics are universally applied and observed, under an anarchic order or a world-wide cosmopolitan government.

Let me first depict what seem to me the inevitable consequences of this state of affairs; and then seek to justify the picture by adducing the evidence provided by history, biology, and psychology. And the picture may with advantage be drawn on two scales, a larger and a smaller—the world scale and the local scale of a particular territory.

Consider, then, the large-scale consequences of the general practice of universal ethics during one century. The outstanding consequence, beside and beneath which all others would appear insignificant and subordinate, would be an immense multiplication of the peoples of the lower cultures. By the end of the century (unless in the meantime the whole apparatus of applied science and administration had broken down, bringing in consequence widespread disasters destructive of human life on a vast scale) the population of the world would have become at least three times as numerous as at present, rising to the neighbourhood of some five thousand millions.<sup>1</sup> And of these five thousand millions the great majority would be descended from the peoples now enjoying the more primitive forms of culture. The populations which have created, and which at the present time are the chief bearers of, scientific culture and administration would not have substantially increased; in all probability they would have actually diminished in number—if they still remained a distinguishable part of the whole. But they would not remain a distinguishable part.

This vast population would not be, as is the present population, very unevenly distributed over the surface of the world. Rather, freedom to

<sup>1</sup> This is a very modest estimate. It has recently been calculated that, if the present average rate of increase of population should continue for two centuries, the population of the world would at the end of that time be multiplied tenfold, that is to say, it would be about sixteen thousand millions.

emigrate or wander and the great facilities of transportation, characteristic of the modern age, would have distributed this population throughout the world, in a manner that would secure in each area a density of population proportioned to its natural resources and to its capacity for the support of human life. The great fertile spaces of the Americas, of Africa, and of Australia would be filled ; in all areas where reserves of water-power or of other great natural sources of energy are most accessible the population would be very dense ; and, in all these areas, the population would be the product of multiple race-crossings. People of the most diverse origins would have mingled together on terms of perfect social equality, separated by no prejudices of race or nation, by no barriers of castes or social classes. This means that intermarriage of the most diverse stocks would have taken place on a vast scale ; so that, after the lapse of a century of such mingled existence, miscegenation would be far advanced, or perhaps, completed ; and the remnant of the peoples that have built up our modern civilization would have been absorbed in the general mass, like a few drops of milk in a basin of coffee, leaving upon that mass hardly any recognizable trace of their racial qualities.

This forecast of the effects of a century of universal ethics, generally and literally obeyed, is based upon four assumptions ; they may be stated as follows : (1) Under the conditions of universal freedom and of political and social equality postu-

lated by the universal ethics, population would tend rapidly to distribute itself over the surface of the earth in the way suggested ; (2) peoples of lower cultures would multiply rapidly ; (3) while those of higher culture would not, but, rather, in all probability would dwindle rapidly in numbers ; (4) miscegenation would result. It is now my task to show that these four assumptions are well-founded.

1. We have only recently entered upon the era of extreme facility of human transportation on a large scale ; yet already we have good evidence of its effects in promoting vast migrations. Wherever no bars to migration into the less crowded areas have been raised, the people of the crowded areas have begun to swarm in ; and especially into such areas as are under administrations that effectively protect the weak against the strong. Already these modern facilities of transport have produced migrations far exceeding, in respect of numbers, anything recorded in the previous history of mankind. Consequently, in all such areas, in defiance of Universal Ethics, certain restrictions have already been imposed ; in some, as Australia, absolute restrictions ; in others, as in North America and South Africa, partial restrictions.

Against these barriers the crowded peoples are already protesting loudly, clamouring for their removal. Chinese and Japanese have shown the strongest tendency of this kind ; but the three hundred millions of India are not indifferent. They have shown their mobility and have begun to

swarm into Africa ; and they have been prevented from swarming into America and Australia only by severe and rigid exclusion laws. It seems safe to suppose that, if no such barriers had been raised North America and Australia and South and East Africa would already have been made the homes of many millions of Asiatics, both yellow and brown.

2. There can be no doubt that, where climatic conditions permitted (and that would be over most of the great areas mentioned) these immigrants, settling in millions in these favoured and relatively uncrowded regions, and augmented in numbers by a steady full stream of further immigration, would breed at a great rate. They would in the main retain the low standard of living and the high standard of laboriousness to which they have been inured through many centuries ; for their numbers would preclude all possibility of any rapid transformation of their standards. And, living under western administration, they would, so long as this was maintained, be protected more or less completely from the great checks by which, in all former ages and in all parts of the world, increase of population has been severely restrained, namely, war, pestilence, famine, abortion, and infanticide. For western administration, applied according to the principles of universal ethics, would abolish war and famine, would reduce the death-rate from disease to a minimum, would strictly prevent infanticide and abortion (the two greatest and most general causes of the restriction of population

among peoples of the lower culture),<sup>1</sup> and would make early marriage and the raising of large families relatively easy to all men.

India shows us clearly that the prime and chief effect of bringing such populations under western administration is to multiply them at a great rate. Such administration has been only partially and locally established in India, with increasing efficiency, throughout a period of hardly one century; yet already the effect has been to increase the population from one hundred millions to more than three hundred millions. Japan, during the brief period since the introduction of administration of the western type, has shown a similar tendency to very rapid increase of numbers. Java, under the excellent administration of the Dutch, illustrates the same fact; for Java, with nearly thirty-five millions, is now, after a century of such administration, one of the most densely populated regions of the earth.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cp. A. M. Carr-Saunders, "The Population Problem," Oxford, 1922.

<sup>2</sup> It is now made a ground of complaint in India and Japan, a complaint that threatens to grow louder and more urgent, that their populations are not allowed to emigrate freely to Africa, America, and other of the less crowded regions of the earth. Those who raise these complaints commonly claim that such emigration is needed to relieve the pressure of the remaining population upon the means of subsistence. But, so long as these peoples continue to breed at the "natural" rate, the largest conceivable emigration would not appreciably relieve the pressure in the home-countries or improve the lot of their inhabitants. I cite in this connexion the following passage from Mr. William Archer's eminently wise and sympathetic study of Indian conditions ("India and the Future," 1917): "There are—between Kashmir and Cape Comorin over three hundred million people. Suppose 4 per cent of them, or

3. The populations that have created and established among themselves Western administration and the arts of modern civilization would find them-

12,000,000, were to emigrate, what difference would that make to India? In a single decade (supposing no very grave calamity to intervene) the population would have risen at least to its former level. But 12,000,000 is very little short of the whole white population of South Africa, Australia, and Canada. Is it for a moment to be imagined that these countries would submit to having their whole policy, their conditions of life and course of development, altered by such a huge influx of an alien and unassimilable race? Of course, this is a flagrantly impossible contingency; but that only makes it all the clearer that no emigration which is practically conceivable would sensibly ameliorate Indian conditions. Any outflow that should be at all perceptible in India would mean, in other countries, an inflow amounting to a cataclysm. But suppose emigration on a large scale were possible—suppose, say, that a new India could be set apart in Africa, capable of absorbing a million immigrants a year for the next half century—would that be a real and permanent benefit to the Motherland? On the contrary, it would be a misfortune. It would indefinitely adjourn the day when India shall realize that life is to be valued by its quality, not by its quantity, and that a country which would be master of its fate must first be master of its instincts. Of course, this is a lesson that many other peoples are far from having taken to heart; but India has not even begun to learn it. She is still unquestioningly devoted to that religion of fecundity which she must one day modify unless she is prepared to conquer the world.

"Let it be clearly realized that this is no mere rhetorical phrase. The world, indeed is not yet overfilled; but the limits of possible expansion are being rapidly approached; and practically all desirable territory is staked-out by people who naturally propose to reserve it for development along the lines of their own racial tradition. It is quite certain that only by force of arms can this right of reservation be infringed; and its successful infringement, in a series of 'folk-wanderings,' would mean an elapse into chaos. . . . Sooner or later, at all events, the pinch must come, and India must learn that her salvation lies, not in numerical expansion, whether within or without her boundaries, but in the intensification and ennoblement of life." And Mr. Archer goes on to show how distinguished writers on Indian problems, as on so many other human problems, are led



selves in economic competition with this rapidly increasing horde of population of very much lower standards of living. And experience shows clearly how in the main such people would react to the situation. There would be, for the vast majority of them, a choice between two alternatives only : (a) to lower greatly their standard of living ; (b) to restrict their breeding very severely, to deny themselves the luxury of children save in very severely restricted numbers. That the latter would be the choice most commonly made we cannot doubt. It is consistent with all we know of human nature ; and in America we have had an impressive demonstration of this effect.<sup>1</sup> An educated, intelligent to make foolish and solemn statements by their neglect to grasp or consider the fundamental facts of population and the processes of procreation. Nine-tenths of the literature of politics and of social reform seem to be written by persons ignorant of the fact that every human being is born of a woman and begotten by a man. There is now no excuse for this ignorance. Let every social reformer begin his studies by reading Mr. Harold Cox's "The Problem of Population." This is no abstruse study, but a plain statement of the A B C of the matter. The impossibility of improving the lot of the peoples of India by emigration is redoubled or trebled when we reflect that China and Japan are similarly overcrowded areas.

<sup>1</sup> F. A. Walker ("Discussions in Economics and Statistics," New York, 1899) has shown that the tides of more recent immigration have produced this effect upon the older American stock in a very pronounced degree. The validity of General Walker's demonstration has been questioned. But, in a recent discussion of the question, Prof. H. P. Fairchild ("Immigration," p. 225) shows that a number of experts have confirmed it. He shows in fact that, although it may be impossible to make the reasoning which points to this conclusion convincing to the prejudiced and unintelligent reader, the conclusion is supported by a consensus of expert opinion. Prof. Fairchild goes so far as to maintain, in the light of all the available evidence, that "if

population that has attained to a high standard of living will not consent to the reduction of that standard; and it will not bring children into the world to live according to a reduced standard.<sup>1</sup>

immigration has not positively lessened our population, we may be certain that it has failed to increase it to any considerable extent. Its net result, so far as size of population is concerned, has been to substitute a very large foreign element from various sources for a native element which would otherwise have come into being." If this has been true of the immigration of the nineteenth century, or the "older immigration," it seems only too probable that it will prove true in still higher degree of the "new immigration." That is to say, that, unless some radical changes of law and custom should greatly alter the present trend of affairs, the population of the United States will, at the end of the present century, be one in which the blood of the old American stock (of predominantly Nordic race) will be hardly at all represented; it will be a population formed by the blending of descendants of South-eastern Europeans, and of Turks, Armenians, Negroes, Mexicans, etc.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that the presence of the negro population of the Southern States has had a similar effect, namely, has restricted the multiplication of the white stock, and that, if negroes had never been brought into North America, the country would have produced, in place of its ten or more millions of negroes, an approximately equal number of white people in addition to those now existing.

<sup>1</sup> Of European countries, France, whose people have for so many centuries led the vanguard of civilization, is already the scene of a strongly working tendency to substitution of population.

Mr. Sisley Huddleston, in a recent article ("Christian Science Monitor," August 4, 1923), writes of "the dwindling native population [of France], with the corresponding encouragement to immigration" as "one of the gravest problems which presents itself to France." "It is estimated," he says, "that 150,000 Polish workers are with their families in France. The other Slav countries have not yet sent many workers to France, but the inflow is beginning and it is easy to foresee that in a few years there will be at least 1,000,000 Slavs. . . . There are Greeks and Turks, Hungarians, and men of the Levant; there are scattered all over the country contingents of Italians." He says

If the immigration of some few millions of Europeans of slightly lower standards of living has had a profound effect of this kind in America, even before the end of the nineteenth century, can we doubt that, when confronted with a much larger number of immigrants with a much lower standard of living and a "natural" rate of increase, the American people (and others similarly situated) would exhibit the same phenomenon in a highly intensified degree?<sup>1</sup>

nothing of the contingent of coloured "Frenchmen"; but he writes: "While the native population remains unequal to the proper exploitation of the potential resources of France, it will be obligatory to recruit labour power from beyond the French frontiers." Even from his narrow economic standpoint (which leads him to use the word "obligatory" in the absurd way in which other economists speak of "economic laws" as something beyond the control of human will) he discerns a danger in this process. "The danger from the point of view of the French artisan is that these immigrants are generally subdued and amenable, and must tend, therefore, to reduce the whole standard of living which has been hardly won by the French trade unions." But he does not seem to be aware of the greater danger, namely, that the process is a vicious circle, that not only does the low birth-rate encourage immigration, but that also the swelling tide of immigration discourages the native birth-rate.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. C. R. Noyes, discussing this topic in a recent article ("The Weather Chart of Population," "Yale Review," July, 1923) writes: "The United States lie between these two areas of high pressure [Europe and Eastern Asia]. Here are found the greatest developed resources and the greatest industries in the world. Therefore this land is able, both through its agriculture and its industry, to support a larger population than any similar area. Yet we have but thirty-five people to the square mile. To be sure, it is this extraordinarily low ratio of people to means of subsistence which makes possible our comparatively high standard of living. On the other hand, this very standard is the attraction that makes our country the natural objective of all superfluous population. If we should resume our old

4. That miscegenation of the completest kind would result from these conditions, if they could be realized, it is impossible to doubt. Wherever different races have lived in the same area, cross-

policy of granting asylum to the oppressed of the earth, if we should again welcome immigrants to our shores as we have done in the past, it is certain that they would offer themselves at a rate hitherto unexampled. For never before in our history has there existed on other shores of both the Atlantic and the Pacific the dynamic pressure of population that is now beginning to make itself felt in Asia as well as in Europe. . . . In the United States it is not too late to forestall the process of overcrowding and to fix ourselves for centuries at that stage in which the whole people, retaining their soundness and sanity through the necessity for work, have, because of the sparseness of the population, the abundance of resources, the advanced state of the arts and the initial advantage of a relative equality of opportunity, a chance to combine the virtues of the aristocratic with those of the pioneer society. But population seeks its level, and only by building dikes on the Dutch pattern can we reclaim our lands from an inundation which would gradually obliterate the splendid foundations that have been laid for a social structure designed for 'the greatest good of the greatest number.' The barbarian invasion of ancient times has given place to the peaceful penetration of the low-class immigrant from an overcrowded land. But the cause and the effect are the same, though the manner is different. And the danger is that to-day this flow can take place almost unnoticed. No force is required. No vandal armies precede the host. There is no apparent threat in these docile steerage passengers. For the same improvements in transportation which have consolidated the societies of the world into one have removed the friction in the way of movements of masses of men. The barriers are down and the channels are wide. . . . From these various considerations bearing upon the social and economic interests of the American people, and in furtherance of a full realization of the possibilities of an exceptional natural opportunity, it seems high time to establish the principle of the exclusion of further immigration as a national doctrine. The 'melting-pot' already holds all it can well digest for some time to come; and in the face of the threatening influx the present temporary and half-way measures should be replaced by uncompromising and permanent restriction."

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breeding has occurred to a considerable extent ; it has occurred even where race prejudice has been strong and where severe social and legal bars have been placed upon intermarriage of the races. How then should it not take place very freely where many different races would be closely intermingled, where all social and legal bars to intermarriage would be removed, and where the prevalent ethical sentiment would favour, rather than discourage, such intermarriage ?<sup>1</sup>

A century (or at most two centuries) of the sway of universal ethics, untempered by any remnant of national ethics, would result in the practical extinction of the white race in all of the two Americas, and in Africa, Australia, and Asia ; the dwindling remnant being absorbed wholly in the flood of coloured peoples.

It is probable that in Europe descendants of the present populations would survive for a longer period ; but there also they would be but a dwindling remnant. The absence of unoccupied lands and the existing density of population would retard the

<sup>1</sup> The extent to which cross-breeding has taken place and still is going on between the negro and the white races in the United States cannot be stated with any precision ; estimates differ widely. It seems to be widely assumed in the north that the process came to an end with slavery. On the other hand, a number of coloured correspondents have assured me that it is still going on rapidly , and they, perhaps, are in a better position for the formation of opinion on this question than most white can be. It seems obvious that the recent rapid migration of coloured people into the northern States which seems likely to continue, must tend to accelerate greatly the process of cross-breeding.

influx of other races. But, even without any such influx, the peoples of Europe would feel severely the economic competition of untold millions of lower culture and lower standards of living, organized in vast industrial armies in all other parts of the world.<sup>1</sup> And the indirect competition of these masses would in all probability, have on their reproduction rate, the same effect as that exerted in other areas by the more direct competition of immigrants. England and Germany, for example, already populated far beyond the point at which they can maintain their standard of living without vast exportation of manufactured goods, would find as they are already finding, the world increasingly closed to their exports; just because the rest of the world would produce what it needed at a lower cost by reason of vast reserves of labour accustomed to low standards of living.

Lancashire is already feeling the competition of the cotton mills of India, China, and Japan, and is likely, under any regime, to find this competition increasingly severe. And, under the sway of the universal system, the process would be vastly accelerated; until the Lancashire weavers, and also the workers in many other industries who live largely by the export of their products, would not only lose their foreign markets but also find their

<sup>1</sup> In the way foretold by the late Charles Pearson in his "National Life and Characters" (1893), a book which in its day was very widely read. Pearson seems to have over-estimated the rate of the changes which he foretold, neglecting to give due weight to the counteracting influence of the spirit of nationalism.

home markets invaded by the products of labour of lower standards. And under the system whose results we are forecasting protective tariffs would be out of the question.

But, in the absence of all restrictions, the European area would not remain without its immigrants. In European countries there are many forms of labour that can be effectively undertaken by coolies from China, Japan, India, and Africa. Hitherto the prevalence of race-prejudice has served as a more or less effective check on such immigration. If this check were removed entirely, we should soon have a variegated population throughout Europe. Chinese laundrymen, Japanese gardeners and domestics, negro labourers, Indian road-sweepers, would be found everywhere. After no long time, the old European, like the present-day American, would scorn to undertake unskilled labour. He would increasingly confine himself to the white-collar occupations; his numbers would then dwindle, making room for still more immigrants. France is already giving an ill-considered encouragement to such immigration of negroes from her vast African dominions; and, having largely overcome her race prejudices, she seems likely to lead the European peoples along the primrose path of domestic comfort, miscegenation, and race-suicide.

The forecast which I have sketched of the inevitable results of the prevalence of the universal

ethics is, I think, well founded. It is not possible to forecast the results in detail or to foretell with accuracy the rate at which the forecasted changes would proceed. But that the tendency to such changes would be strong and would realize itself sooner or later seems to me an indisputable proposition.

What attitude, then, can the exponent of unmitigated universal ethics assume towards this tendency, which the general acceptance of his principles must bring into operation? If he is honest and consistent, and if he resolutely rejects the Utilitarian principle, he can only say: "My principles are right, and, being eternal principles, they must be followed regardless of consequences. What we have to do is to face and accept these consequences bravely, endeavouring to raise all mankind in the scale of civilization. We must strain every nerve to educate, to civilize, to spread our culture among all the peoples of the world, so that, when our stock disappears from the scene, all that is worthy of preservation, all that it has contributed of permanent value, our science, our art, our literature, our industrial skill, and our free political institutions, shall be preserved and, in the world-civilization which is to succeed us, shall be incorporated in the cosmopolitan State which is to supersede our petty nationalisms." Like Mr. H. G. Wells, he may sketch fanciful pictures (attractive perhaps to some minds) of a completely civilized, industrialized, and cosmopolitan world—a world in which swarms of variegated and parti-



coloured men and women pullulate in vast cities of steel and glass, cities provided with the most wonderful systems of free transportation, free education, free recreation, and free love. That is to say, he may indulge the dream that the civilized fraction of mankind is capable of leavening with its culture the whole of the human race, of assimilating it, even while that civilized fraction itself declines to the point of extinction ; so that, as it dwindles away, it may see its ethical and its political culture, its art and science and literature, carried onward and upward by the populations whom it has taught to appreciate their value.

This would be an idle dream indeed. It is not necessary for me to spend any time in arguing against the possibility of its realization. The experience of America, in its efforts to assimilate, to Americanize, a few millions from the south and east of Europe has been sufficiently illuminating. And there is more than sufficient reason to believe that, the more the immigrants are unlike the native stock in race and culture, the more difficult is the task of assimilation. If America had assimilated the bulk of the negroes who have dwelt within her borders for more than a century, making only one-tenth of her population, the hope of assimilating the whole world would still be fantastically vain.

When our optimistic exponents of universal ethics describe in glowing terms the future of our civilization, they presumably base their expectations, so far as they can be said to think at all, on

an amiable view of the relations between Europeans and the peoples of lower cultures which seems to have been widely entertained about the middle of the nineteenth century. Public attention had been drawn to certain striking instances, notably the Red Men of North America and the natives of Australia and Tasmania and of other islands of the Pacific, in which the aboriginal populations seemed to fade mysteriously away at contact with the white man. It was complacently assumed that this was the natural and inevitable fate of all the coloured peoples ; and that the duty of the white race towards them should consist merely in comforting the declining remnants of all such races, making their disappearance from the earth as little distressing as possible, and converting them first by missionary effort, so that, as they passed away, they might at least enjoy the consolations of Christianity.<sup>1</sup> But we know now that this was an ill-based anticipation. We know something of the causes of such disappearance of some of the peoples of lower culture ; and we know that many such peoples do not thus fade away. In fact, it seems probable that, if all of them had been treated from the first on the principles of universal ethics, all of these races would still be with us, and would have steadily increased in numbers under the fostering care of a paternal administration.

We cannot too clearly realize that one of the

<sup>1</sup> This complacent view, so characteristic of the Victorian age, is reflected, e.g., in the writings of the late Benjamin Kidd.

greatest achievements of our scientific civilization is the lowering of the death-rate by the conquest of various diseases, by the maintenance of an efficient public health service, by the spread of a knowledge of the elementary principles of hygiene, and by the prevention of famines due to local scarcity by use of modern means of transportation. These great agencies for the lowering of the death-rate have only recently come into world-wide operation. But their very partial application during the last century, in such an area as British India, has sufficed to treble the population of that area.

The maintenance of such services in an increasingly efficient manner has become a chief part of the white man's burden ; and the chief result of the bearing of that burden has been that the burden has become three times as heavy. Under the universal system of ethics, the efforts and resources of the whole world would inevitably and increasingly be absorbed in this gigantic task. By an immense and sustained effort, the cosmopolitan State might bring down the death-rate everywhere to the low level now obtaining in England or New England. The more successful the World-State might prove in maintaining in all regions an efficient administration of the western or scientific kind, the lower would be the death-rate, and the more the birth-rate would rise among the populations of the lower standards of living. A moderate degree of such success would ensure for them a rate of increase that would far surpass every rate hitherto

realized. We might hope to achieve a universal death-rate of 10 per 1,000 ; and this might well go with a birth-rate of 50 per 1,000 (or more) among the populations of low standards of life. These populations would then double their numbers every twenty years or so ; and, so long as the burden was successfully carried, its weight would increase at this staggering rate.

The Universalist will admit that this would be an impossible state of affairs. But he will argue that, as the peoples of lower culture are brought more completely under the beneficent influences of Western administration, they will learn two things and, in so doing, profoundly modify the situation. First, he may say, they will learn to restrict their birth-rate ; as the peoples of Europe and North America have been learning to do during the last fifty years. Secondly, they will learn to carry their burden for themselves ; that is to say, they will be assimilated to that point at which they can effectively maintain for themselves the public services and the private standards of life which are the very framework and basis of modern civilization.

It may be admitted that these anticipations might be partially realized ; but only very partially. The probabilities require to be stated in terms of two different assumptions ; (a) the common Universalist assumption that all men are created equal ; (b) the assumption that men and the various races of men are unequally endowed with the qualities that render possible the attainment of a high standard of life.

Accepting for the moment the former assumption, let us consider the consequences. The population of the world would increase very rapidly ; and each part of it would increase the more rapidly the lower the standard of life it had attained. The population of the whole world would eventually adjust its birth-rate to the means of subsistence, and then would settle down to develop the higher culture. And, though this population would in the main be derived from the peoples which at present are lowest in the scale of culture, that result may be contemplated with equanimity, since (by the hypothesis) all men are equal and one man is as good as another. Only an irrational race prejudice could lead us to regret that the physical features of this population would be very different from those of the European type. If their souls glowed with the light of intellect and the warmth of a lofty morality, what more could be desired ? The dying out of the stocks which at present are the bearers of our civilization would merely mean that the establishment of a settled world-order of uniformly high civilization would be postponed for a few generations or, perhaps, for a few centuries.

But, even on the assumption that all men are created equal, this view would be unduly optimistic. As I pointed out in a previous lecture, human nature develops its higher potentialities only when men live as members of stable communities, cemented by strong moral and political traditions. The process that in this country is called " assimilation "

is the process of imparting such traditions to the immigrants. Does not American experience clearly prove that, even when the material to be assimilated is not very unlike the assimilators and in numbers does not exceed a small percentage of them, the process is slow and difficult.<sup>1</sup>

Under the conditions we have imagined the assimilation process would be very much more difficult than any that America has hitherto undertaken. For, all barriers to migration having been removed, North America would very soon contain many millions of immigrants of all colours and creeds, of the most diverse traditions, and of relatively low standards; and the same would be true of all the areas which at present are relatively uncrowded. And the difficulty of assimilation would have been very greatly increased; for the strongest of all aids to assimilation would have been destroyed in the process of denationalization required by the Universal Ethics. That strongest agency of assimilation is the spirit of nationality, the pride in America's institutions and in her past history, and the hope for her future as a mighty and beneficent power among the nations of the world: in short, pride and hope in all those fine things symbolized by the Stars and Stripes. All these emotions and sentiments, which are of the essence of nationality, are repugnant to the Universal Ethics and would have been destroyed at its bidding. The immigrant could no longer be moved by the

<sup>1</sup> Cp. A. Drachsler, "Assimilation and Immigration," and many similar studies.

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desire to become a true American, by pride in his citizenship in the greatest nation in the world, by aspiration to maintain and promote the greatness of his adopted country. He would be a citizen not of any one country, but of the Cosmopolitan State ; national pride, national aspiration, and national service would be merely memories of the dark and dreadful past, memories of that period in which we now live, perplexed and tormented by the conflict between the demands of our Universal Ethics and the claims of the Nation upon our loyalty to its traditions and its ideals.

### SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO LECTURE III

The extent of ignorance and blindness and the extreme diversity of opinions in respect of the most fundamental of all political and social problems, namely, the problems of population, are astonishing. They are due, no doubt, to the fact that any contact with these problems is apt to bring into play emotional tendencies that strongly distort or repress all intellectual activity in relation to them.

This influence is amusingly illustrated by the opinions expressed by contemporary writers on the work of Malthus. While many eminent authors contemptuously refer to his famous treatise on population as a tissue of exploded fallacies, others express the highest praise, regarding it as the beginning of all wisdom in Sociology. I have more sympathy with the latter than with the former. The truth seems to be that, while the forecasts

made or implied by Malthus have, up to the present time, been largely falsified by the incidence of new factors not foreseen by him, especially the exploitation of the earth's natural reserves of energy, nevertheless his fundamental assumptions hold good, and that, unless the physicists and synthetic chemists shall shortly put at our disposal vast new sources of energy and food, every civilized administration must become increasingly concerned with the principles taught by Malthus.

Another striking illustration of the extent and perversity of contemporary blindness to the rudimentary facts of human reproduction is the almost complete absence of any intelligent reference to them in the floods of printed matter concerning the relations of France with Germany. Many influential German writers have boldly affirmed that, since the German population continues to increase rapidly, Germany is entitled to overrun the territories of other peoples. This, in short, was the keynote of the justification offered for her outrageous outbreak of 1914 and of her demand for a place in the sun. And they have loudly asserted that the absence of any similar increase of the population of France marks her as a decadent nation and the natural prey of her eastern neighbour. The War has sufficiently refuted this last proposition. For it has shown the French to be the most vigorous and virile of all existing peoples. And this is what might properly have been expected in the light of any unprejudiced consideration of the facts. For,



while the other leading nations have, for some generations, been breeding chiefly from the lowest strata, the French, having adopted the small-family system throughout all the social strata, have avoided this source of national degeneration and have maintained the quality of their population. Hence the astonishing energy, resolution, and resistant power of the French in the Great War. During the War I had opportunities to observe in France large numbers of British and French troops and of German prisoners, and I was much impressed by the appearance of a more uniformly good standard of physique and mentality among the French soldiers, the relative absence among them of the poor specimens so common among the British and the Germans.

In spite of the lessons of the War, publicists of all degrees of eminence still seem inclined to follow the late Marquis of Salisbury in regarding the French as decadent, because they are too intelligent to produce a swarm of population for which they cannot provide without overrunning the territories of other peoples. There is also manifest a tendency to accept the claims still made in Germany on the ground of her continued increase of population. Germany, while professing inability to pay her just debts and complaining of the economic hardships suffered by her population, continues to indulge herself in the greatest and most expensive luxury that any people can enjoy, namely, a high birth-rate. It is, I think, substantially true to say that Germany deliberately brought on the Great War

by discouraging emigration and encouraging the increase of her home-population. Yet in the main the difference between the rates of increase of population in France and in Germany, during the later part of the nineteenth century, was due to the fact that nature had given Germany immense and rich coal fields and had denied them to France. Germany converted her coal into the twenty millions or more of citizens by which the population of Germany exceeds that of France. What Mr. William Archer says of India is true also of Germany: "She is still unquestioningly devoted to that religion of fecundity which she must one day modify unless she is prepared to conquer the world." When the Germans complain of their inability to pay their debts, they are in the position of the pauper debtor who points to his large and still increasing family as his excuse for his default. To all such complaints France may justly reply in the wise words addressed to India by Mr. Archer: "A country which would be master of its fate must first be master of its instincts." And, when Germany demands to be excused from the payment of her debts, France may well reply in the words with which the same author comments upon the proposal that India should seek in emigration relief for the congestion of her population: "It would merely postpone the facing of her population problem, which she must assuredly undertake before she can claim her due place among the civilized nations of the world."

## LECTURE IV

### FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF UNIVERSAL ETHICS

I HAVE tried to show you that, even on the most favourable assumption of human equality (the assumption that all men are potentially as good as the best, that every Hottentot, every dweller in the slums of Canton, of Madras, or of London, is by nature the equal of Washington and of Lincoln), the adoption of the universal system must quickly result in world-wide chaos; that, under any such system, civilization would everywhere give place to barbarism; that the whole world would fall into a condition comparable to that of Europe during the dark ages which followed the decay of the Roman Empire.

But the assumption that all men and all races are created equal is, as every one knows, a false assumption. The inequalities of natural endowment among men of the same race are too great to be denied by any sane and impartial person; although some journalists of the ultra-democratic and cosmopolitan tendency love to repeat Jefferson's glittering generality and to ridicule those who do not share their prejudices, denouncing as anti-democratic snobbery all recognition of the fact of

inequality. The recent application on a large scale of methods of mental measurement has merely made a little more definite our knowledge of the extent and distribution of these natural differences of mental endowment<sup>1</sup> among ourselves.

When we raise the same question in respect of the various branches of the human race we are on more difficult ground ; and we are on ground where the suggestion of differences of intrinsic value, or of level of natural endowment, arouses an even more violent opposition. It must be conceded that, so far as our knowledge goes, any existing people may be capable of producing individuals of the highest capacities of all kinds. But an impartial survey enables us to lay down with confidence the following propositions :—

1. Some races or peoples have been far more prolific than others in individuals that have displayed great capacities.

2. Some peoples have contributed far more than others to the development of culture ; and some have proved their capacity to sustain for a time a high level of civilization, while the capacity of other peoples to do so remains unproved.

3. Among all peoples is a considerable proportion of individuals who do not easily assimilate the higher culture, and who, therefore, do not and can not contribute to the maintenance and further

<sup>1</sup> Cp. especially "A Study of American Intelligence," by Carl Brigham, Princeton, 1922 ; and my "Is America Safe for Democracy ?" New York, 1921.

development of civilization, but rather require constant supervision and regulation, in order that they may be kept up to the standards of living required by civilization. And in some races or peoples the proportion of such individuals is very much higher than in others.

Now, experience shows that, when any people attains to, or is brought under, western administration and enters upon the strenuous tasks of civilization, all parts of the population share in considerable degree, if not equally, those benefits which result in the lowering of the death-rate ; and that, on the other hand, a differential birth-rate is apt very soon to appear. The less assimilable part of the population maintains a natural birth-rate ; while the part which most effectively assimilates the current culture, which achieves the higher standard of living, and which plays the chief part in the services essential to the maintenance of civilization, this part shows a restricted birth-rate, a birth-rate so restricted that, in spite of a low death-rate, it hardly keeps up its numbers from generation to generation.

This phenomenon of the differential birth-rate, making for the relative increase of the unassimilable, is already manifested among all the peoples of European civilization and gives just ground for grave concern as to their future. But if the universal system could be established throughout the world, the phenomenon would be manifested with very much greater intensity than it is by any existing people at the present time ; and it would

become world wide. For everywhere the people of higher standards would be confronted by the economic competition of great masses of the relatively unassimilable. And, at the same time, there would be removed the principal influences which hitherto have in some degree counteracted this tendency, namely, national pride, pride of race, and pride of family.

It seems certain, then, that the undisputed prevalence of the universal ethics would result in a rapid relative increase of the unassimilable of all races and peoples in all parts of the world ; and that the burden of administration would rapidly become too great to be borne. Intellectual and moral and material standards would decline, and civilization would soon give place to chaos.

There is yet another consideration which must be taken into account, although we have no certain knowledge to go upon : I mean the effects of miscegenation upon the qualities of mankind. We have seen that, under the universal system, widespread miscegenation would inevitably occur. We cannot confidently assert that this would be injurious to the qualities of the human race. Yet what knowledge we have makes this seem highly probable. In the absence of knowledge, we have to be guided by opinion. Almost all impartial observers are agreed that the crossing of two human stocks that are closely related may be expected to produce a stock not inferior in any way to the parent stocks, and indeed one likely to be superior to them in

the two important qualities of vigour and variability. But there is no less agreement in the more decided opinion that the crossing of widely unlike stocks is apt to produce a stock gravely inferior, even if the two parent stocks are of equal value.<sup>1</sup>

I lay no great stress on this consideration, since it remains possible (though improbable) that this ancient and widely held opinion is mistaken.<sup>2</sup>

The world-wide application of the principles of universal ethics would then greatly intensify a process which is already in operation in all civilized nations and which already gives occasion for the most serious concern, namely, the process of a dysgenically differential or adversely selective reproduction-rate. This process arrests the operation of natural selection, which, no matter how cruel it may have been in its effects upon individuals, has in the long run made for the improvement of the human race, for the increase of its intellectual capacities, and for the strengthening of the native tendencies that conduce to harmonious social life; and which also has weakened the tendencies that are incompatible with social welfare. And such a differential reproduction-rate not only arrests this

<sup>1</sup> In "Race or Mongrel," G. A. P. Schultz (Boston, 1908) brings together much evidence and reasoning of a somewhat loose nature in support of this ancient and widely held opinion. It has been confidently asserted by Herbert Spencer and expressed by such great democrats as President Eliot and Lord Bryce. Cp. also Reibmayr's "Inzucht und Vermischung beim Menschen."

<sup>2</sup> It is impossible to make exact allowance for the social handicap commonly suffered by mulattoes, Eurasians, and all such progeny of widely diverse stocks, the handicap resulting from their lack of full participation in one firm social tradition.

conserving and improving tendency of natural selection, but also it puts in its place a tendency of the reverse kind—a tendency that makes for the lowering of the average intellectual and moral endowment of the population of each civilized country; in this way it renders each of such populations less capable in each succeeding generation of producing men of exceptionally high moral and intellectual endowments, those individuals whose activities are the only source of all further progress in the intellectual and the moral spheres, and without whom the level of civilization that we have already achieved cannot be maintained.

I will indicate this process of dysgenic selective reproduction within the nation only very briefly, because I have dwelt upon it at some length elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> and because many other writers have expounded its dangers, showing how it constitutes a most serious threat to the future of any nation in which it obtains and persists.

The tendency to dysgenic reproduction seems to come into operation in some degree as an inevitable consequence of the attainment by any nation of a certain level of civilization. It seems to have been a main factor in the destruction of most of the great nations and great civilizations of the past. It constitutes for the nations of the modern world a peculiarly serious threat, just because among

<sup>1</sup> "Is America Safe for Democracy?" and "The Island of Eugenia, the Fantasy of a foolish Philosopher."—"Scribner's Magazine," October, 1921.



them the principles of Universal Ethics are obtaining a greater influence than they have ever had in earlier ages.

There are two main factors which bring about this dysgenic selective reproduction. The one we may call psychological. It operates in some degree in all ages and in all civilizations. The other is ethical ; it is a consequence of the sway of Universal Ethics, and is becoming increasingly powerful in the modern world.

The psychological factor is the exercise of intelligence in the regulation of marriage and reproduction. So long as men live on the plane of unreflecting obedience to custom, or, rather, so long as the instinctive promptings of men are regulated only or mainly by custom, and so long as the means of subsistence are ample, early marriage and unlimited procreation are the general customary rule of life.<sup>1</sup> But, as soon as culture develops and some part of the population begins to have leisure to reflect, this part begins to emancipate itself from the sway of instinct and of custom ; and unless the custom of early marriage and unlimited procreation is supported by the strong sanctions of a national religion and national ethics, one of the first effects of this emancipation is the exertion of intelligent control over the reproductive functions.

This intelligent control almost always aims at,

<sup>1</sup> The last condition has seldom been realized. We have seen an approximation to it in the United States of America in the colonial and early republican period.

and results in, a reduction of the labours and responsibilities of parenthood. Some men remain celibates, others marry late ; and those who marry are apt to restrict the size of the family, more or less severely. And this tendency sets in earliest and works most strongly in those who have attained to some degree of leisure and culture, that is to say among those that constitute the upper social strata. On the other hand, those who remain subject to the sway of instinct and custom continue to propagate themselves at a more natural rate, that is to say, a more rapid rate. Hence in each generation the bulk of the increase of population comes from the lower strata. And all the while, in any society not regulated by strict rules of caste, individuals of exceptional capacity keep rising in the social scale to establish themselves in the upper strata ; whereupon they and their descendants begin to exercise the intelligent control of reproduction that is the rule in these strata.

The ethical factor, the influence of a system of Universal Ethics, greatly accentuates this tendency. A well-organized society swayed by such ethics is concerned for the welfare of all its members. It takes measures to prevent the natural consequences of unrestricted reproduction in its lower strata. It institutes vast schemes of poor-relief, of charity, of education, of free medical and surgical treatment in free hospitals, and of care for the health of all members of the community ; bringing all the resources of modern science to its aid, it lowers

the death-rate throughout the population, and, especially, it lowers the rate of infant mortality. In thus abolishing the high rate of infant mortality in the lower strata of society it abolishes the one factor which, in earlier stages of social evolution, had counteracted in considerable degree the inequality of the birth-rates of the upper and lower strata, and so preserved in some measure the balance of numbers as between the upper and lower strata.<sup>1</sup>

Further, the influence of Universal Ethics works strongly to accentuate the dysgenic selective reproduction in two other ways.

The public services, which reduce the death-rate and facilitate for the lower strata the bearing and bringing up of large families, are very costly; they can be maintained only by very large expenditure, which in turn means heavy taxation; and, in accordance with the principle that taxation shall fall upon those best able to bear it (a principle of Universal Ethics), it falls mainly upon those classes which have raised themselves in the social scale. The lowest strata then bring up large families; and the upper strata in the main bear the expense, and, in consequence, restrict their own families the more severely.

<sup>1</sup> I know, of course, that in consequence of my plain statement of this fact, I shall be accused of advocating a high rate of infant mortality. I would ask that those of my readers who may feel moved to write to me, or to the Press, denouncing me on this account, should first make an effort to reflect a little more logically on what I have written.

The third way in which Universal Ethics contributes to accentuate the dysgenic selective reproduction has only in recent years begun to make itself strongly felt ; especially it has become very marked during and since the Great War. In all our modern nations, society is stratified ; it contains, not castes, but social strata which shade imperceptibly into one another. Individuals and families rise and fall freely in the social scale ; nevertheless the various strata have certain standards of living, standards of comfort, of refinement, and of culture, which the members of each stratum endeavour to preserve, to live up to. Within this whole range of social strata the broadest and most important distinction is that between the handworkers and the brainworkers. Thirty and even twenty years ago the distinction was fairly sharp—sharper perhaps in Europe than in America ; the strata of brainworkers made up the white-collar class, or middle classes. They were expected to have, and in the main did have, a higher standard of education, of refinement, and of culture than the handworkers. They were able to maintain this higher standard, because in the main they enjoyed a higher standard of remuneration. They endeavoured especially to secure for their children a fuller education than that with which the bulk of the handworkers were content. And they secured this fuller education for their children by expending a part of their earnings, upon it.

This class, in spite of all the criticism to which it has been subjected, was of high value to the nations. Since any boy, born in the handworking class, who showed more than average capacity, initiative, and energy, could rise into it, and since he was generally encouraged to strive to do so, it was constantly recruited by the pick of the handworking class. The average level of culture of this class was perhaps not very high ; yet it did interest itself in its self-culture, took a pride in keeping up its standards, and was a main support of all the intellectual life of the nation. Fifty years ago it was the predominating power in the political sphere. All this was true perhaps of Great Britain in higher degree than of any other country. Yet in America the class existed and comprised a large part of the old American stock.

If this middle class had used its power selfishly it could have preserved and increased it and maintained its privileges. But, under the influence of Universal Ethics, it has abdicated in favour of the more numerous handworking class. The principal incidents of this abdication were, in England, the successive extensions of the political franchise. In America the enfranchisement of all immigrants, upon their request, has played a similar leading part. But in a hundred other ways the middle class contributed to bring about the change which is now so far advanced, and which, as I said, constitutes the abdication of the middle class from its position of political power and the resignation of

its claims to standards of remuneration, refinement, and culture higher than those of the mass of handworkers. These many ways are all comprised under the general head of efforts to level up the standards of all classes—efforts which have been in large measure successful. A very important element in this process has been the moral and political support, given by the middle class to the handworking classes, in the establishment of trades unions and in all the other modes of combined action by means of which the latter have raised their standard of wages and of comfort.

The most striking result of all this activity is the effect upon the relative scales of remuneration of the two classes concerned. The wages of the handworking class have risen rapidly, inevitably producing for all classes a great rise in the cost of living. The salaries of the brainworking class have not risen proportionally; in many cases—perhaps the great majority—they have hardly risen appreciably. In consequence, the middle-class incomes are no longer superior to those of the handworking class; and in very many cases are far below them. The change is most striking when we compare the incomes of the higher strata of each of the two classes.

The higher ranks of handworkers command incomes far beyond the reach of most professional men, whose callings require long and costly education and special capacity. The average salary of ministers of religion in America is said to be

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"much less than \$1,000" <sup>1</sup>; and it has remained unchanged, while the cost of living has risen very greatly and the hand-labourer's wages have risen to a degree which, in spite of the increased price of commodities, gave him "an increase in purchasing power of over 35 per cent" <sup>2</sup> in 1922, as compared with his pre-war condition. Wages of job-pressmen were \$2,135 a year in 1921. The average wage paid by the United States Steel Corporation reached in 1919 the figure of \$1,905; that received by railway operatives reached \$1,505 for shortened hours of labour. But the wages of the higher strata of hand-labour, such as drivers of railway locomotives, came very near the \$5,000 mark. At the same time, full college professors were receiving salaries averaging about half that sum; medical practitioners who earned as much were few and far between; and ministers of religion earned an average salary of \$735. In the year 1919 plasterers were paid \$7.25 for an eight hour day, and first lieutenants in the army only \$6.97 a day. <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J. Corbin, "The Return of the Middle Class," p. 141. New York, 1922.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143.

<sup>3</sup> I take these figures from J. Corbin, *op. cit.*, p. 101. I have recently been informed by a young man, who has had only a few months' practice and training as a compositor, that he has earned as much as 180 dollars in eight days by operating a linotype machine. This is a rather better rate than the highest salaries paid to full professors in the greatest universities of the country.

While these pages are in the Press, the newspapers announce that the bricklayers of America have won their strike for a basic wage of twelve dollars a day. It is added that many of them are dissatisfied with this result, because they have been accustomed to earning eighteen dollars a day. It is announced at

A similar state of affairs obtained in England in the first years after the War, and still, in great measure, persists. Mr. C. F. G. Masterman (in "England after War") observes : "The municipality pays its scavengers and street cleaners substantially higher salaries than it pays to its elementary school-teachers. No unskilled trade unionist would be allowed for a day to accept the salary of an average clergyman or minister of religion. In the great newspaper offices, the linotype compositor who prints the paper can afford to despise the income of the journalist who writes the paper. The general decrease in the real income of the middle class has been accompanied by such a complete substitution of another class as to make the double indignity even harder to endure."

the same time that two bacteriologists have applied for admission to the school of bricklaying ; and that in New Hampshire two young men have claimed public assistance rather than accept a wage of six dollars a day, with board and lodging, for work in the hayfields. In comparing the wages of "white-collar" workers with those of handworkers, it should be borne in mind that the work of the latter is in very many, probably a great majority of, instances more healthy and enjoyable and less exacting than that of the former class. We hear much of the hardships of the manual workers ; and it seems to be the common assumption of social reformers that work is an evil, and that a prime aim of all social reform should be the reduction of the hours of daily labour to the smallest possible number. This is a fundamental fallacy. Few men can be reasonably happy without regular work that fills the greater part of each day. I have been assured by a very intelligent man, who has spent several years as a factory-worker, but who more recently has held a responsible "white-collar" position, that he looks back on his years of manual labour with regret, and that most of his fellow-workers in the factory enjoyed their hours of labour no less than he did.



Again : " The real income, with present prices, of the teaching community is a scandal and a shame to a civilized State. . . . What hope is there for the future of a nation which holds out to any careful parent twice the inducement to put his child into the career of coal portage rather than into the career of teaching ? " Mr. Masterman had not altogether refrained from the familiar supercilious criticism of the dwellers in Suburbia ; but it is a matter for congratulation that here at last is evidence that one man who has held an important government office is not completely blind to the most fundamental conditions of national welfare. Writing of the ridicule which has been the accustomed portion of the middle class, he says : " Four years of furious fighting has silenced that ridicule for ever. The London clerks, the ' pals ' battalions of the big towns, all ' middle class ' regiments, have been tested and found true in the ultimate experiences of human tenacity and courage. No class has more distinguished itself for resourcefulness, endurance, and determination in war. One may smile, perhaps, at the appeal to the Government to encourage propagation from ' respectable ' classes living on the margin of subsistence in the suburbs rather than from other more doubtfully ' respectable ' classes living on the margin of subsistence in the slums. Yet, broadly speaking, the children of the middle class once provided the richest inheritance of the community. Its increasing sterility, however necessary under present conditions, is causing a

substantial loss to the nation as well as a tragedy amongst individual lives. From these suburban centres the State should be able to draw continual supplies of fresh and vigorous young life. It does not do so . . . the 'only child' or 'only son,' which was before the war the sole luxury permitted to so many of those black-coated anchorites, has perished in the ultimate and fierce demands of war."

The facts cited in the foregoing paragraphs illustrate a general tendency and result of the unqualified acceptance of the extreme democratic principle dictated by Universal Ethics. The tendency is, by giving predominant political power to the handworkers, to produce a state of society in which the handworkers, their vastly preponderant numbers efficiently organized as a fighting machine, use this preponderant power for a single purpose, the raising of their wages and the diminution of their hours of work, treating the brainworkers, the bourgeoisie, as their natural enemies, whose work is of no value to the community and whose claims to the pursuit of happiness may justly be disregarded.

We have seen the principles of pure democracy carried to and beyond their limit by the Bolsheviks of Russia, in the wholesale slaughter of the brain-working class and the crushing of the remnant to the point of extreme misery. This is an instance in which the impetus of the movement prompted by the Universal Ethics has carried it beyond its natural logical goal. But, nevertheless, it exempli-

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fies the tendency and the logical and natural goal of the Universal Ethics, expressing itself politically in pure or unmitigated democracy, namely, the destruction of all those prerogatives which the brainworkers have enjoyed in every flourishing civilization, and which, I submit, are essential to such flourishing.

For consider the inevitable consequences of such deprivation, under two heads. First, in the past the brainworkers' prerogative of better pay and better social status has excited, in every member of the handworking class who was conscious of possessing more than ordinary capacities, the natural ambition to rise into the brainworking class, in order to secure the amenities, and especially the social consideration, enjoyed by that class. And this has secured to that class a constant stream of recruits consisting of the ablest members of the handworking class. Thus, so long as these prerogatives are maintained, society secures the maximum amount of effective brainwork from its most capable members. But, when these prerogatives are withdrawn, a main incentive to choose the more exacting life of the brainworker ceases to operate, and the indolence natural to the greater part of mankind will inevitably bring it about that the higher capacities of very many members of society will remain latent, undeveloped, virtually wasted.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We may expect that all our bacteriologists will become bricklayers.

In this connexion it is important to realize that the cultivation of superior intellectual capacities is the most profitable of all undertakings for the individual and for society; that the neglect to cultivate them is accordingly the most serious form of waste. This is true, even if we consider waste and wealth from the most narrow economic standpoint of material prosperity alone.

For the cultivation of intellect is the only field of industry in which the law of diminishing returns does not hold good. In this field indeed the law seems to be inverted, to be replaced by a law of increasing returns. Two children—two brothers, let us say—are born with unequal natural abilities. The one, B, is by nature or heredity endowed with average or ordinary intellectual capacity (i.e. potentiality of intellectual development); the other, A, with rather better capacities or intellectual potentiality. If both live in a pure democracy and both receive similar education and both remain handworkers, and especially if they work under a trade union system that forbids A to excel his brother in output of work, their careers will be very similar and the potential superiority of A will remain latent. Their friends may recognize that A is a little smarter than B, and allege perhaps that he might have done great things. On the other hand, if they live in a society that offers rewards to intellectual achievement, in the form of higher pay and greater social consideration, A may respond to these incentives. At an early age he becomes

ambitious to distinguish himself; he works hard at school, improving his capacities to the fullest degree and storing up knowledge and skill in the use of it; passing into college, he continues this process still more intensively. Then he enters upon a strenuous career in an intellectual profession that keeps his intellectual powers always on the strain, and brings constantly fresh gains of power and knowledge. In this way—if his constitution is so tough that he does not break down prematurely, as so many do—he takes his place in the ranks of the accomplished brainworkers, a man who, as a scientific worker, a judge, a physician, or a great teacher, performs services to society vastly out of proportion to the scant remuneration he earns. The potential difference between B and A, almost too small to be discernible to their fellows, has become the vast difference between an ordinary mind and a great intellect.<sup>1</sup>

Consider the second way in which the depression of the economic status of the brainworker proves costly to the nation. This second effect is already

<sup>1</sup> It is not sufficiently realized that a high civilization, with its demands for men of special capacity and training and its various departments of specialized instrumental knowledge and skill, differentiates men more widely than any more simple state of society can do, accentuating their natural differences of capacity by the processes of education. Education is not a levelling process; it is rather a differentiating process, as we see from the illustrative example in the text. This remains true even in America, where education has been organized on the assumption that all men are of equal native capacity, and where consequently, it fails to differentiate as fully as it should do, failing to develop to the highest degree the powers of those who are most highly gifted by nature.

strongly operative and is more serious than the former; for, while the former is merely wasteful, this second effect is positively destructive of the nation's most valuable assets, namely, the *strains* of superior ability comprised in the population.

Here we must consider a biological truth which is fatally incompatible with the principles and practice of ultra-democracy.<sup>1</sup> This truth is that, not the individual man or woman, but rather the family, is the true social unit: the family, not merely as it exists at any one moment of time, but as an organism that endures throughout an indefinite number of generations.

The family is the meeting-place of various hereditary strains; it is the means by which they are perpetuated and projected into the future. A nation, biologically regarded, is not a mere mass of co-existing individuals: it is rather a vast and enduring tissue or network of hereditary strains, complexly interwoven throughout the past and constantly becoming woven into fresh combinations. The strains or strands of this tissue are of unequal value; some are strong, some are weak in very various degrees. Of this network families are the nodal points, from which the living strands are projected in fresh combinations. Any strand, no

<sup>1</sup> In my lectures I used the expression "unmitigated democracy." This accurately describes the extreme form of democracy that recognizes no inequalities of natural endowment or of qualification for leadership. But the word "unmitigated" is liable to be regarded as dyslogistic and question-begging. I therefore use in place of it the term "ultra-democracy."

matter now strong, can maintain itself only a little while. If it does not, within the brief space of some forty years, enter by fertile marriage into "a new node or family, its career is finished for all time. At the nodal points the strains or threads of various values or strengths come into new combinations. Where strong threads are woven together a strong strand results; where weak threads are woven together feeble strands result. Where strong and weak come together the resulting strands are of various values, but on the whole are of intermediate strength.

In every society, in every nation, multitudes of these threads or strains fail to make contact at new nodes, and thus come to an end. Their place is taken by new strands formed at the nodes. Thus the texture of the whole fabric woven on the loom of time, although it is continuous through indefinite periods, is subject to change of quality. If, in each unit-period, in each generation, the strong and the weak threads, the threads of various values, make the nodal contacts in equal proportions, the strength of the fabric remains unchanged. If the stronger threads make the nodal contacts in greater proportion than the weaker, the fabric becomes stronger and stronger. If the stronger threads fail to make their contacts in equal proportion with the weaker ones the whole fabric deteriorates in strength and quality.

Such changes may take place very rapidly, as viewed in the long perspective of history. When

social conditions within a nation are such as to favour the nodal contacts of the stronger strains, we see the great periods of intense national activity and achievement, such as the great ages of Greece and Rome, the Elizabethan and the Victorian period in England, the post-revolutionary period of the United States of America. When conditions in any nation are favourable to the perpetuation of the weaker strains and unfavourable to that of the stronger, we see the periods of stagnation or decay.

Now the conditions we have been considering, as the inevitable outcome of ultra-democracy, are conditions of this latter kind. They are conditions unfavourable to the perpetuation of the stronger strains or threads. In other words, under those conditions the brainworking class, formed by the rise into it of the more capable strains of the handworking class through many generations, becomes relatively infertile ; within it, celibacy, late marriage, and the severely restricted family become the rule, while the fertility of the handworking class is encouraged, and maintains itself or actually increases.

Thus within the nation the principles of Universal Ethics, bringing about the regime of ultra-democracy, tend to produce on the small scale and are now actually producing within many, perhaps all, of the modern nations that deplorable effect which they tend to produce and are producing on the world-wide scale, namely, the progressive



supplanting of the stronger strains by the weaker, of the more finely constituted by the more grossly constituted.<sup>1</sup>

It is perhaps worth while to repeat the argument in brief in the following condensed form. The universal individualist ethics, carried to its logical conclusion, demands that the whole of mankind

<sup>1</sup> Russia is not the only country in which the middle class is being exterminated so rapidly that the process forces itself on the attention of every observer. Thus, Mr. Langdon Mitchell after a visit to Germany in 1922 writes ("Atlantic Monthly," April, 1923) of "one sinister phenomenon that impressed me most—the fall of the middle class. There was painful evidence of the decay of that class on all sides. . . . The professional class, which creates and sustains civilization, is being rapidly abolished. It needs no Trotzky or Radek to destroy it; the tyranny of circumstance suffices . . . the scholarship, science, medicine, and art of Central Europe are actually disappearing." And, he adds, the result must be that "the people that produced Luther, must necessarily perish as a creative force; that is, their civilization will cease to exist. But, civilization once rooted out and gone, cannot be wished back into being. There is a dream among men that it is not so. We think of Civilization as of the Earth or Air: it cannot conceivably suffer diminution, or be absent, but it must be recalled that modern science and its child, modern civilization, or progress, are not like the Roman state and culture, robust and enduring things, iron and granite, which only time and erosion can destroy: they are as frail as any weed, and yet more frail. For they depend on money; on a class of highly bred human animals with well-trained minds; on a degree of leisure in that class; and on a selfless enthusiasm. Let the educated men and women of a community become hewers of wood and drawers of water—all is over; the thing ends; you have a dark age."

Mr. John Corbin ("The Return of the Middle Class") has shown that the same process is going on more slowly and subtly in America. And in Great Britain, there is good reason to believe, the same influences are working towards the same end, only rather less effectively than in Germany. Cf. C. F. G. Masterman "England after the War," and "England?" by an Overseas Englishman.

form one society, without national boundaries and without racial distinctions. And it requires that this vast society shall be organized on the principles of communism. All men shall share equally in the fruits of the earth and in the products of human thought and human labour. Suppose this state of affairs to be established and maintained, every man practising faithfully the principles of strict communism and of brotherly love, always postponing his own claims and interests to those of his fellow-men. If we make this impossible supposition, we shall see that in this earthly paradise there would prevail a differential reproduction-rate.

The disciplined energies of all mankind being bent upon providing the material basis of universal comfort, on banishing disease and keeping down the death-rate to the minimum, and on providing pleasurable recreations for the masses, the masses would respond by raising their birth-rate to a natural maximum, and population would double itself everywhere every twenty years or less.

The more capable and energetic individuals, denied the incentives of family and national sentiment and of personal distinction, would cease to put forth the abundant energies and powers which vitalize our civilization and are the source of all wealth,<sup>1</sup> all culture, and all progress. And, especially, these individuals, looking into the

<sup>1</sup> I use "wealth" here in the literal sense as the opposite of "poverty."

future and seeing no prospect for themselves and their like beyond the perpetual struggle to maintain a reasonable standard of physical comfort for the ever-increasing hordes of population, as they press with increasing urgency upon the means of subsistence, the common stock of human resources, these individuals would be content to do their communistic duty and to pass away, without perpetuating their strains. The prevalence throughout a brief period of such differential reproduction would exterminate all higher aspirations; it would produce throughout the world a population that would spend all of its leisure jiggling to the jolly strains of jazz-bands, gazing at sensational trivial "movies," and applauding the heroes of the milder forms of gladiatorial combat. After a brief space of time the Fatty Arbuckles, the Charlie Chaplins, the Babe Ruths, and the Queens of the Musical Revue would reign supreme as the beneficent dispensers of the preferred pleasures of the populace.

Such would be the result of the universal practice of Universal Ethics. And the result would be the same even if science should shortly discover and put at our disposal immense new sources of energy (such as the internal energy of the atom), and should teach us to synthesize food from the elements or otherwise to produce it in unlimited quantities. Population could then multiply itself on the earth many times. The theoretical limit of population would be far away in the future. For all practical

purposes we might regard the number of mankind as subject to no limit ; yet even then, I say, swift decadence would be the inevitable result of Universal Ethics ruthlessly applied.

But we have no guarantee that any such discoveries can be made. They are, in fact, highly improbable. And, if they are beyond our power to achieve, we have to reckon with the continued sway of the most fundamental law of human life, namely, that the multiplication of every community and of the whole population of the world always has been and always will be limited by the supply of the means of subsistence, or, broadly, by the available supply of food and energy.

Until the opening of the nineteenth century the population of the various regions of the earth had remained stationary for long ages, or had on the whole very slowly increased, with more rapid increases and decreases of purely local and temporary character. Then came the discovery of the means of tapping and harnessing the great reserves of stored energy, first coal and then oil. This, by vastly facilitating mechanical transportation, brought all the surface of the earth within easy reach and so extended greatly the sources of food-supply. In consequence, population multiplied as it had never done before and as, in all probability, it never can do again.

We are nearing the close of this great period of rapid multiplication, based on the intensive mechanical exploitation of the earth's reserves of

energy and of fertile soil. During that period we have become accustomed to the altogether abnormal and unique condition of almost unlimited multiplication of the human race. We have come to assume that such rapid multiplication is the normal or natural state of affairs, and that it will and must continue indefinitely. But that is a gross error. We are, as I said, nearing the close of that great and unique period. Mankind has now to return and to adjust its customs to something like the old order of things, namely, an approximately stationary population. Once more, as throughout the ages preceding the nineteenth century, the enormous potential fecundity of mankind must be severely limited.<sup>1</sup>

The natural fecundity or multiplication-rate has been approached by any population only here and there, under the most favourable conditions and for brief periods, as in the colonial days of America. Let us clearly understand this fact—its realization would mean that every woman would bear and rear on the average at least ten children. The exercise of the reproductive function has, then, to be very severely limited ; and it will be so limited through the long ages that stretch before us. The practice of Universal Ethics would mean that everywhere the function would be exercised chiefly by the most primitive, the least civilized, the least cultured, the least assimilable members of every community,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Prof. E. M. East's "Mankind at the Crossroads," a book which shows how near we live to the margin of subsistence.

and that everywhere the higher types of mankind would exercise increasingly, in one way or another, a severe self-restraint in respect of this function.

The prevalence of that state of affairs throughout a brief period would suffice to destroy all the institutions, undermine all the traditions, and degrade all the moral, intellectual, and æsthetic standards of our civilization.

It may be said there is little danger that the precepts of Universal Ethics shall be generally acted upon. I reply that, even though not generally acted upon, their acceptance as the sole acknowledged moral basis of our civilization constitutes a very serious danger, and that, in so far as they influence the conduct of men, they must tend to produce the deplorable results I have indicated; further, that they have already exerted a very considerable effect of this kind.

Thus on the large world-wide scale, as on the smaller national scale, the principles of Universal Ethics, when they begin effectively to control the relations of peoples and the social relations and conditions within the nations, inevitably make for the deterioration both of the living fabric, which is the human race, and of the spiritual fabric, which is civilization. They threaten thus to bring to an end the progress of mankind. And the progress of civilization is threatened not merely with stagnation upon the mediocre level already achieved. It is only too probable that, with the slowing down of all higher forms of activity and the acceptance of

progressively lower standards in all the works of taste and intellect, the ascending process must be converted into one of actual retrocession and decay.

This is a gloomy picture. But I have not drawn it as a forecast of what must inevitably happen. I say it expresses a tendency which will more and more realize itself, if we do not boldly think through the moral problem confronting our civilization and achieve the needed synthesis of National with Universal Ethics.

## LECTURE V

### A SYNTHESIS OF NATIONAL WITH UNIVERSAL ETHICS IS THE NEED OF OUR TIME

I HAVE sketched very briefly the argument which shows that the principles of Universal Ethics are in themselves inadequate to secure the higher interests of mankind, and that they must, if strictly applied, prove fatal to those interests. I believe my reasoning is capable of being substantiated in detail and at length, such as I cannot attempt in this brief course of lectures. I must be content to have demonstrated that the present conditions of the world and especially two factors, the immensely increased facility of transportation and the control of the death-rate, force upon our consideration problems and probabilities that were entirely beyond the ken of earlier ages.

The moral philosophers have envisaged their problems without considering the immense complication introduced by the tendencies of population we have briefly considered. In the main, the vision of each has been restricted to his own people. This is most obviously true of those who have taught a national ethics ; but it has been hardly less true of those who have taught a universal



system. The fact was amusingly illustrated by the great Greek philosophers, who, though they claimed to seek ethical principles of universal validity, yet failed to take into their ethical purview even the slaves that dwelt among them and the barbarians that pressed upon their frontiers.

In the main the vision of modern philosophers has been hardly more wide-ranging. The few exponents of National Ethics have had in view the citizens of their own State. Fichte and Hegel, for example, conceived their moral philosophy on behalf of the Prussian State and for the guidance or control of the citizens of that State.

The modern exponents of Universal Ethics have professed to lay down the principles of conduct for all men ; but they have been content to assume that the men they knew most familiarly, the best of their fellow-citizens, were a fair sample of all mankind ; and they have neglected to consider the consequences for the world in general of the universal practice of their principles. But I am not the first to discern the tendency of the Universal Ethics, though I am endeavouring to define it more broadly and explicitly than has been done before. Others have discerned this essential incompatibility between Universal Ethics and human progress ; and it has filled them with something like consternation or despair. I will refer to only one thinker as illustrating this effect.<sup>1</sup> T. H. Huxley devoted the best

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy may, I think, be said to be his reaction to the perception of the destructive tendency of

part of his life to the study and exposition of the principles of biological evolution. In his old age he turned to ponder problems of human destiny ; then he glimpsed the great antagonism I speak of. And in his famous Romanes Lecture he set forth in eloquent and impressive language this disharmony (as it seemed to him) between " Evolution and Ethics."

Huxley, like many others since the publication of " The Origin of Species," saw that the ethical restraints of civilization tend to reduce to a minimum the operation of natural selection upon the human race ; and, since he believed that natural selection alone had evolved the higher qualities of the race and was essential for their continued maintenance, he spoke of an inevitable opposition between the ethical and the cosmic processes. He wrote : " I have termed this evolution of the feelings out of which the primitive bonds of human society are so largely forged, into the organized and personified sympathy we call conscience, the ethical process. So far as it tends to make any human society more efficient in the struggle for existence with the state of nature, or with other societies, it works in harmonious contrast with the cosmic process. But it is none the less true that, since law and morals are restraints upon the struggle for existence between men in society, the ethical process is in opposition to the principle of the Universal Ethics. In the violence of his reaction he poured out the child with the bath-water and preached an ethics that was neither national nor universal, but purely individual and aristocratic.

cosmic process, and tends to the suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in that struggle.

"It is further to be observed that, just as the self-assertion, necessary to the maintenance of society against the state of nature, will destroy that society if it is allowed free operation within; so the self-restraint, the essence of the ethical process, which is no less an essential condition of the existence of every polity, may, by excess, become ruinous to it."<sup>1</sup>

And, writing of the logical consequence of Universal Ethics, he said: "It is desirable to recognize the fact that these consequences are incompatible with the existence of a civil state, under any circumstances of this world which have obtained, or, so far as one can see, are likely to come to pass."<sup>2</sup>

In view of this opposition between the cosmic process of evolution and the ethical process of increasingly effective self-restraint, he despaired of bringing "the course of evolution into harmony with even the elementary requirements of the ethical ideal of the just and the good."<sup>3</sup> And he wrote: "Thus, brought before the tribunal of ethics, the cosmos might well seem to stand condemned." And again: "Cosmic nature is no school of virtue, but the head-quarters of the enemy of ethical nature," and "the cosmos works through the lower nature of man, not for righteousness, but against it."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Collected Essays," by T. H. Huxley, Vol. IX, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., p. 32. <sup>3</sup> Op. cit., p. 58. <sup>4</sup> Op. cit., p. 76.

“By the Tiber, as by the Ganges, ethical man admits that the cosmos is too strong for him ; and, destroying every bond which ties him to it, by ascetic discipline, he seeks salvation in absolute renunciation. Modern thought is making a fresh start from the base whence Indian and Greek philosophy set out ; and, the human mind being very much what it was five-and-twenty centuries ago, there is no ground for wonder if it presents indications of a tendency to move along the old lines to the same results.”<sup>1</sup>

Huxley concluded by saying : “Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.”

This is, as he said, “an audacious proposal” ; and, if we have to accept Huxley’s view that the ethical and the cosmic processes are necessarily and for ever in conflict, and that we are compelled by our ethical principles to combat the cosmic process, then I am afraid the combat must be for us a hopelessly unequal struggle in which we shall be worsted ; then, in truth, it remains only to choose between the pessimistic resignation of the stoic and the pietistic resignation of the mystic ascetic who looks to a world we know not of to offset the incurable evils of the world we know.

I venture to suggest that Huxley’s conclusion is not well founded ; that it can be bettered. If the ethical process is, as Huxley held and as I

<sup>1</sup> Op cit., p. 78.

hold, an outcome of the cosmic process, how can the two processes be essentially in conflict? And if the former undertake to combat its progenitor, how can it hope for success?

May it not be that this conflict between the ethical and the cosmic processes is a false appearance, an illusion produced by a false conception of the ethical process, by inadequate conception of ethical principles. Throughout his discussion Huxley assumed that the ethical process is necessarily governed by the principles of Universal Ethics. He never paused to consider whether the principles of National Ethics may not also have a certain validity, and whether, by recognizing such validity, we may not achieve ethical principles by aid of which we may reconcile the ethical process with the cosmic process of evolution. That we may hope to do this is the essential suggestion I wish to make. I suggest that our task, as moral agents, is, not to enter into futile, hopeless combat against the cosmic process, but rather to revise our conception of the ethical process and to achieve ethical principles which will enable us, while co-operating with the cosmic process, to guide it, modify it, moralize it, and at the same time accelerate it.

If we are right in believing that the cosmic process has slowly evolved the intellectual and moral nature of man as its highest product, Huxley's proposal to combat that process is not only audacious, it is also in the last degree rash and unwise, or, in short, unethical.

When in 1893 I first read Huxley's famous Romanes Lecture in the pages of the London "Times" on the morrow of its delivery, I received a severe moral shock, followed by a profound depression. From that shock and depression I have never wholly recovered. These present lectures are my delayed reaction to the shock; in them I am endeavouring to work my way out of the pessimistic impasse in which, as it seemed, Huxley's lecture left us.

I begin, then, the constructive section of these lectures by insisting that it is the essential nature and function of Mind to exert a progressively intelligent, foresighted, purposeful guidance upon the seemingly blind mechanical processes of the material world, including those processes of natural selection which seem to have played so great a part hitherto in fashioning the nature and destiny of mankind.

If Mind has this power of guidance, it may hope to guide, though it may not effectively combat, the cosmic process. For it follows that man's moral nature is not a principle alien to the cosmic process; his conscience is not an unnatural power that impels him for all time to fight a hopeless and losing battle against the forces of Nature. That is a view of morality to which we are led, if we start out with any intuitive theory of moral conduct, if we repudiate the Utilitarian principle.

For, if we reject the Utilitarian principle, believing that our moral ideal is fixed for us by some

supernatural moral organ or faculty, and that we cannot modify our notions of what is right and wrong in the light of experience of the consequences of conduct, then our moral ideal must be static, incapable of development or evolution; and we naturally are condemned to follow the universal and individualist ethics.

The immediate prompting of our nature leads us directly to approve such precepts as the universal systems have set forth—that we always turn the other cheek to the smiter; that we always and everywhere subordinate our own welfare, and that of those nearest us, to the welfare of those who are further from us;<sup>1</sup> that we regard all men as created equal and as of equal value; that every man shall be treated only as an end in himself and never as a means; that all men have an equal claim to an equal share of all that is worth having. And, if it can be clearly shown, as I have endeavoured to show you in the foregoing lectures, that any such system, literally carried into universal practice, must quickly bring civilization to an end and plunge mankind back into depths of barbaric disorder, with consequent vast suffering to many

<sup>1</sup> The reader may question this statement, but it is, I believe, generally true of persons of rare and extreme generosity. Such persons identify themselves so closely with those to whom they are personally attached that they include them in their sphere of self-sacrifice, or rather tend to postpone the interest of these loved ones, together with their own, to those of the stranger without the gates. And this tendency though it rarely, if ever, determines the actions of most of us, does I believe, work obscurely in many men and in more women.

millions, still the principles of intuitive morals require us to continue on this destructive path, heroically practising the accepted principles, while we witness and share in the chaos they are producing ; they require us, as Huxley said, to continue what we (falsely) conceive to be the ethical endeavour hopelessly to combat the cosmic process. Or, alternatively, we might regard ourselves as condemned to a merely stoical contemplation of the cosmic process, as determinist philosophers would have us believe. But if we were, in fact, compelled by logic or philosophy to accept the determinist view of the cosmic process, a lofty scorn for its inanities, such as Mr. B. Russell proposes to us,<sup>1</sup> would be for most of us but a poor and ineffective antidote to the distress which the contemplation of it must engender.

On the other hand, if we recognize the truth that we are part of the cosmic process, not passively enduring parts, but rather the growing points of the evolutionary process, the parts in which the creative energy of Life and Mind finds its fullest expression—parts in which intelligent purpose is beginning to take a vastly wider scope than it has done in the past—then we see that it is our highest task, not to define some statical ethical formula, fixed for all time by some unnatural or supernatural principle, and to deduce from it the rules of conduct, but rather to discover, by the aid of all our vast and increasing stores of knowledge, how

<sup>1</sup> "A Free Man's Religion."



we best may co-operate in the cosmic process, so guiding it as to carry to yet higher levels that highest product of evolution, the cultured life of well-organized societies—societies in which alone human nature can realize its higher potentialities.

If we find that what we have assumed to be the essential principles of ethics must lead the human race to disaster and degradation, our duty is, not to exclaim "*fiat justitia, ruat cælum*," but rather to re-examine our ethical assumptions in the light of the consequences to which they lead, and, if necessary, to revise and amend them according to the Utilitarian principle.

In making this revision we have to assume a responsibility which moral philosophers have never yet recognized.<sup>1</sup> They have been content to take Man for granted, to accept human nature as a fixed quality, and to reason about, and to legislate for, the standard moral man ; as the economists of the last century reasoned about a standard economic man. The new task, the new responsibility, of scientific ethics is to decide, not only how men should act, but also what they should be ; to determine, not only how human nature, being what it is, should conduct itself, but also what kind of human nature is most desirable, what type of man is to prevail increasingly in numbers throughout the earth : in short, ethics can no longer be content to seek and to formulate the ideal of conduct for human nature as it is ; it must also assume

<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche and Spencer were partial exceptions.

the responsibility of formulating an ideal of human nature as it may come to be.

The first step towards the new ethical synthesis must be the frank realization that Ethics cannot be divorced from Politics. Such divorce has been the fatal error of the philosophers who have taught the Universal Ethics. Yet some great thinkers have seen this truth. Long ago Plato embodied his principal ethical teaching in the book ("The Republic") in which he sketched the political organization of his ideal State, recognizing no separation between the principles of Ethics and of Politics. And in a later age, another great thinker, Edmund Burke, explicitly announced the same truth, declaring that "the principles of true politics are but those of morals enlarged."

Even if Ethics and Politics are regarded merely as sciences which enquire into the existing order of things, seeking to describe that order and to explain how it has come about, they cannot properly be treated as distinct and independent studies. And, when they are conceived as philosophy, as enquiries into what ought to be, rather than into what actually is and has been, then they are, or should be, intimate and inseparable aspects of one enquiry. For, when we set out to enquire—What is the true goal of human purpose and endeavour? we cannot treat of man as an individual merely. We see at once that our enquiry concerns, not the isolated individual man (that pale abstraction with which psychology has too exclusively dealt) but the con-

crete men and women whose lives are but a part of the life of an organic whole, the life of organized society, from participation in which the individual acquires whatever value or importance he may have. We see that the worth of his purposes, of his ideals, and of his efforts to realize them, must be judged with reference to their effects upon the life of Society. We see also that, in turn, political ideals must be evaluated with reference to their effects upon the lives of individual men now existing; and that, more importantly, they must be judged also with reference to the lives of the generations yet unborn, and especially with reference to the qualities of the men of those future generations.

We have, then, to ask, not only—How should men act and live? but also—What manner of man is best fitted to the best life? And we cannot answer these questions in any deeper sense, without asking also—How should Society be organized, in order that the best men may exist and realize the best life?

The separation of these two great questions, the ethical and the political, the attempt to answer either one without at the same time considering the other, has been the ground of the sterility of much ethical and political discussion. It is the fundamental error of the Universal Ethics, as well as of the extreme forms of National Ethics, such as the Machiavellian and the Hegelian. And this separation has prevented us from achieving the much-needed synthesis of National with Universal

Ethics, to replace the unstable and perplexing compromises which hitherto have served as the moral basis of our Western civilization.

Recognizing, then, that ethical and political principles and precepts are not eternal truths which we can discover by deduction from moral axioms of any kind, or by listening to the pronouncements of some mysterious supernatural voice or organ within us, some divinely implanted moral faculty, a "moral sense" or "conscience," but that they are rather means towards a goal; we must define that goal as clearly as possible, in order that we may choose, and may refine by critical examination, the ethico-political principles which will best further the progress of mankind towards that goal.

Surveying the various goals proposed by the utilitarian philosophers of the past, we find that two such goals claim our allegiance above all others, in virtue both of their intrinsic reasonableness and of the weight of philosophic opinion by which each is maintained. One is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," the greatest possible happiness of all human beings dwelling on the earth. The other is the development to the highest possible degree of the potential capacities of the human race, of the species *Homo Sapiens*, or, in other words, the finest possible flowering of all that we call human culture and the higher life of man.

The former is the goal proposed by those philosophers of the Utilitarian School who vitiated their

system by making the false doctrine of psychological hedonism a part of it. They are the group to whom the term "utilitarian" is commonly applied and who openly avow the utilitarian principles. Bentham was the most prominent and thorough exponent of the principles of this group. They may be called the pleasure-Utilitarians. Those who have proposed the other goal have not usually acknowledged the utilitarian principle. For they have been averse from being confounded with the pleasure-Utilitarians. And they have been accustomed to claim that the use of the term "higher," in their formulation of the goal of human endeavour, excludes them from the utilitarian class. And, in a similar way, it has often been asserted that J. S. Mill, in recognizing the distinction between what he called higher and lower pleasures, implicitly transcended the utilitarian principles. For it is said that the comparative valuation implied by the word "higher" is only to be achieved by means of an intuitive function, and that therefore any ethical system which recognizes higher and lower goals of action is essentially an intuitionist rather than a utilitarian system. This is merely a confusion that arises from bad psychology. Let us recognize, then, that both the "greatest happiness" principle and the "highest culture" principle are utilitarian in the broad and proper sense of the word ; and let us admit that they both have very strong claims for acceptance.

We have next to ask, Are these two principles

opposed to one another, as they have commonly been represented to be? May it not be possible to formulate our goal in a way which will reconcile and synthesize these two seemingly opposed ideals?

I suggest at once that such synthesis is possible and may be indicated in a single brief formula, namely, the highest happiness of the greatest number. But this formula requires further interpretation. The phrase "the greatest number" is ambiguous. Does it mean the greatest possible number of those living at the present moment and in the immediate future? Or does it mean "the greatest number" in the long run? That is to say, in formulating our goal or ideal, must we have regard only to our contemporaries and our immediate descendants? Or should we have regard also to the generations of the remote future? Clearly, the latter.<sup>1</sup> We cannot rationally approve of any

<sup>1</sup> It is the most serious ambiguity and defect of almost all statements of the utilitarian principle that they do not clearly formulate or attempt to answer this fundamental question. According as one or other answer be given to it, the utilitarian principle will dictate one or other of two widely different practical policies. This ambiguity may be illustrated by a recent statement of the utilitarian principle in which this essential question is almost, though not quite, explicitly recognized. Prof. R. B. Perry (in "The Present Conflict of Ideals") writes: "We may construe utilitarianism in the broad sense to mean that right conduct is the means to human happiness" (p. 493). Further he writes: "The merit of any social system is to be judged by the happiness which it creates. And a social system may as fairly be judged by the lot of men at the bottom as by the lot of men at the top. It is comparatively easy to devise a system that shall make some men happy, provided the majority may be sacrificed for the purpose. The great task of civilization is to achieve a happiness that may be generally shared, by which

system which would secure even the highest and greatest happiness of all existing human beings, if it were essentially unstable, if it were such as to destroy itself after a short time, giving place inevitably to some system under which the mass of mankind would be condemned to prolonged misery.

Mr. H. G. Wells, in the first and greatest of his imaginative stories,<sup>1</sup> has depicted for us a society which came near to realizing the ideal of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." But we all should agree that that society of jolly little people, who spent their lives in a perpetual round of innocent, graceful, and æsthetically pleasing activities, was gravely defective in two respects. The pleasure and the happiness of the people were relatively low in the scale ; and they were low in the scale just because they were the product of a social organization which provided no guarantee for their continuance, and gave no scope and no incentive to efforts for further development.

It is probable that if, owing to some miraculous change in human nature (such as Mr. Wells has described in "The Days of the Comet") a completely socialistic or communistic organization of the good of one man shall also balance the good of another" (p. 500). To this statement we need to add the following : It is comparatively easy to devise a system that shall make all men happy, provided that we are under no obligation to the future, that the system is required only to secure the happiness of the great majority of persons now living, and is not concerned to secure the further progress and diffusion of the higher forms of culture, nor even to provide against the universal stagnation and decay of civilization.

<sup>1</sup> "The Time Machine."

society throughout the world could be rapidly and completely established, we should see an approximation to the ideal of the greatest happiness of the greatest number of the then existing human beings.

But such a system would have the two fatal defects of Mr. Wells's society of little people. The happiness of the people would be on a relatively low level; and it would be on a low level largely because the system would inevitably be an unstable, degenerating system, one containing the seeds of its own ineffectiveness and rapid decay. It would be a degenerative rather than a stable and progressive system, for the biological and psychological reasons I have already indicated; and also for a reason which has been more generally recognized, namely, it would rapidly consume all the natural resources of the earth and exhaust all the stores of capital which men have accumulated and without which civilization cannot be maintained. In other words, under such a system, consumption would soon vastly outstrip production, and the common store of good things would steadily and rapidly diminish until, though all shared alike, the share of each would be a mere pittance.

It will be commonly agreed, then, that the ideal system must have regard to the remote, as well as to the immediate, future; that we cannot be content to say "eat, drink, and be happy; posterity has done nothing for us, let posterity look out for itself"; that we cannot approve of a system which would give good results now and in the near future,



if its remote results must be the decay and self-destruction of all that we call civilization.

We must therefore amend our formula by adding some sufficient recognition of the claims of future generations. It may then run as follows : Our goal must be the highest happiness of the greatest number enduring throughout an indefinitely prolonged future ; or, more briefly, *the enduring and highest happiness of the greatest number*.

And we must refuse to regard each man only as an end in himself ; we must regard him also as a means towards this goal. We must recognize, not only that each man can exercise by moral choice an intelligent direction upon his own development, but also that the human race can and must learn to exercise a similar intelligent direction of its own development, and, by doing so, progressively realize the ideal of human nature—that nature which is best suited to the attainment of the supreme ethical end, the enduring and highest happiness of the greatest number.

Accepting this as the goal of ethical endeavour, we see at once that political and social organizations are the all-important means towards the realization of this goal. We see also that, in judging the value of any actual or proposed organization of society, we must attach to its stability and to its cumulative effects over long periods of time at least as much importance as we assign to it in virtue of its immediate contribution to the happiness of the greatest number.

We shall find that this formula implies that synthesis of National with Universal Ethics which, as I have already shown reason to think, is the crying need of our time.

The Universal Ethics naturally tends to express itself politically as pure democracy, what I shall speak of as ultra-democracy. Assuming that all men are of equal value, in respect both of their claims and of their powers, and that they are to be treated only as ends in themselves and not at all as means to the flourishing of the State or nation and to the welfare of future generations, ultra-democracy demands that every man shall have an equal voice in the control of public affairs ; for it assumes that each man knows best what he wants and can best judge how to obtain what he wants. Hence the political formula of Universal Ethics is—to each adult one vote, or universal suffrage.

National Ethics, on the other hand, naturally tends to find political expression in an aristocratic organization of society. This for two reasons. First, regarding the welfare of the nation as of prime importance, because an essential condition of the higher happiness of future generations, it sees that all existing members of the nation must be treated in some considerable degree as means to this end ; and it recognizes that this end, the welfare of the nation as an organic unity that lives and moves among other similar organisms, can best be secured by placing the main responsibility for, and power of control over, the affairs of the nation in

a limited number of men specially qualified by training and by experience for the tasks of statesmanship.

Secondly, it recognizes that men are not equally endowed, but that some are by natural endowment much better qualified than others to undertake the duties of leadership and control in all public affairs. It holds that the principal purpose of political organization should be to secure that such individuals—those having the best natural endowment for the tasks of statesmanship—should be given the training, the experience, and the power that will enable them to control the destiny of the nation.

Politically, then, the synthesis of National with Universal Ethics will demand a synthesis of the aristocratic with the democratic principle.

Such synthesis is not impossible ; the democratic and the aristocratic principles are not incapable of being combined. History displays for our contemplation certain instances of nations that have achieved such synthesis in imperfect forms ; and these instances, imperfect as they were, were yet, of all political organizations that the world has known, the most successful in promoting progress towards the goal we have defined—the higher happiness of the greatest number enduring through an indefinitely long period.

I would cite, as the best among such instances, Greece in its great age, the Roman Republic, England in the middle of the nineteenth century,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> W. H. Lecky's deliberate judgment was that no country was ever better governed than England under the Whig aristocracy in the middle of the nineteenth century.

and America in the days of the founding of the Republic. In all these the synthesis of universal with national principles was only very imperfectly and partially realized; yet they remain as the high-water marks of human achievement, the times and places in which most progress was made towards the ultimate ethical goal.

## LECTURE VI

### SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS THE SYNTHESIS

LET us be clear about two facts. First, that the principle of ultra-democracy, although its advocates have always taken a high moral line, claiming for all men highly developed moral capacities, is yet founded upon a deep-lying distrust of human nature. It claims that every man should have an equal voice in the control of affairs, on the ground that no man can be trusted to act fairly towards his fellow-men, that every man who may hold power in his hands will use it unjustly, that he will not act ethically, striving only to realize the ethico-political ideal, but will rather act unjustly for his own advantage. That is a very grave indictment of human nature. If it were true, the outlook would indeed be dark. The principle of ultra-democracy, then, is a counsel of despair, rooted in a dark, pessimistic view of the potentialities of human nature. It is therefore natural that we commonly find, in the writings of its advocates, an illogical mixture of lofty moral pretensions and of cynical pessimism—a mixture that gives a tone of unreality and lack of good faith to so much of the writings of this school.

Secondly, let us be clear that the principles of

ultra-democracy have never yet been practised by any large and enduring community. All the modern nations that are organized more or less democratically have adopted some form of representative democracy. And representative democracy, as rightly conceived, and as conceived by the founders of this great Republic, does essentially imply and aim at the synthesis of democratic with aristocratic principles, which is the true political expression of the ethical synthesis I have indicated. For representative democracy, so conceived, aims at securing, as the representatives of the people, the men best qualified by capacity and experience to guide and control the affairs of the nation ; making of them, not mere delegates of their constituencies, but representatives responsible for exercising their own best judgment on all matters with which they are charged.

Thus the wisdom of statesmen has outrun the insight of moral philosophers ; practice, as in so many other fields, has preceded theory ; political institutions have been shaped in accordance with a moral philosophy that has not yet been formulated. For representative democracy implies, as its ethical basis, that synthesis of National with Universal Ethics which we have found to be the ethical basis necessary to our civilization.

The practical man, in face of this fact, is likely to ask, If we already have the right sort of political institutions, why trouble about the theoretical or philosophical basis ? To this the answer is that

the influence of Universal Ethics, explicitly accepted as the basis of democracy, has inevitably tended strongly to subvert the principle of representative democracy, chiefly in two ways: (a) by converting the representative into a mere delegate; (b) by extending unduly the basis of representation; in both cases in accordance with the implicit cynical assumptions of ultra-democracy, namely, that all men are created equal and that all men are equally unworthy to be trusted with power over their fellow-men. This subversive tendency is, I say, inevitably the influence of the universal individualist ethics, which regards every man solely as an end and neglects to regard the nation as a means to the ultimate ethical goal—a means higher and vastly more important than all the existing men in whom at any one moment the life of the nation is embodied.

Only by consciously accepting the nation as such an ethical means of supreme value, that is to say, only by embodying in our ethical basis the truths of National Ethics as well as those of Universal Ethics, can we hope to counteract this subversive tendency—a tendency which is destroying representative democracy, in favour of ultra-democracy working by the method of delegation.

The general tendency of thinkers who, like Huxley, have perceived the disharmony between organic evolution of the human race and the principles of Universal Ethics has been to emphasize the importance of social evolution (including under that term all improvement of culture as well

as of social organization) and to belittle the importance of the innate qualities of men. They point to the fact that individuals of almost all races have shown themselves capable of assimilating the most advanced culture and even of contributing to its further advance. And they make the inference that, if only the forms of social organization, and especially the processes of education, can be maintained and further improved, all will be well with our civilization, no matter what changes may occur in the native qualities of the populations which are the bearers of it.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Few perhaps would maintain this position, if the question were presented in some such concrete form as—Do you believe that civilization could thrive in a population consisting of morons or feeble-minded persons only? Those who profess indifference to the question of the quality and changes of quality of the population, and maintain the dogma of natural equality presumably postulate as the substance of society a population of normal men and women, leaving out of consideration the subnormal part of the population. Yet there is only too good reason to believe that the subnormal part is already very largely and rapidly increasing.

During a large part of the period of the Great War it was my duty to survey all cases of mental and nervous break-down sent home from the British armies in all parts of the world, and to select, from among them all, such cases as I deemed suitable for treatment in open hospital wards. The task was a very distressing one for any man of normal sensibilities, although it was in a sense an errand of mercy. I am not one of those who maintain that only men of degenerate or naturally unstable constitution broke down mentally or nervously under the strain of war. My experience, of nearly five years' duration in the handling of such cases, convinced me that the best constituted man was liable to break down if the strain were sufficiently great and prolonged. But, in addition to cases of this type, I saw, in a never-ending stream, thousands of poor unstable creatures, many of whom had suffered moral collapse as soon as, or before, they had come within sound of the guns or even without having



These thinkers see that, as Professor Hobhouse says : " The factors which determine the survival of physical organisms, if applied as rules for the furtherance of social progress, appear to conflict with all that social progress means " ;<sup>1</sup> that is to say, they see that deliberate destruction of the less fit, after the manner of natural selection, is incompatible with any ethical order of society. And, failing to see that, under civilization, a selective death-rate is naturally and inevitably replaced by a selective birth-rate, they fail equally to see that some social control of this selective birth-rate is an

been assigned to service abroad, Yet most of these men had volunteered for military service, and all of them had been accepted by the medical officers whose duty it was to reject the obviously unfit among the recruits. No one, I think, could have passed through this experience without developing a grave anxiety as to the soundness of the national stock. If any American is inclined to suppose that, as regards the population of his country, there is no occasion for such anxiety, I would refer him to the statistics of mental and moral break-down among the very carefully selected troops of the American Army during their brief service in France and to the statistics (still very incomplete) of public assistance in the United States. The magnitude of the sums devoted to public and private charity is splendid evidence of the humanity of the American people ; but a complacent acceptance of the state of affairs implied by it would show that their hearts are more excellent than their heads. The " Monthly Bulletin " of the Massachusetts Society for Mental Hygiene announces that " Last year [1922] there were 9,219 Joes who resided for varying periods in the county jails and houses of correction in Massachusetts." And Joe is the generic name by which the " Bulletin " designates men who come before the courts charged with criminal offences which they commit by reason of their feeble-minded condition. If the same proportion holds good in the other States, it follows that in the year 1922 the jails and houses of correction of the whole country must have lodged some 300,000 such persons.

<sup>1</sup> " Social Evolution and Political Theory." New York, 1923.

indispensable condition of national welfare, a means which may be substituted for the operations of natural selection, enabling nations to secure the benefits of natural selection without inflicting its terrible cruelties. Hence they seek to disguise from themselves, by all manner of specious arguments, the importance of the native qualities of men, and to represent all possible changes of such qualities as of vanishingly small importance in comparison with the processes of social evolution.

This is the common method of avoiding in theory the difficulty of harmonizing evolution with ethics. And the desire to avoid or circumvent this difficulty is the unavowed ground of much of the common bias against recognition of native differences of value between individuals and races. But to take this line is merely to refuse to face the most fundamental and tremendous issue that confronts us. Civilization must not be content to avoid this issue, to shirk it, to be wilfully blind to it. The inevitable penalties of doing so are racial degeneration, cultural decay, and social chaos.

The truth is that the native differences between men, though they may seem small to a superficial view, are nevertheless vastly important.<sup>1</sup> It may be true that civilization may endure and even undergo further development, without any further evolution of the native qualities of men. But this

<sup>1</sup> These differences, no doubt, are small in comparison with the total native endowment of the average human being. But to call them "small" in any other sense would be gravely misleading.

can only be possible so long as the various peoples of the world continue to produce a fair proportion of individuals of the highest type, men and women capable of fully assimilating the culture transmitted to us by our forefathers and of further refining and improving it.<sup>1</sup>

That is to say that, though much may yet be done to improve the civilization of the leading peoples of the world, so long as they suffer no

<sup>1</sup> Since the opinion of one who has made a lifelong study of the mental qualities of men will hardly carry the same weight as that of a man who has devoted himself to the study of the physical peculiarities of race, I cite in support of my position the judicial statement of a leading anthropologist. Professor R. B. Dixon writes, in his recently published "Racial History of Man," as follows: "That there is a difference between the fundamental types in quality, in intellectual capacity, in moral fibre, in all that makes or has made any people great, I believe to be true, despite what advocates of the uniformity of man may say" (p. 518). Further, he writes, in reference to the present tendency to mingling of all races: "To make sure that from this newest, most tremendous fusion, the most perfect product shall result can it be denied that we should seek to compound it mainly from the best? And not only from the best so far as race is concerned, but best in individual quality within the racial group, for that within the group there is difference in quality is obvious. In the past, when racial mixture was so often brought about through invasion or conquest, a certain rough selection was exercised in this respect. . . . To-day this more or less automatic process of selection exists but little, if at all . . . it seems doubtful if any man-made substitute can fully compensate for the kind of natural selection which for accounted ages has controlled in this respect the development of mankind."

To which I would add that the chief difficulty in the way of preventing the racial decay which is here hinted at by Prof. Dixon as the probable fate of all mankind is the difficulty of bringing the thoughtful part of the race, biased as it is by its acceptance of the Universal Ethics, to recognize the facts and admit the requirements of the present world-situation.

deterioration of native quality, nevertheless we cannot rationally hope for further social progress nor even for the maintenance of social life at its present modest level, if our populations are destined to continued deterioration of quality. From which it follows that an ethical system that tends to such deterioration is at its best an imperfect, an incomplete, ethics. There, in brief, is the biological case against the universal systems—the case for the necessity of recognizing the validity of National Ethics, and the need for effecting a synthesis of the two systems.

The great need of our time is, then, such a system, an ethico-political philosophy that will harmonize the principles of Universal and of National ethics. It must be a utilitarian philosophy, in the sense that it must formulate its precepts and pass its moral judgments with reference to an ethical goal that lies in the distant future. And it must give due recognition to two conditions, which are to be fostered and preserved as means for the attainment of the goal, namely ; (1) nations as the bearers of culture and moral tradition, (2) the native qualities of the populations of each nation. Without the former means, namely, well-organized nations each maintaining and developing its national traditions, social life will fall into chaos, no matter how excellent the qualities of the peoples. Without the latter, namely, populations that maintain their qualities undiminished from generation to generation, the nations cannot thrive and international harmony cannot be attained.

We may lay down a third essential principle of the required ethico-political system, namely, every man is to be regarded, not only as an end in himself, but also as an element in the life of the nation, and therefore as a means to the supreme ethical goal, that is to say, his welfare must be in some degree subordinated to that of the nation. Yet the national organization must be such as favours the highest development of personality ; for, without such development of individuals, the nation itself cannot thrive. Hence, the nation, though it may demand unlimited sacrifices from all its citizens, must secure as much freedom to every individual citizen as is consistent with its own welfare, must put only such limits to his freedom as its own needs imperatively require.

Political writers have often described the institution of representative democracy as a mere consequence of the fact that the large size of modern nations renders direct democratic procedure impossible. But that is, I think, a very serious error. Whether we consider American or British democracy, the historical truth would seem to be that the institution of representative democracy was governed, not merely by regard for the welfare of its component individuals, but largely by regard for the welfare of the nation as such ; or, in other words, that the principles of National Ethics worked strongly in the minds of those who chiefly shaped the political development of these two peoples.

It seems to be equally true that the subversion

of representative democracy, which already has gone far, has been due mainly to the fact that, while the principles of Universal Ethics have been generally and explicitly accepted, the principles of National Ethics have remained implicit, unformulated, and unacknowledged ; so that whatever demands have been made in the name of Universal Ethics have seemed to the mass of mankind to be ethical, moral, or right ; while all demands made in accordance with the unacknowledged principles of National Ethics have seemed to be unethical, because in conflict with the principles of the acknowledged universal code. Under these conditions it was, I say, inevitable that representative democracy should be subverted by the drift to ultra-democracy.

This, then, is the first of the political precepts dictated by the new ethics, namely, that democracy must be of the representative type, not merely as a matter of expediency, but in virtue of the ethical principle that the nation itself is an indispensable means to the ethical goal.

Two corollaries follow from the acceptance of this precept.

(1) The duty of the representative is not merely to secure the largest possible distribution of good things to his constituents ; but rather he is charged primarily with the higher duty of conserving the moral and material resources of the nation and of guarding and developing its institutions, for the sake of the future welfare of the nation as the indispensable means to the ethical goal.

(2) The duty of the citizen in choosing his representative is to elect the man best qualified to discharge these national duties, rather than the man who is a true sample of any particular class of citizens, a class whose special interests he understands and might promote as the delegate of that class.<sup>1</sup>

These conclusions may be concisely formulated in the statement that the government required by the new ethics is government by aristocracy, an aristocracy representative of the best tendencies of the democracy and responsible to the whole people.

The second great political precept, the full recognition of which is demanded by the new ethics, is that Internationalism, rather than Cosmopolitanism, is the true or desirable world-order. Nations and the spirit of nationality are to be recognized, not as unfortunate legacies from the past, not as survivals from a darker age, to be tolerated only until we can bring about their abolition without immediate social chaos, but rather as most precious products and instruments of the process of human evolution. For each nation is the indispensable bearer of the sum of

<sup>1</sup> This principle is incompatible with any extreme form of Guild Socialism, Syndicalism, or any other "ism" that would put political representation on an occupational basis. Or, more generally, it is incompatible with the doctrine that the welfare of the nation may be secured by the mere conflict of interests of the various classes of citizens: a doctrine which seems to be widely accepted, and which, if not often baldly stated, has received some support from political philosophers.

national traditions without which civilized life is impossible. And each nation is, or should become, a moral organism capable of taking its place as a member of a society of nations and of undergoing a process of further moral evolution. In that society each nation must increasingly recognize the rights of all nations and its own moral obligations and duties as a member of that society.

This is the point where the new ethics will encounter the most obstinate resistance from the cynical scepticism of the exponents of Universal Ethics and of ultra-democracy. For these, while pretending that every man may be expected to show a sensitive regard for the welfare of all his fellow-men, no matter how remote from him in place, in customs, beliefs, aspirations, and interests, scoff at the notion that nations may learn to conduct themselves as moral organisms in a society of nations.

In this they completely overlook two facts of fundamental importance: first, that each man attains to whatever morality he may display in virtue only of his coming under the influence of the moral tradition; second, that this moral tradition, of which the nation is the bearer, is the product of a long evolution to which the efforts of many exceptional men have contributed.

The hope that nations may attain to a decent level of international morality in their dealings with one another is far better grounded than the hope that, under a cosmopolitan order, men would



continue to achieve the modest level of moral conduct which is now the average level of civilized mankind.

Such hope of the establishment of an effective tradition of international morality, of moral self-restraint in the conduct of each nation towards other nations, is the one hope of the world.<sup>1</sup> *There is no other conceivable world-order under which we may rationally expect or hope for continued progress or, indeed, for anything but general relapse into barbarism and world-chaos.*

Here, then, is the second and more important ground on which the new ethics demands that nations shall repudiate ultra-democracy, in favour of a representative democracy in which the aristocratic principle is given due weight. If each nation had duties to itself alone it might perhaps indulge in any form of experiment in political organization, taking the risks of disaster on its own shoulders,

<sup>1</sup> We hear much talk of "international law"; but it cannot be too clearly recognized that the so-called international law is nothing other, or more, than a tradition of international morality, at present but feeble and of little effect. But all moral tradition becomes effective only through a long process, involving the efforts and sacrifices of a multitude of men of the better sort. Therefore we should not allow the present disorder of the world to drive us to a cynical or pessimistic view of the future development of international morality. As Baron F. von Hügel writes: we have to recognize "the State as essentially moral, as (after all) the creation, however spontaneous and necessary, of human beings, who begin to be, and who remain, human only so long as they possess, in any and all of their functions and formations, some interior striving, conflict, groping, ideal, all of an ever incomplete kind, never more than partially practised, yet none the less truly moral."—"The German Soul," p. 203.

without grave offence against morality. But no nation can live to itself alone ; the welfare of all is increasingly dependent upon the welfare and the stability and the morality of each. Each nation has therefore grave moral obligations to all the rest. And the primary and most fundamental of these obligations of each nation is that it shall strive to achieve within itself such political organization as will enable it to discharge effectively all its other international duties.<sup>1</sup>

Now a nation organized as an ultra-democracy cannot hope to discharge its international obligations. Inductively and deductively it is only too clear that an ultra-democracy cannot be expected to act in international relations as a moral agent. This truth might be demonstrated at great length. I will venture to adduce only one illustration of it.

The Great War was the result of the total repudiation by one nation of Universal Ethics, in favour of exclusively National Ethics. When that nation (Germany) launched itself upon its supreme enterprise of world-domination, Great Britain delayed hardly a single day to throw all her resources into the struggle for the defence of civilization. America, on the other hand, required nearly three years to make the moral decision and to begin to throw her

<sup>1</sup> That the development of internationalism depends upon and presupposes sound and vigorous nationalism was clearly recognized by Theodore Roosevelt. Shortly before his death he wrote: "Let us build a genuine internationalism, that is, a genuine and generous regard for the rights of others, on the only healthy basis—a sound and intense development of the broadest spirit of American nationalism."

immense resources on the side of international morality ; a delay which proved disastrous, and almost proved fatal, to Western civilization.

Why this great difference between the two nations in the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged their international obligations ? Many partial explanations of the difference have been suggested. But the fundamental and true explanation is, I submit, the fact that in Great Britain the political organism retained more of the truly representative and aristocratic principle, had not drifted so far down the slope towards ultra-democracy as had the United States.

Americans commonly allege, truly I suppose, that Woodrow Wilson was justified in making every effort to keep the country out of the war for nearly three years, because the people was not ready to play its part. It is said that, if his Government had declared war at an earlier date, it could not have carried the people with it.<sup>1</sup> And what influence was it that, in the end, led the people to undertake the discharge of their international obligation ? There was no essential change of the situation. No new moral issue arose. The moral issue was the same in 1914 as in 1917. The result was achieved through an intensive campaign of popular education, conducted by the best elements

<sup>1</sup> This however, was not the opinion of W. H. Page, whose published letters strongly support the view that Mr. Wilson used, with great effect, the prestige of his great office to suppress the sounder judgment and the more generous impulses of the American people.

of the population. Now, I suggest that if the American nation had been organized on the true principles of representative democracy, which give due weight to the best elements, to the most instructed, to the most capable, to those in whom the moral tradition is most fully embodied, those elements, having moulded public sentiment and being in a position to determine the issue of national deliberation, would have been able to bring the united nation rapidly and effectively to the discharge of its international obligation ; in consequence, the world would have been spared immense sufferings and immense losses of life and of morale ; in place of these losses the world would have gained by a signal enforcement of the principles of international morality, and those principles would have been established on a new and vastly higher plane of stability and world-wide influence. This, then, is one historical illustration of the truth that a nation which allows itself to drift into ultra-democracy does a grave injury to civilization, to all the higher interests of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Here I will venture to hold up the mirror that enables a people " to see itself as others see it." In the midst of the war, that great American, W. H. Page, wrote of the impression made abroad by the supineness of the American nation as follows : " They say that the American democracy, since Cleveland's day, has become a mere agglomeration of different races, without national unity, national aims, and without courage or moral qualities."—*Life and Letters*, vol. II, p. 32. And he wrote also : " The United States stands for democracy and free opinion as it stands for nothing else and as no other nation stands for it. Now, when democracy and free opinion are at stake as they have not been before, we take a ' neutral ' stand—we throw away our very birthright. We talk of ' humanity '

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Nations, then, owe, not only to themselves, but also to the world, the duty of developing and maintaining a political organization such as the new ethics demands—an organization based on representative institutions which shall synthesize the democratic with the aristocratic principle. If all the leading nations can attain to such organization,

all we like ; we have missed the largest chance that ever came to help the large cause that brought us into being as a nation. And the people, sitting on the comfortable seats of neutrality upon which the President has pushed them back, are grateful for peace, not having taken the trouble to think out what Peace has cost us and cost the world.”—Op cit., vol. II, p. 173. That is to say, the American nation, in spite of the wide diffusion of benevolence and “idealism” throughout the people, was unable, through lack of the necessary national organization, to make effective this great store of “idealism,” until the world had suffered vast and irreparable injuries

At the present moment a similar situation confronts the American nation. It may fairly be said that all Americans of goodwill and enlightenment are advocating some form of co-operation with the nations that are striving to ensure peace and international justice. Yet the issue hangs in the balance. It remains very doubtful whether these numerous best elements can leaven the lump. In a recent number of “Our World” the editor writes: “The fact that the last five presidents, Republican and Democrat alike, have favoured it [international co-operation] will not ensure success. President Harding saw clearly that carrying out this policy of American co-operation with the world, especially as it was related to the World Court, would require a tremendous struggle . . . the ‘irreconcilables’ have already shown that they will push their opposition with fresh vigour and force. . . . The new political forces that have appeared in the farming section of the country will continue in hostility, unless they are enlightened. The same will be true of labour, in the mass, despite the stand for world co-operation taken by some of its leaders. This is no endeavour to paint a gloomy picture, but an effort, instead, to point to facts and conditions as they are. And it may be safely added, as they will continue to be, unless the people are convinced that the World Court and all other questions of co-operation with other coun-

then we may rationally hope to see the principles of international morality firmly established and duly observed. When that world-order shall have been achieved, any formal League of Nations will be unnecessary, as unnecessary as is any formal undertaking to act justly and considerately among men of honour and developed moral cultivation.

But so long as nations are not so organized, so long as they are ultra-democracies, then, when some international crisis arises, they will require long years of effort on the part of the better elements of the population, before each nation can be brought to see its duty and to act as a moral agent. In such a world a League of Nations is perhaps the best that can be hoped for, imperfect and uncertain as its influence must always be as a substitute for international morality.<sup>1</sup>

I now come to the essential constructive suggestion to which all that I have said so far is but preliminary.

tries, are pressing American questions that affect the welfare of every man, woman and child in the United States." This statement, that America can be moved to action only when the majority of the people believe that their individual self-interests are affected, this statement amounts to an assertion that the decline from representative democracy to ultra-democracy has already been completed in the United States. Whether the writer realizes the gravity of the charge he makes against the American democracy is not apparent from this article.

<sup>1</sup> It may be argued that, as the development of individual morality was possible only in virtue of the protection of individual rights afforded by domestic law with all the apparatus for its enforcement, so also international morality can develop only if the rights of nations are protected in an analogous fashion. I add some further discussion of this topic in the Appendix.

The question before us is, How shall a nation be organized? What political national organization will most effectively render the nation a means towards the supreme ethical goal—the enduring and highest happiness of the greatest number of mankind in the near and in the distant future?

The two great functions of the nation must equally be kept in view: (1) the internal function, namely, efficient legislation and administration, making for the maintenance of a strong, sensitive, and moral public opinion, and for the preservation and, if possible, the improvement of the innate qualities of the people; (2) the external function, the effective co-operation with other nations in maintaining the principles of international morality.

The first practical principle essential to the true democracy is that not all individuals are qualified to share fully in the rights and duties of citizenship. This is true of all democracies, but especially of our vast modern nations, and most of all of the American people, made up as it is of so many heterogeneous elements of very different levels of culture and tradition and of diverse racial origins. Instead of blindly, indiscriminately, asserting the principle of "one adult, one vote," we must deliberately assert the principle—one qualified citizen, one vote. The franchise, municipal, state, and federal, must be denied to those who are obviously unfit to exercise it.

How, then, shall the unfit be defined? Two categories of the unfit can be defined easily, namely, the mentally deficient and the convicted criminals.

Our highly organized medical science and institutions can select the former. Our legal institutions can select the latter. It seems to me a simple and indisputable truth that the mentally defective should never be enfranchised and that the convicted criminal should be disfranchised.

A third category of persons unfit to enjoy the full rights, because unfit to discharge the duties, of citizenship are the illiterate. This proposition also seems little open to dispute in the case of the completely illiterate, those who cannot read at all. For the whole machinery of modern democracy can only be worked on the supposition that the electors of representatives are capable of reading intelligently. Without this capacity they cannot exert, under the modern conditions, any intelligent choice or judgment. But illiteracy or literacy is a matter of degree ; and there is room for differences of opinion as to the degree of literacy which should be held to qualify for full citizenship. I, for one, should have no hesitation in drawing the line fairly high. I would not accept as a qualification a mere capacity to enjoy reading the details of the latest murder. But the actual level of qualification that should be demanded is a question of detail. The assertion of the principle is the main thing. All modern States maintain elaborate systems of State-education. Especially in America there exists a finely graded and universal system of free State-education. There you have in working the machinery for separating the illiterates from the literates. Let it



be established that only those individuals who attain or pass a certain grade of the educational system are qualified for full citizenship, and that no others shall be enfranchised.<sup>1</sup>

Those then are the three chief categories of persons obviously unfit for full citizenship. Let it be recognized that full citizenship is a privilege entailing responsibilities—a privilege which any person may attain and retain only by showing himself to be fitted to exercise its responsibilities.

If the literacy requirements were drawn at a reasonably high level, the effect of this differentiation of two classes of citizens—the full citizens and the unenfranchised citizens—would be to cut out from the political organism its least efficient part, a part which is apt to exert a degrading effect upon the whole, constituting as it does an inert mass of voting power that lends itself to, and invites, abuses of every kind.

Let us for convenience distinguish the two classes by the letters A and C ; A is the class of full citizens, C the class of unenfranchised citizens. If the literacy standard were made approximately the same in all countries, the two classes would be found in very different proportions in the various nations and countries. I suppose that in America the C class might comprise perhaps one-quarter to one-third of the adult population. In Italy it would be

<sup>1</sup> A recent estimate, based on the statistics of the Illiteracy Commission of the National Education Association, puts the number of adults in the United States who are " illiterates " or " near-illiterates " at twenty millions.—" Time," vol. II, no. 7.

larger, and in Mexico or India much larger still, and might rise as high as four-fifths or even nine-tenths or more of the whole. But, even in those countries, or in China, the adoption of the principle would render possible the introduction of representative democracy in a workable form, under which the proportion of the A class might steadily grow by the spread of education.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> As a corollary of the educational qualifications, I would make the State system of education free to all, but compulsory on none, trusting that the desire for the privileges of full citizenship would be a sufficient incentive to all, or almost all, who are fitted by natural endowment to profit from the educational opportunities offered freely by the State.

The necessity for the adoption of such mitigated form of democracy in Mexico has been well stated by President Obregon in the following passage: "In those periods in which Mexico has enjoyed peace, this peace has been produced by the rule of the cultured section of the people and the subordination of the unlearned class to that rule. If the country is to be governed in accordance with the rule of universal suffrage, then the majority of the population, that is to say, the illiterate section of it, will have the control of the cultured class. In other words, that class which for its own benefit was subordinated under the Spanish regime, which in the United States is kept under guardianship, would rule in Mexico. If such should be the case, we must in candour confess that the Mexican people are not capable of self-government. This is mere common sense. The Indians and illiterate class of Mexico do not know in some cases even the Spanish language, do not know the political constitution and the functions of the different branches of the administration. If their vote is to decide, then they will be the tools of wire-pullers who may preach to them democracy or communism or any other word which will excite them and stir them into warlike action; or they will be the raw material for the government electoral machine. In both cases the sober, honest citizen prefers to abandon the field to his opponents, because he can see no possibility of overcoming that machinery, nor is he disposed to compete in machinations. There is no country in the world in which the most intelligent and capable class, in the long run, does not obtain in the government the pre-eminence it deserves

The separation of the C class from the class of full citizens should serve to raise the standard of intelligence and responsibility in the electorate, and, in so doing, greatly diminish the present evils of democracy, rendering possible a return to the practical recognition of an elected and responsible

unless there is some external power, which interferes with the inner forces of that country.

"But, on the other hand, if the Mexican people are left to their own resources and discretion they will prove their capacity for self-government, just as they give daily proofs of their intelligence as members of the professional classes, and of their ability and honesty as business men. If they do not find it necessary to misrepresent the facts, they may start again that work of civilizing the Indians which they undertook in the epochs of greater prosperity for Mexico. Let the educated class of Mexico assume before the world the responsibility for the culture of their own fellow-citizens. They will show that they are trustworthy.

"I am not advocating an autocratic, irresponsible government; what I believe is a primary necessity for the life of Mexico is to restrict the exercise of political rights in Federal matters to those who at least know how to read and write, who thus have an opportunity to know what politics and justice and political economy may mean. If we continue the rule of universal suffrage, we may have the opposite effect of what you had in the South, where the majority of the whites suppressed the vote of the coloured people, and we may be forced to suffer the well-known evils of the reconstruction period, with all the political manoeuvres of the carpet-baggers. In Mexico the enormous majority of the unlearned class discourages and overcomes the vote of the literate. If you remember the history of the Indian territory of the United States, and the reasons why you were compelled to withdraw the political franchise from the Indians there, you may realize that the present situation in Mexico is a mere duplication of conditions in that territory; and you may be compelled to admit that my suggestion is the only possible solution for the Mexican problem." He therefore proposes "a literary test for the exercise of the franchise."—"Are the Mexican People Capable of Governing Themselves?" ("Journal of International Relations," vol. XI, 1920).

aristocracy. But it should be further used in the service of a purpose no less, perhaps even more, important, namely, the preservation and possibly the improvement of the native qualities of the full citizens. Consider now how this great end may be served by the institution of the two classes of citizens.

We have seen how, under present conditions, there obtains in all civilized nations a tendency to deterioration of the population, owing to the relative infertility of the better endowed, the inverse correlation of fertility with degrees of natural endowment. Under the present order of society the rapidly multiplying lower strata are constantly infiltrating into, and substituting themselves for, the higher strata ; so that the general tendency in each new generation must be a lowering of the average level of endowment throughout the whole population.

Now suppose that intermarriage between the A and the C classes were strictly prohibited. We should then have a system under which the A class would constantly be purified, namely, by shedding off into the C class, first, all those of its members who by criminal conduct showed themselves unworthy of the privileges and responsibilities of their class ; and, secondly, all those who, though born of parents of the A class, failed to qualify for admission to it. At the same time it would be constantly recruited by the admission of the best progeny of the C class.

We should thus have a system under which the

A class would enjoy the advantage of a stringent selection, without the infliction of the cruelty and suffering that are inevitable consequences of Nature's harsh processes of natural selection. In this way we should solve, so far as the A class was concerned, the seeming opposition between the cosmic and the ethical processes, on which Huxley so eloquently insisted as an ultimate and irresolvable disharmony of human life.

But I suggest that this most important result might be better achieved, than by prohibition of marriage between persons of the A and C classes, namely, in the following way: A third class, of status intermediate between A and C, should be legally instituted. This class, call it B, would have a probationary status. Every candidate for admission to the A class would have to spend at least twenty or twenty-five years of his life as a probationer in the B class before admission to A. But the children of parents both of whom belonged to the A class would have the status of the B class as their birthright; and, on attaining adult life, they would be, if otherwise qualified, admitted to the A class. On the other hand, children born of parents, either of whom was of the C class, would have the status of the C class; if and when they passed the qualifying educational test, they would enter the B class as probationers; and only after twenty years of this probationary status, with due discharge of its recognized obligations, would they be admissible to the A class. This would be the

recognition of the sound principle that not the individual, but the family, is the unit of society.

In addition, it might be wise to enact, as a discouragement of intermarriage between the classes, that any citizen of the A class who married a member of the C class should *ipso facto* lose his A status and revert to the C class.

In this way the nation would achieve the benefits of a simple caste-organization, namely, the preservation of the qualities of the superior strains, while avoiding those features which condemn to stagnation every society founded upon a rigid caste-system, namely, the discouragement of ability and ambition and the prevention of character and capacity from rising in the social scale and exerting the influence that should be accorded to them. For the classes would not be hereditary castes.<sup>1</sup>

The establishment in all civilized nations of a three-class system, such as I have briefly sketched, would bring three great advantages.

First, it would secure that in each nation political

<sup>1</sup> Some of my readers may exclaim, "But the men of the C class would be mere serfs; and we cannot for a moment contemplate a return to serfdom for any part of our population." The answer is that men of the C class would not be serfs: they would be free men, free to sell their labour, to choose their place and mode of life, enjoying all the rights of citizens, except the right to vote and possibly also the right to unlimited and indiscriminate procreation. It may be pointed out also that the bulk of the coloured people of the United States, both of negro and Indian blood, have long been practically, and in part legally, restricted to the C status. My proposal therefore involves, so far as the United States are concerned, merely the cessation of racial discrimination and the explicit recognition and legal regulation of a state of affairs already existing in an unjust and disorderly fashion.

power would rest in the hands of a reasonably select body of citizens, men and women who would be capable of understanding and of valuing and preserving the national traditions, who might be trusted to prefer representative democracy to ultra-democracy and to select, as their representatives, persons of outstanding capacity and merit. Active participation in political life would thus be restored to the position of high honour which is proper to it ; and the best men, no longer fearing utterly ignorant and incapable electors, would be glad to undertake these honourable tasks. Secondly, each nation would be fortified against that most fatal tendency which has played a great part in destroying most of the civilizations of the past, namely, the tendency to die away at the top. Thirdly, the class of full citizens would be protected against the lowering of its average quality by the immixture of blood of inferior quality ; and so it might rationally hope to preserve itself from deterioration and even slowly to improve its quality from century to century.

One important problem remains to be lightly touched. It is certain that the population of the world cannot long continue to multiply itself as it did in the great era that is now drawing to a close—the era of rapid exploitation of the world's reserves of energy and of consequent rapid multiplication of men.

Continuance of such rapid multiplication would render futile all hope of abolishing war and of improving the lot of the mass of mankind.

The world must soon return in this respect

the normal condition, that is to say, a condition of approximately stationary numbers. Since we cannot permit the return of the more primitive agencies by means of which population has been restricted in the long ages preceding the industrial era, namely, abortion, infanticide, epidemic and endemic disease, high infant mortality, and warfare, we must adopt the only alternative, namely, deliberate regulation of its population by each nation. Throughout the development of our Western civilization such control seems to have gradually supplanted in large measure the primitive methods. Society embodied in its customs and institutions the view that marriage and the production of a family are properly the privileges of those citizens who show themselves best fitted to assume the responsibilities of those privileges. In the towns and among the artisan classes this result was in a large measure achieved by the institution of apprenticeship and craft-guilds; under this system it was practically impossible for a man to marry before he became a master craftsman and a member of the guild. In the country the same result seems to have been secured in large measure by the fact that the common labourer had to postpone marriage until he could procure a house and perhaps a farm of his own.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> His position was, it would seem, very similar to that of the disappearing New England figure, the hired man of the farmer. On this topic see Mr. Carr-Saunders's "Population Problem." He cites the conclusions of a Danish investigation by Rubin: "These obstacles to marriage in the case of the labouring class caused marriage to be postponed by men in this class. . . .



At the present time all such social control has been abolished. The State and a multitude of

Even though the social and economic structure of the community' of old restrained one section of the population—the dependent section—from marriage, the other part of the population, the independent section, married far earlier than nowadays. . . . Those who could marry early, then, did so. But those who were unable to marry till late in life—when they no longer held the position of journeymen, labourer, etc.—yet married. . . . In spite of the fact that in the independent section of the community marriage took place, as a rule, at an earlier age in the eighteenth century than it does now, the average age of marriage was yet higher at that time, because the more numerous dependent class married later. . . . The state of things indicated above is that typical of mediaeval Europe and lasted up to the industrial revolution" (p. 265). Again he writes: "Far more important than any particular disabilities regarding marriage which attach to serfs are the conditions making very difficult any increase in population which are always found among cultivators. When a village has as many hands as it requires, the number of houses is not increased. Speaking generally of the Middle Ages, Pollard says that 'the number of holdings was almost stationary and the number of families fixed. The number of hands in a village found to be required would be about that which experience had shown to produce the largest average income. Any further increase is made very difficult, if not impossible. Country life was as elsewhere rigid in its habits; young people found it difficult to establish themselves till some married pair had passed from the scene and made a vacancy in their own parish; for migration to another parish was seldom thought of by an agricultural labourer. . . . Such always are the conditions among cultivators in a settled country; it is forced to the notice of every one that not more than a certain number of hands are required, and postponement of marriage is thus imposed upon the younger people. Neither land nor houses are available for them at an early age. Before the Reformation, not only were early marriages determinately discouraged, but the opportunity for them did not exist. A labourer living in a cottage by himself was a rare exception to the rule; and the work of the fields was performed generally . . . by servants who lived in the families of the squire or farmer, and who, while in that position, commonly remained single and married only when by prudence they had saved a sufficient sum to enable them to enter some other position'" (p. 280). Of the

charitable agencies undertake to provide for every child that any couple may fortuitously bring into

towns, we read: "In essence the mediaeval town was the formation of guilds of merchants and craftsmen. . . . Membership of a guild was a birthright or an inheritance, and new-comers could only enter after a long period of apprenticeship. The result of this system of apprenticeship was to bring about the postponement of marriage, and thus to limit the undue increase of population. The position of a son who acquired a holding when his parent died is analogous to that of an apprentice who cannot set up as a master till given permission by the proper authorities. It is quite plain that in the eyes of the ordinary man in the sixteenth century one of the advantages of a system of compulsory apprenticeship was that it prevented youths marrying at a very early age. . . . Rubin . . . sums up the position in these words: 'The domestic servant class, then as now, was unmarried, but that class was much more numerous than at present. Subordinates in the industrial class and in handicrafts were not, as in our own time, free and independent, but lived for the most part in the houses of their masters, and, at any rate, were accustomed to wait until they became masters before marrying. . . . The same rule applied to other journeymen in various employments, whether in town or country.' Thus in the town as well as on the land the pressure was at work. The result was twofold. Marriage was made difficult, and many sought refuge in lifelong celibacy in religious institutions. Again, a standard of skill was insisted upon which tended to ensure that young husbands would be able to support a family, as well as ensuring that they would not have a family at all until there was a place for them" (p. 282). In addition, various States enforced laws against the marriage of unqualified persons; e.g. in Würtemberg no subject could marry until he possessed "the right of a member of a community or a settled non-freeman. But even such a one must prove to the magistrate before his marriage that he possesses sufficient means of subsistence. The want of such means of subsistence is considered as existing (a) in every one who is not primarily qualified in the exercises of a liberal art or science, or for exercising on his own account, commerce, or profession, agriculture or some other business sufficient for the independent support of a family; and (b) in every one who, at the time of the intended marriage, is the subject of political or police investigation, for vagabondage, prodigality, habitual idleness, notorious propensity to drinking, or repeated fraud, theft, or begging . . . or has received assist-

existence ; and custom and the Universal Ethics approve early marriage for all, and unlimited procreation among the lower strata of the populace.<sup>1</sup>

ance from public funds for his own support " (p. 283). I cite this evidence at some length because it reveals the secret of the control of population in Europe from the early mediaeval to the modern period. No doubt the older more primitive checks remained operative in some degree, as they still do ; but in the main they seem to have been replaced by a system of more or less deliberate social control.

And a point of extreme importance is that this social control must have operated in the main eugenically, confining parenthood to the prudent, the competent, the industrious, the skilful, and the successful. This social control, continued through several centuries, must have done much to maintain the qualities of the populations by which it was exercised and may even have raised considerably the average level of "civic worth." Two influences have combined to suspend in the modern era this social control and to reverse the eugenic tendency to breed from the upper strata of society : first, the social chaos of the industrial age ; secondly, the unchecked extension of the universal ethics at the cost of national ethics, leading to a state of affairs in which the privileges of marriage and parenthood are regarded as the right of every man without respect to his personal qualifications for discharge of the correlative responsibilities

In modern discussions of the minimum wage this all-important aspect of the social problem is never considered ; it is assumed without question that every man has the right to be a parent and therefore to receive a wage sufficient for the support of a family. Yet even the modern reformer, swayed purely by Universal Ethics, does not venture to be consistent ; for consistency would lead him to demand for every man a wage capable of supporting in comfort a family of some fifteen children.

In the small State of Massachusetts an alarming proportion of the State's revenue is expended upon public assistance, and in addition there are, I am told, as many as 140 distinct charitable associations which devote all their resources to bringing up the children of those who are incompetent to discharge the responsibilities of parenthood.

<sup>1</sup> It is sometimes asked, Why does the agricultural population of Denmark prosper exceedingly, while that of England is chronically in difficulties ? And no answer is found. May it not be that the answer is to be found in the fact that the industrial

In the period upon which we are now entering a return to severe restriction of reproduction is inevitable. All experience shows that, in the absence of social regulation and under the unmitigated sway of the Universal Ethics, this restriction will tend to be effected in the various social strata in direct proportion to their civic worth. In other words, each generation of the population will be in the main the progeny of the least competent, the least self-controlled, the least successful members of the preceding generation; society will continually renew itself from the bottom and will continually die away at the top. This disastrous tendency can only be counteracted by a deliberate social control dictated by the principles of National Ethics, the ethics which recognizes the nation, as an essential means towards our ethical goal, and demands that the rights of the individual be subordinated to, and in some degree determined by, the needs of the nation.

Some such social organization as I have suggested would enable this most necessary social control of reproduction to be effected in a manner conducive to national prosperity and the advance of civilization; for it is obvious that a wise social regulation would aim at, and would know how to secure through the agency of custom, of social institutions and, if necessary, of legislation, a restriction of revolution has maintained conditions of deterioration in the agricultural class in England for more than a century; while in Denmark something of the mediaeval system has been maintained with consequent preservation of native qualities?

reproduction among the citizens of the unenfranchised class—a restriction as severe as the circumstances of the time might demand.<sup>1</sup>

If such restriction were effectively maintained, the class of full citizens might be trusted to regulate for themselves their reproduction-rate; and this class, relieved both of the economic competition of an excess of population swarming up from below, and from the evil influence of that excess of wealth and luxury which the more successful classes now obtain, through the exploitation of the labour of these masses of low-level population, the class of full citizens, I say, might under these conditions be expected to exercise in due measure the privileges of marriage and of parenthood. For, under the influence of an ethics in which the national principle was duly recognized, the function of parenthood would be restored to the position of honour that it has enjoyed in every healthy and stable society. We might hope to see the family re-established as the foundation of the State, as the true social unit, and as the nursery of those national traditions which alone raise us above the level of savage life and by the development of which alone mankind may hope to rise to higher and ever higher levels of happiness and culture.

<sup>1</sup> As an ultimate consequence of such social organization, we might look forward to a time when the whole population of the world would consist of the A class alone, the B and C classes having dwindled to the point of extinction. Then, and not before, our descendants might hope to see throughout the world the successful working of pure democracy, according to the formula "one adult, one vote."

## APPENDIX I

### OUTLINE. OF THE ONE AND ONLY PRACTICABLE PLAN FOR BRINGING ABOUT THE DISARMAMENT OF NATIONS AND THE REIGN OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

**I**N these supplementary pages I desire to make certain suggestions towards solving the problems of international relations. While sympathizing strongly with those who have instituted the League of Nations and who hope to see it increase steadily in authority and efficiency, I yet recognize the great force of the considerations that have hitherto prevented the American people from entering it.

Any nation that enters the League commits itself to the sacrifice of its sovereign rights in an undefined and unlimited degree.<sup>1</sup> In consequence

<sup>1</sup> The American objection to adhesion to the League has rested mainly on the ground that Article X of the Covenant of the League commits each member nation to the obligation of taking up arms in defence of other nations unjustly attacked. This is a very grave commitment of indefinite range and magnitude. The advocates of American co-operation in the League attempt to exhibit it as of secondary importance. Thus Justice J. H. Clarke, one of the most generous of these advocates, said (in his address on behalf of the League of Nations Non-Partizan Association): "But, even this remote possibility of war within the

it remains only too probable that situations may arise (as in the case of Italy at the present moment—September, 1923) under which a member of the League will regret its adhesion and will threaten to break away from it, perhaps at the cost of destroying the League. It seems, therefore, that the instituting of the League was too large a change to be made at a single step. I agree with many other publicists in holding that it would have been wiser to institute at the present time a permanent court of international justice. Such a World Court would interpret and enforce the terms of existing treaties; and it might be hoped that the Great Powers would enter into a series of treaties (such as the Washington Disarmament Treaty) looking towards the enforcement of peace and international justice. The terms of such treaties, signed by the various Great Powers, would then assume the status of international law—law binding upon all nations and enforced by the rulings of the World Court. In this way we should advance from the present position, in which no international law (*loi*) exists, but only partially recognized

League can come to us under Article X only with the consent of our own representative on the Council, for such a decision under it must be a unanimous one and with the consent also of our Congress, for it is too clear for discussion that the treaty-making power is subject to the constitutional limitation that only Congress can declare war, and this all the other nations know as well as we and they are dealing with us on this understanding." It is clear that if the United States, and if other States, give to the League only such qualified adhesion as is here implied, its power to enforce its decisions must remain very limited.

principles of international right (*droit*), to one in which all nations would be bound and forced to obey certain explicitly defined and limited principles of international law (law in the full sense of the word, only if the World Court wielded the power to enforce its rulings).<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps the most important of all such international laws would be one forbidding any nation to proceed to military action without having first stated its case to the world and having allowed a certain space of time to elapse between such statement and its first attempt to apply armed force to the remedy of its complaint.

A World Court, proceeding on these lines, might prove to be a sufficient protection of the rights of nations and a sufficient guarantee against unprovoked or unjustifiable attacks by one nation upon another (provided always the Court had the power to enforce its rulings). Under its protection the smaller nations, and perhaps even the Great Powers, might become content to live without military establishments.

If such a World Court, after some experience of its working, were found inadequate to the needs of the world, its existence and operation would have paved the way for the farther and more extreme step of instituting a League of Nations with powers of international legislation—a parliament of all mankind.

<sup>1</sup> For, by "law in the full sense of the word," I mean law that can be enforced, or law supported by effective sanctions—sanctions which, if they fail to secure observance of the law, will secure adequate punishment of infringement.



Whatever form of International Authority is to become the safeguard of nations, whether a League of Nations, a World Court, or some other institution not yet foreshadowed, two great obstacles to its establishment, permanency, and efficiency remain to be overcome. These two obstacles are already very obvious to the world. I will state each one very concisely, and then put forward two suggestions which, I venture to think, are perfectly practicable and capable of overcoming these two obstacles respectively.

The less serious of these two difficulties is that of determining justly and acceptably the extent to which each nation shall be represented in the constitution of the International Authority. It cannot reasonably be expected that the Great Powers would long be content with an International Authority in which each of the smaller nations should be represented as strongly as any Great Power. In such a body, any Great Power, or even any combination of Great Powers, would be liable to find itself out-voted and overruled by a combination of such States as Liberia and Haiti, Siam, Tibet, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia.

If such a state of affairs should arise in relation to some vital interest of the Great Powers, the International Authority would be destroyed by the tension within it: it would explode, and all the work of international organization would have to be taken up anew on wiser lines.

Can we, then, adopt for the International

Authority the principle of representation of Nations or States in proportion to the numbers of their populations? That also is an obviously impracticable plan. The Great Powers will not be content to be completely outweighed by India or China; not would the secondary European nations readily accord to Java or to Siam an influence greater than their own.

This difficulty would no doubt be less serious in the institution of a World Court than in the organization of a League of Nations. For, since the sphere of authority of the World Court would be clearly defined and limited, nations would engage themselves to the acceptance of all its findings more readily than they would bind themselves to observe every law that might be promulgated by a League of Nations; and they would feel less strongly the need for adequate representation in the personnel of the Court than in that of the League.

Nevertheless, even the judicial deliberations of the Court would be liable to be influenced to an incalculable extent by the national sentiments of its members, no matter how honestly they might strive to maintain a strict impartiality.

I suggest that this difficulty may best be met in the following way: Let each nation be represented in the International Authority (whether Court or League) to an extent proportional to its annual budget. Or, since it would not be possible to secure any very strict proportion, the nations

might be grouped for this purpose in some five or more classes, according to the magnitude of the average annual budget or revenue of each one.

The justification for this arrangement is the fact that the annual expenditure of a nation corresponds roughly to the extent of its power, and to the magnitude of its interests in the economic world-order. It would thus be an approximately just arrangement and one which all nations might be expected to accept. Further, it would be one which would secure automatic readjustment of the representations of the various nations, as in the course of time their relative status as World-Powers might undergo more or less rapid changes. Thus, if any nation, such as Siam or Mexico, were to repeat the recent history of Japan and to spring almost suddenly into the rank of a Great Power, its representation in the International Authority would undergo automatically and without friction a corresponding increase.

An objection to this arrangement of some weight is the fact that those States in which the nationalization of industries and services was more general than in others would secure unduly large representation. And this fact might constitute an undesirable inducement to increasing nationalization. Also, it may, perhaps, be argued that it would unduly favour those nations which expended large sums on military equipment and training. I suggest, therefore, as an alternative form of the same principle, that the representation of each

nation in the International Authority might be made proportional, not to its total annual expenditure, but to that part of the revenues of the State devoted to public education. Such expenditure may, I think, be fairly regarded as the best measure of the extent to which any nation may justly claim to make its voice heard in all international deliberations and decisions. And if this arrangement should stimulate any nation to increase the amount of its expenditure upon education, that result would be of benefit both to itself and to the whole world.

The second and greater obstacle in the way of the institution and effective operation of any International Authority is the difficulty of securing to it the power to enforce its rulings. This problem is of the first importance in relation to the preservation of peace and the disarmament of nations.

There are, I think, but few nations which would not be glad to rid themselves of the burden of armaments, if they knew that in all international questions they had the right to submit their case to a World Court, and if they were absolutely assured that this World Court had the power to secure to them this right and to enforce its own rulings. But so long as there can be any doubt, any suspicion, concerning the absolute supremacy of the physical force wielded by the Court, or of the effectiveness of its control over its means of enforcement (its power to put such force immediately into action with overwhelming effect

against any nation, no matter how powerful, or any combination of two or three strong nations), so long will nations be unwilling to disarm themselves completely and to entrust their defence entirely to the principles of justice and to the strong arm of the International Authority.

There are idealists who will say that the International Authority needs no armed forces, that its moral authority should and must suffice. I will not waste words in demonstrating the unpractical nature of this contention. We are concerned with the world as it is and may be, not with the world as we should like to have made it. If men and nations had attained to such a level of morality that the International Authority required no powers of compulsion, the world would already have passed beyond the need for any such Court or League.

Three proposals, and, I believe, three only, have hitherto been made for meeting this difficulty :

First, it has been proposed that the International Authority should rely upon the weapon of economic pressure or boycott ; that, if any nation should refuse to abide by its ruling, it should forbid all other nations to trade with it.

This, no doubt, would be a powerful weapon. But would it have that quality of absolute and immediate efficiency which is indispensable, if the complete confidence and sole trust of all nations is to be placed in the protective power of the International Authority ? I think not. It would have two great defects. On the one hand, the weapon

of economic boycott would be slow in operation, and slower in proportion to the power and resources of the recalcitrant nation to which it might be applied. Imagine that Germany had established economic and military dominance over Russia. Might she not venture to defy the threat of economic boycott? And, if the boycott were applied, might she not overrun and destroy one or more of her neighbours before the economic pressure could reduce her to submission?

On the other hand, it would be difficult or impossible to enforce the observance of the boycott on all other nations. In the circumstances just now imagined, it might well be that the smaller neighbours of the recalcitrant Great Powers would be tempted to throw in their lot with hers. We might then see the tragi-comedy of one half the world boycotting the other half, to the detriment of all nations, to the frustration of the International Authority, and perhaps to its disruption.

A second plan proposed is that the International Authority should have the right to call upon each and all nations to furnish contingents towards the formation of an international army and navy, which force would then execute its behests. This also would involve a slow and cumbrous procedure; and it would provide no absolute guarantee of success, even in the long run, if it were put into operation.

A more serious objection to this plan is the fact that it might prove impossible to put it into opera-

tion. In these days of democratic government, it might well happen that one or more of the nations called upon to furnish contingents (and in certain eventualities the contingents might need to be very large) would find itself unwilling or unable to respond. The mass of the population might threaten a general strike or otherwise effectively prevent even a well-intentioned government from living up to its obligations.<sup>1</sup>

Further, this plan, apart from the slowness and uncertainty of the procedure proposed, would have the drawback that it would involve each nation in the obligation to maintain armed forces of considerable magnitude. And, in so far, it would constitute a constant threat to peace and an absolute bar to general disarmament.

The third plan proposed is that the International Authority should maintain its own armed forces for constant readiness to enforce its rulings. This plan, if adopted on a sufficiently large scale, might seem to afford better assurance of rapid and effective action in support of international law. But against it also would lie certain very grave objections. In

<sup>1</sup> Something of this sort did actually occur in Great Britain, when it was proposed to send a contingent to aid in the defence of Poland against the aggression of Soviet Russia. It is obvious also that, if States are to give only such qualified adhesion to the League as is proposed for the United States by Justice Clarke (compare footnote on page 171), i.e. armed support, when requested, only if and when the national Parliament shall have approved such support, the protection offered by the League of Nations to any nation, threatened or attacked, must be lacking in two essentials, namely, first, rapidity of application, secondly, guarantee of adequacy when applied.

## APPENDIX I

order to provide sure protection to unarmed nations, the army and navy to be maintained by the International Authority would require to be very large. An army of less than a million men, highly trained and equipped, would be *pour rire* ; and the navy would have to be proportionally large. The expense of maintaining these large forces would be very great. But, apart from that, the maintenance under arms of a very large mercenary army of professional soldiers (and a corresponding navy) would be in itself a very grave evil and even a positive danger to the world. Empires have been overthrown by such armies in the past. It would not be possible to guarantee to the International Authority its control over such an army. Even if there were no risk that such an army as a whole might get out of hand at any time, there would remain another great risk. Such an army would necessarily be composed of men of many nationalities ; and the men of any one nationality would necessarily be grouped in units, such as divisions or army corps. This being so, there would always be the danger that one part of the army might refuse its co-operation or might even take up arms against another part.

It may be suggested that the objections I have raised to both the second and third plans would be very much diminished if under the third plan all nations would consent to complete disarmament, or if, under the second plan, each nation would consent and faithfully agree to maintain only such



armed forces as might be permitted and enjoined upon it by the International Authority, holding the whole of such forces at the disposal of that authority. It is true that, if either arrangement were practicable, the efficiency of the corresponding plan would be greatly increased. But neither arrangement is practicable. Nations are willing neither to abolish nor seriously to limit their armaments, *unless their protection can first be absolutely guaranteed*. Further, even if all nations consented to such limitations, it would not be possible for the International Authority to ensure the exact observance of those limits ; and even if it were able to do this, it would not be possible to prevent doubt and suspicion and anxiety from growing up on all sides. To make in secret very considerable preparations for war would be so easy for any nation that universal confidence in the universal observance of the prescribed limitations could not be continuously maintained.

What then is to be done ? Must we sorrowfully admit that the problem is beyond the possibility of all solution, that each nation must continue to arm itself to the teeth and to rely for its safety upon its own power of armed resistance and upon a shifting system of war-breeding alliances ?

The foregoing discussion has made it clear that, if the International Authority is to assure to the Nations absolutely effective protection, if it is to confer on mankind the inestimable blessings of perpetual peace and universal disarmament, it

must be furnished with a weapon of tremendous power—a weapon which can be maintained at small expense in perfect readiness for almost instantaneous action in any part of the world ; a weapon that can be wielded by a small body of trained experts in a way that can overcome the resistance of an armed nation ; a weapon which no nation can develop and perfect in secret.

If such a marvellous weapon can be found our problem will be solved, the crux of the difficulty may be overcome, and the world may breathe freely once more.

It so happens that science has recently placed in our hands a weapon answering perfectly to all these essential requirements. It only remains for the nations to place in the exclusive control of the International Authority this supreme weapon, this flaming sword of the Archangel of Peace. That Authority will need but to let its gleam be seen afar off, to make audible the sound of its swift, annihilating rush through the skies, and the proudest nation, the [greatest army, the most formidable navy, will lay down its arms, and Reason and Justice will prevail in all the earth.

The weapon I speak of is an efficient and exclusive air-force, equipped with all those terrific annihilating agencies the contemplation of which, as agencies of warfare, is even now holding the world in shuddering horror. Here is by far the greatest aggressive agency yet invented, or likely to be invented ; and it will prove to be the greatest

curse of the world or the greatest blessing that science has brought to mankind, according as we use it ill or well, as we turn it to bad or good ends.

I suggest, then, that the leading nations of the world authorize and instruct the International Authority to equip and maintain a small but highly efficient air-force, and that the prime article of International Law (to be established in the way suggested above, i.e. by treaty between the Great Powers) shall be that no nation shall maintain an air-force of its own. And, in order to make this weapon of International Justice absolutely effective, it will be necessary to forbid absolutely (by similar process of International Law) all commercial and all other forms of aerial navigation. *The right to navigate the air must be confined absolutely to the air-force of the International Authority.* This drastic suppression of all other flying is both necessary and practicable.

It is necessary because, in the absence of such a ban, various nations would soon develop large fleets of commercial airships or airplanes ; it would remain impossible to provide against the rapid conversion of them into instruments of aggression ; therefore, confidence in the powers of protection of the International Authority, the prime condition of general disarmament and therefore of peace, could not be secured.

It would be practicable, because, unlike naval and military preparations, the training of an air-force cannot be carried on in secret. A principal

feature of the training of the one sole and international<sup>a</sup> air-force would be the patrolling of the whole earth, in order to observe and report any indications of unauthorized aerial activity. And there can be little doubt that such patrol could effectively secure this object.

This concentration of the control of all aerial navigation, and of all means of assault from the air, in the hand of the International Authority would, then, secure to it the means of immediate enforcement of its rulings. It would provide that completely effective sanction to International Law which is absolutely necessary, if the institution of any International Authority is to succeed in attaining its prime object, namely, the protection of nations against unjust aggression and against the denial of their indisputable rights. Under the protection of an International Authority, thus effectively armed—armed with a thunderbolt of overwhelming power that could be launched against any State with a delay of only a few hours or days—every nation, it might fairly be hoped, would be willing and glad to divest itself of the burden of armaments. And even if some nations should continue to maintain armies and navies of great size, such forces would cease to be a cause of anxiety to the unarmed nations.

The realization of this plan would bring to the world a further immense benefit, namely, it would relieve all the world from that terrible threat under which the peoples of Europe are even now, in spite

of the League of Nations, suffering acutely—the threat of attack from the air, coming perhaps suddenly, without a moment's warning, to devastate their cities and to spread disaster, mutilation, and death on a scale hitherto only known in the convulsions of Nature.

It is difficult for Americans, or any others who were not under bombardment from the air during the Great War, to realize imaginatively the full horror of this threat. It is necessary to reflect on the following facts. France has already developed a very powerful air-force. Great Britain has felt herself compelled, in spite of great reluctance and her economic embarrassments, to renew her air-force and to vote £20,000,000 for this purpose. But more serious still is the fact that Soviet Russia is preparing an immense air-force. In a recent article,<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-Commander C. A. Tinker has described these Russian preparations. He asserts that this action of the Soviet Government is finding enthusiastic support in the Press and among the populace. "While it is known that three hundred airplanes built in Italy were bought by the Soviet Government last spring, the real power behind this movement is Germany. German manufacturers and operators have established plants and air lines in Russia, and German war pilots make up the flying personnel. This is a direct consequence of

<sup>1</sup> "Christian Science Monitor," August 24, 1923. The same newspaper publishes a recent pronouncement of Premier Mussolini to the effect that Italy must have an air-force stronger than that of any other nation.

the scheme of the Allies to control German aviation since the war. By curtailing activity within German borders the Allies have forced the Germans into other countries. German manufacturers are now engaged in producing airplanes in Holland, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and Russia. Their enterprises in Russia, however, are on such a scale as to overshadow their efforts elsewhere. . . . The Junkers' Airplane Company of Germany has arranged for the creation of the Soviet air-fleet and it has built a huge plant on Russian territory for the purpose. A schedule of contracts calls for delivery, on or before April 1, 1924, of three thousand airplanes of every sort required for a complete military air-force—these are of the all-metal type—the last word in airplane construction. . . . This is enough to cause the French and British considerable worry as to what Russia means. To go further, the bugaboo of a German-Russian-Turkish alliance does not seem to down. Only recently Clemenceau called attention to the fact that behind Russia and Germany is the menace of Turkey, which, largely backed by Boshevistic resources, becomes an enormous power for damage to western civilization.

The prospect raised by these facts is appalling. *No plan other than the one here proposed can relieve the world of this horrible nightmare.* No limitation of armies, navies, and air-fleets by general international agreement; no international army, navy, or air-fleet, nor all three combined, could make the nations secure, and, still less, enable them to feel

themselves to be perfectly secured, against this swift, terrible, incalculable menace. The desired security, the security which alone can induce nations to disarm, and to regard military preparation as a thing of the past, can be attained only by the absolute prohibition of all aerial navigation to the nationals of all countries, except to the small body of aerial experts employed by the International Authority to carry out its orders. And only by maintaining such a body of aerial experts can the International Authority prevent the development of secret air-forces.

Two objections, and, I think, two only, can be raised against this plan.

First, it may be said, the air-force of the International Authority might mutiny and hold the whole world at ransom, as some years ago the crews of two Brazilian warships mutinied effectively against their government. This is not a real danger, for, though the personnel of the air-force would have the power to use a threat, or even to do incalculable damage, all motive for such action would be lacking ; a few men, professional experts carefully selected from all countries, would not be tempted to make themselves universally execrated by betraying the trust placed in them by the whole world, as the instruments of International Law.

The second objection has more weight. It will be urged that the proposed plan involves the suppression of a new agency of transportation vastly more rapid than any other conceivable, and

that the giving up of this agency would be too great a deprivation to ask of the world.

In reply, it may fairly be asked whether any material deprivation could be too great, in proportion to the world-wide benefit to be brought by it—a benefit which will be felt by every human being and which will secure civilization against the menace now hanging over it like a dark thundercloud, the menace of self-destruction. And is it clear that aerial transportation is capable of conferring great benefits on mankind? Actual communication, in these days of telegraphy and radiograms, will not be facilitated by it. Only the transport of persons and of the less bulky kinds of merchandise, such as newspapers, will be accelerated. It is, to my mind at least, an open question, whether, apart from all military use of aerial navigation, the drawbacks attending the development of aerial transportation would not outweigh its benefits. Is it not a doubtful blessing that a man should be able to halve the time required for travel from London to Paris or New York? Is not the world already beginning to suffer from the tendency of men to flit rapidly from place to place in an almost aimless, meaningless fashion? Is it certain that the descent upon France of multiplied swarms of foreign tourists would increase the affection of the French for America or for England? Would not a further great increase of facility of human transport take away one of the few remaining forms of romance? Would it not also tend to the spread



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of that vicious cosmopolitanism which consists in detachment from the traditions of one's own country? Under the head of "A 'Triumph' for Journalism" a newspaper<sup>1</sup> recently commented as follows on the first consignment of trans-continental mail by air from San Francisco to New York: "The flight which marked the culmination of long, patient, and costly effort on the part of the Post Office Department, and in which were employed airplanes representing the final achievement of inventive effort, occupied thirty-eight hours. 'The World' exultantly prints a facsimile of the first page of a San Francisco paper which the inventive genius and the daring of men, aided by the resources of the nation, had thus carried across the continent in less than two days. And what is the message conveyed to the world by this fortunate San Francisco newspaper? Across its first page, in letters of deepest black, appears the heading, 'Bandits Kill Poker Player!' Other large headings are: 'Posses Scour Mountain for Wounded Man'; 'Musical Comedy Stars Revealed as Agents in New York Bucket Shop Quizz'; 'Mrs. Kerr Fined \$10 for Battery of Woman While Whipping Spouse.' The only other considerable head has to do with the enterprise of the Government in arranging the coast-to-coast flight by which all this important intelligence could be speeded across to the eager people of the Atlantic seaboard." And all this "important intelligence" might have come far more rapidly and cheaply by telegram.

<sup>1</sup> "Christian Science Monitor," August 24, 1923.

I will add to this comment only one further consideration. When travel by airplane shall have become easy, cheap, and generally practised, the exploits of the motor-bandits of the present age will be thrown into the shade by those of the airplane-bandits of that rapidly approaching time. What police-force, what frontier-guards, will know how effectively to control these bandits and bootleggers of the air?

In view of these and of many similar considerations, I submit that the deprivation to be asked of the nations, in resigning to the International Authority the exclusive right to make use of aerial navigation, would, in comparison with the benefits to be secured to all the world by such deprivation, be vanishingly small; and that, therefore, there is no serious objection to be raised against the plan here proposed.

It only remains to suggest how the International Authority is to be given this absolute and exclusive control over aerial navigation and the single air-force of the future. It may be hoped that, on ventilation of this plan, its advantages may appear so great and obvious that it will be accepted by all the Nations without exception. But this cannot be confidently predicted. I would urge, then, that its institution requires only the agreement of a group of Great Powers, with the adhesion of many of the smaller nations—an adhesion which many of them would give with enthusiasm. If any nation or nations, great or small, Great Britain, or

Russia, or Germany, or France, or Guatemala, or Liberia, should refuse to consent to dispense with all aerial navigation, it, or they, should be told that great emergencies and world-wide dangers demand drastic remedies ; that the world is now one, and that, as no nation could be allowed to spread a deadly epidemic over the earth, so no nation can be allowed to endanger the peace of the world, to hold a terrible threat over the heads of all other nations, and to frustrate the world-wide desire for peace, disarmament, and the universal sway of International Justice ; that, therefore, it is formally required by the agreed nations that it, or they, subscribe to the compact and faithfully observe its terms.

Lastly, I suggest that the United States Government should take the first step towards the realization of the plan here proposed, by issuing to all the Great Powers a formal invitation to co-operate in its institution and maintenance.

It will be observed that the plan would avoid the great objection raised against the present League of Nations (and especially against Article X of the Covenant of the League) ; for it would not commit the United States, or any other State, to participation in European, or any other, war. Nor would it aim absolutely to prevent all war. Nations which might find a fair cause of quarrel would be at liberty to settle it by open warfare (exclusive of aerial warfare) so long as they abstained from the infringement of explicitly defined precepts of International Law.

It is noteworthy that, although the people of America have been hitherto spared the horrors of bombardment from the air, there is already on foot in the United States a strong movement for the limitation of national air-forces.<sup>1</sup> The American Legion is taking the lead in this movement and gaining wide support. The Legion is reported in the Press to have issued recently a proposal for an international air disarmament conference and to have received favourable replies from many influential persons, including "22 United States senators, 93 representatives, 15 Governors, 216 newspaper editors, 44 college presidents, and

<sup>1</sup> This movement should be strengthened by the following citation from the "Literary Digest": "Military critics agree that there is no defence against this slaughter (from the air) at the present time, since, to put it professionally, the development of the airplane has put the offence far ahead of the defence in modern warfare. They agree also that, in case of another great war, so much of civilization would be destroyed that a return to something resembling the 'Dark Ages' would not be improbable. European civilization might easily be blotted out, agree the German and French authorities, and the British commentator, Commander Burney of the Navy, inventor of the paraplane during the war, and at present a member of Parliament, says that America would be anything but immune. He writes: "There is scarcely a city in America which could not be destroyed, together with every living person therein, within, say, three days of the declaration of war [or perhaps three days before] between America and such a country as Japan on the Asiatic side, or a new group, such as Russia, Germany, and Bulgaria, from the European side. I do not say that this is possible to-day, but assuming that the technical possibilities which now exist in plan and on paper are translated into actual fact within, say, ten years, I believe that I have not overstated the possibilities. . . . An airship leaving Japan could, within forty-eight hours, be destroying San Francisco. Similarly, an airship leaving Europe could be attacking New York in less than forty hours from the time of her departure.'"

82 other prominent citizens." It is clear, therefore, that there is a large body of influential opinion well prepared to regard with favour the plan here proposed for the international use of air-force to suppress the use of national air-forces and to secure the blessings of disarmament and peace throughout the world,

### ADDENDUM

It should be laid down as a preliminary principle that the persons who should draft the clauses of the proposed international agreements would be held personally responsible for the clear and unambiguous phrasing of each and every clause. If any such persons were to be found guilty of having drafted clauses in the ambiguous style of the notorious clause of the Armistice of 1918 governing reparations, of the clause of the Panama Canal Treaty stipulating for equality of treatment, or of the equally notorious and ambiguous clause of the Treaty of Versailles stipulating the right of the Allies to take steps for the enforcement of payment of reparation in case of default by Germany; in any such case, the persons found guilty should be hanged, drawn, and quartered, and their heads should be set up on pikes before the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.

## APPENDIX II

### PSYCHOLOGY, DISARMAMENT, AND PEACE

AN ADDRESS MADE AT THE MCGILL UNIVERSITY,  
MONTREAL, ON FEBRUARY 8, 1924

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American Review.")*

THE purpose of my address is to illustrate and enforce a truth which in theory is obvious and generally admitted, but which in practice is almost universally ignored—the truth, namely, that, if we would effectively intervene in the affairs of nations in order to bring harmony in place of strife, to prevent the waste of human energies in destructive warfare, to make conflict give place to honourable emulation and friendly co-operation, we must constantly have regard to the facts of human nature, we must think always psychologically. In the sphere of the control or management of individuals this truism is now at last beginning to receive practical recognition ; those who are leading the way in the theory and practice of education are striving to make good use of such psychology as we have ; in industry the fact that the workers are not merely hands, but also heads and hearts, is finding practical recognition in many hopeful movements—in welfare-work, in personnel selection

and management, in profit-sharing, in co-partnership, in giving the workers a voice in the general management and in the control of the conditions of their work, in recognizing them as very delicate complex parts of a vital and psychic organization, rather than as merely subordinate fragments of a vast machine. In medicine also the truth that man is not merely a mechanism, but also a purposive being, striving more or less intelligently to adjust himself to strange complexities of his environment—even in medicine this truth is at least receiving wide and rapidly increasing recognition. In these and other spheres of practice concerned with individual men and women the leaders are eagerly turning to psychology for such guidance as it can provide.

But in the sphere of international relations psychological thinking is still conspicuously lacking. Here the economic interpretation of history is the assumption that, explicitly or implicitly, underlies almost all discussion and practice. It is still assumed that men are governed solely by the desire for economic prosperity, that each man and each nation strives merely to obtain as large as possible a share of the material goods or wealth of the world, and that all that is needed to produce the millenium is maximum production and equitable distribution of such goods. This fallacy of the economists, which throughout the nineteenth century was the openly avowed basis of economic theory, this fiction of the purely "economic man," this grossly oversimplified psychology, continues to be the funda-

mental assumption of those who discuss and direct the relations of nations, vitiating their interpretation of the past, their discussions of the present, their forecasts of, and their prescriptions for, the future. Modern history provides but too many illustrations of this truth. I will mention a few only—the prediction of the Cobdenites that the rapid increase of international trade must soon lead to an era of universal peace ; Mr. Norman Angell's assumption that nations go to war for economic gain, and his belief that the demonstration of the economic futility of war is the sure way to prevent it ; the confident prophecies of the pre-war period to the effect that European war, if it should break out, could not last more than a few months, by reason of economic exhaustion and financial chaos. The course of history has shown, and always will show, the falsity of all such purely economic interpretations of national life. As Viscount Milner says : " Actual experience, in and after the war, has confounded even the best-reasoned economic anticipations."<sup>1</sup> And why ? It was not that the reasoning was faulty. It was rather that the premises of the reasoning were false ; for the main premise was that man is purely or chiefly an economic man, that the only motive that need be taken into account is the

<sup>1</sup> Viscount Milner writes also : " The general conviction certainly was, and it was strongest on the part of men versed in economic studies, that, if nothing else brought the war to an early close, the impossibility of financing it must do so. In view of the enormous costliness of modern warfare, it was argued, and reasonably argued, that no great civilized country could long endure the financial strain."—" Questions of the Hour."



economic motive, the desire for material comfort and prosperity—in short, a psychology so simplified as to be grossly misleading.

If in national and international affairs we would reason to sound conclusions, if we would make well-founded anticipations and fruitful prescriptions we must think in terms of some more adequate psychology than that which regards man as a mechanism, or that which looks upon him as a purely rational creature seeking only a maximum of well-being, or as an animal moved only by desire of pleasure and aversion from pain. In terms of such psychologies who could have foretold or can now interpret the fact that Prussian fanatics for the welfare of mankind would slaughter in cold blood millions of their fellows, send other millions to untimely death by starvation, and bring their country to economic ruin ; or the fact that, upon the French occupation of the Ruhr, the German nation would inflict upon itself extreme suffering and plunge itself into bankruptcy ; or the fact that, when France proceeded to put economic pressure upon Germany, the British Government, supported by the mass of the people, would steadily oppose itself to the crippling of German industry, the rapid revival of which was threatening to undercut all British export trade and to add immensely to the severe economic embarrassments of the British people ?

Yet, in spite of all such experiences, the practical men of the world—the statesmen, the economists,

and the financial experts—continue to talk and act in terms of the false psychology of the “economic man.” We hear it repeatedly asserted that reparations, international debts, and disturbed exchanges are the root of all the trouble ; that, if and when these economic tangles can be straightened out, all will be well. And the financial and economic experts of the Reparations Commission are set to work on this task, while all the world looks on, believing that now at last the trouble is about to be terminated. General Dawes breezily opens his enquiry, and all America congratulates the world, assuming that now at last the magic touch of its national idol, the American business-man, is about to set Europe in order once more. And, when the great plan for the economic rehabilitation of Germany shall have been given to the world, and when France refuses, as she undoubtedly will, to yield to the blandishments of the business-man, turning a deaf ear to his demonstration that the economic restoration of Germany will increase her own material prosperity, the business-man and his worshippers will be filled with naïve astonishment at the failure of their efforts and with scorn and moral indignation at the “ militarism ” of France.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I am glad to recognize that one business-man at least is a partial exception to the rule. Mr. Bernard Baruch, in his “apologia” for the Treaty (“The making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty”), has truly said : “No one can understand the Peace Treaty who does not know and cannot measure the human conditions under which it was brought forth” ; . . . its demands “had their genesis in deep-rooted and almost ineradicable hatreds and in the insistent

Though the practical men, the statesmen and financiers and economists, and the greater part of the Press and of the general public continue to base all their reasoning on the fallacy of the "economic man," there is to be heard in the land the voice of another party, whose very different prescriptions are equally well reasoned, equally "rational," and equally futile—futile for the same reason, namely, that they are not based on any sound psychology. This is the voice of the "idealists." Let me cite you one fair sample only of the utterances of this voice :

"While one sympathizes with the motive up-desire for self-protection against future danger." "The Conference was dealing with blood-raw passions still pulsing through the people's veins. It was impossible, I repeat, to ignore the human factors . . . There are cross-currents in the tides of circumstance against which principles and men, no matter how strong they may be, are at times unable to make headway. These cross-currents may have their rise in great passions that cannot be stilled until they have run their course. It would be idle to assert that the atmosphere in which the Treaty of Versailles was made was free from enmity and vengeance; it would be transcending human nature if such were the case. The Treaty was made in the still smouldering furnace of human passion." But Mr. Baruch, while recognizing retrospectively the force of the passion of hatred at the time of the making of the Treaty, permits himself to take a hopeful view of the future because he regards this hatred as purely an after-effect of the war which is destined soon to die out, leaving men once more purely rational economic men. It is necessary to recognize that the passion of hatred has two roots, two components—the passions of anger and of fear. The essential psychological fact of the present international situation is that in France, while the fierce anger engendered by the brutality of the German methods of warfare is dying down, the fear continues, because the conditions that excite it remain, and will continue until France can be given *security* against Germany

holding the advantages of organization as a means to overcome war, it still remains that until the root evils, of envy, malice, etc., are eliminated from consciousness, the mainspring of war will be undestroyed. It is true that organization would do much to hold the war spirit in check, but to accomplish results which will be permanent something more than such human methods is needed. When wisdom, kindness, and true Christianity fill the hearts of all men, it will not be necessary to organize, and, until they do, organization must be seen as subservient to the effort to regenerate the human heart.”<sup>1</sup> Comment upon platitudes of this sort seems useless, yet, since they appear very frequently in the Press and in conversation, and since the “Monitor” prints every day in large letters the following cryptic phrase, “First the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear,” I will comment on them by constructing a strictly analogous platitude, as follows: While one sympathizes with the motive which inspires men of science to discover improved methods of agriculture, one cannot regard such efforts as of more than very subsidiary importance. For until the inherent defects of our food-plants, their weakness in face of noxious weeds, their absolute dependence on sunlight and moisture, are eradicated, the danger of hunger and starvation for the human race will not be eliminated. It is true that improved agriculture may perhaps make some slight defence

<sup>1</sup> “Christian Science Monitor,” December 24, 1923.

against famine ; but something more is needed. When we shall have food-plants that will flourish and yield abundantly and perpetually without human care, and in spite of the most adverse conditions of soil and climate and weeds, then, and then only, will the human race be freed from the curse of labour. The one platitude ignores the nature of man, the other the nature of plants. But the practice of international management requires to be founded on sound psychology, on knowledge of human nature, not a whit less than agriculture requires to be practised with due regard to the laws of botany.

It may be said that such "idealism" is too obviously remote from reality to influence international affairs and therefore should be allowed to pass without comment as the pious and harmless expression of affable natures. Yet the present chaos and suffering in Europe are due very largely, if not mainly, to the influence of just such an idealist, the man who prescribed "peace without victory" and "the fourteen points," tied up the Peace Treaty with the League of Nations, and, by inducing France to believe that America would join with England to guarantee her against aggression, persuaded her to renounce the other safeguards which she naturally and properly desired.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the new British Premier, would seem to belong to this group, and, since he presides also over the Foreign Office, it is of peculiar interest to enquire whether he thinks psychologically

in any degree. His latest utterance is not encouraging in this respect. He is reported in the Press to have said: "France must understand that its safety cannot in the future depend on armaments or alliances between nations. To unprejudiced minds it would seem that the best guarantee of French safety would be the admission of Germany into the League of Nations, for a league of all nations; or even of the nations of Europe, would be a great obstacle to armed aggression, such as Germany could not ignore. But we need courage to disarm; that is the only sacrifice on which permanent peace can be based." It is certain that the answer of the statesmen and of the people of France to this amiable proposal of an "unprejudiced mind," though it may not find official utterance, will be of the following tenor: "We distinguish between courage and foolhardy recklessness. The Covenant of the League provides no guarantee of security for us; and it is not clear that the admission of Germany will in any degree improve the situation in this respect. Since America and Britain have refused to guarantee us against destruction by a restored Germany, and since, in anticipation of that guarantee, we have renounced the territorial adjustments which would have given us some measure of security, our prime duty to France is to maintain and develop our air-force and army, especially its African section; and our second duty is to put such pressure on Germany as will prevent her restoration as a great united military power."

A vigorous exponent of this idealistic school of thought is Mr. M. E. Ravage, author of "The Malady of Europe" (New York, 1923). In reviewing the past, Mr. Ravage is as psychologically minded as Mr. Baruch; but when he turns to prescriptions for the future he throws psychology to the winds and speaks the language of "Idealism." As regards the French, his prescription runs: "A straightforward statement to them now, warning them that the present course of their governing class is alienating the respect and affection of the American people, would bring very prompt results." It is as though one should signal from a safe harbour to the crew of a ship on fire: "Calm yourselves; if you continue to behave in so agitated a manner you will lose our respect and affection." Mr. Ravage recognizes the necessity of providing security for France. And what is his prescription? It is that America should shed the light of her benign countenance upon the German Republic, and, by so doing, prevent the restoration of the monarchy. "The only way to help make Germany democratic and pacific, the only way to wake her out of her dream of revenge, is to assure her people of our goodwill towards them, to convince them by concrete acts that they have everything to lose by a return to their antiquated and discarded system." Here we have a perfect illustration of the ineffectiveness of American "idealism." Its exponents persist in believing that the moral exhortation and example of America are all that is required to set the world

to rights and to keep it on the path of the virtuous and prosperous economic man for evermore.

Two recently published books have made powerful pleas in the name of justice and humanity for a more lenient treatment of Germany by the victorious Powers. One of these ("Let France Explain," by F. Bausman) dwells chiefly upon the events and activities that preceded and led up to the war. The other ("The Decadence of Europe," by F. Nitti) vividly depicts the present disorder of Europe and seeks to display its causes, to assign the blame for it, and to urge, as the only remedy, the economic rehabilitation of Germany by relaxation to the point of abolition of all measures of economic reprisals taken against her.

These two books together thus cover the ground of pre-war and post-war conditions, and may be taken to present the case for leniency in the most complete and authoritative manner. For Mr. Bausman, an American of high legal standing and qualification, claims that, though of German descent on the one side and of English on the other, he writes with the strict impartiality which is more easily attainable by an American than by any other commentator on the affairs of Europe; and in all that he says of Great Britain he displays a generous appreciation of her aims, her actions, and her difficulties.

Signor Nitti, who, as Premier of Italy, has taken an active part in much of the post-war negotiations, and who has been a lifelong student of economics,



writes with a fullness of knowledge of European politics and economics that probably is unsurpassed, and he is manifestly actuated by motives of the purest philanthropy.

It is, however, the most striking feature of these books by these two eminent authorities that, in all their advocacy of a policy of leniency and reconciliation, they utterly fail to take account of the fundamental and determining facts of the present situation in Europe—facts which are purely psychological.

Those fundamental facts are, first, the French fear of future aggression by Germany; secondly, the fact that France can be turned from her present policy, to one of reconciliation and of co-operation in European reconstruction, only by guaranteeing her against such aggression, *by allaying her fear*.

That these are the two fundamental and determining facts of the present disastrous state of affairs in Europe no instructed person can deny. It follows deductively from the history of European relations and from our knowledge of human nature. It has been repeatedly admitted by many well-informed students of the situation of all nationalities. It is vehemently asserted by Frenchmen of all classes. Yet so commonly are these two fundamental facts ignored or passed lightly over that it seems necessary to emphasize them. Especially is this ignoring or belittling of the fundamental facts common form among those who denounce recent French policy as militaristic and imperialistic and as aiming at the

economic depression or the actual destruction of Germany. It is necessary for the friends of France to admit the truth of these changes. Her defence must be conducted by pointing out that no other policy was open to her statesmen. The first duty of a statesman is to secure his country against destruction. Let each of us admit that, if he were a patriotic far-seeing Frenchman, he would under present conditions be bound to support a policy aiming at such treatment of Germany as will prevent her regaining her former economic ascendancy; for such ascendancy would mean at least potential military ascendancy, and that in turn would be a terrible threat to France. A keen and philanthropic leader in the American business world has lately stated this very frankly; that he should have seized these essential facts rather than follow the crowd in talking exclusively of debts, reparation, and exchanges, is much to his honour. He writes: "There was never a time when France would have allowed Germany to recuperate industrially. Whenever Germany has seemed on the point of being able to pay according to schedule, new demands, new complications have been put in her way by the French." And he points out how, as inevitable correlates of this policy, France has done much to militarize Poland and Czecho-Slovakia and Belgium, has encouraged separatist movements within Germany, occupied the Ruhr, developed her African army, and, it may be added, perfected and enlarged her aerial forces until they have become a night-

mare to her neighbours. These are the facts which the accusers of France never weary of throwing up against her. But, unlike most of these accusers of France, Mr. Filene<sup>1</sup> is not content to rail against her. He goes farther, and admits the inevitableness of this policy under the existing circumstances. "The basis of this French policy," he truly says, "has been the lack of guarantees of her safety. If Germany had been allowed to recuperate, France would have had to keep on increasing her armaments to offset the possibility of a new German military power as represented by her revived industries. This increased military effort would have so increased taxation and hampered production that France would have sunk to a second or third rate power." He asserted: "No French Government could have survived, if it had tried to follow any other policy than that of continued pressure on Germany. *If I were a Frenchman I should have supported Poincaré's foreign policy.*" That is a refreshingly honest statement. He goes on to say: "This, in brief, is the French Government's programme. The object of its pressure on Germany is to destroy German unity, which it considers a menace to France's security. Until assured of safety it will maintain the French armies as the strongest in Europe. When Aristide Briand was disposed to listen to Lloyd George's proposals at Cannes for

<sup>1</sup> My citations are from an address delivered by Mr. Edward Filene at the Town Hall, New York City, December 14, 1923.

a more lenient treatment of Germany, he was forced to resign. There has been no opposition possible to this programme. All parties, with the exception of the extreme radicals, have united to support a policy of keeping Germany under. Last summer I spent many hours with the French opposition leaders in Paris. They are Liberals who have occupied positions up to the premiership. Naturally they would like to replace M. Poincaré in power. But they all told me that they could do so only if they could obtain guarantees of aid in case of another attack—guarantees that would satisfy the average voter. From my personal observations I feel warranted in asserting that the French people are not militaristic. Next to being assured safety from Germany they want to escape from the heavy taxes due to the war debts, the upkeep of the army, and the expenses of restoring the invaded provinces. . . . On the whole, the French are a sensible people. They have no illusions about the reparations a divided Germany can pay, and if they could feel secure against another German attack they would rather see their neighbour restored and in a position to pay than divided and bankrupt. *The cure for the so-called French militarism must come through an assurance of safety.* . . . No threats from the outside will ever make them give up their army until they feel their safety no longer demands it."

The recognition of these facts as fundamental is the first requisite of all intelligent discussion.

Great Britain, through her failure to recognize them, has greatly prolonged the passive resistance of the Germans to French action in the Ruhr, and thereby, although her motive was largely philanthropic, has done much to produce the present suffering in Germany. And all those who, like Messrs. Bausman and Nitti, expose and denounce French policy, without giving due weight to these facts, are merely wasting ink and paper, if they are not also further embittering the French and hardening their resolution.

It may be argued that if, from the Armistice onward, France had pursued a policy of extreme magnanimity towards the vanquished, if she had claimed no reparations, or but very modest sums, and had done everything possible to conciliate Germany and to secure her friendship, she would have escaped her present dilemma. But that is a matter of opinion; and France, to whom it was a question of life or death, was entitled to her own opinion. France had no guarantee that the imperialist faction in Germany would not, sooner or later, gain the upper hand; and such guarantee is still wholly lacking, except in so far as it is provided by the French army. Can we reasonably assert that France ought to have accepted the risk involved in such a policy? Is it fair to France to assert that she ought to have adopted at once a policy of brotherly love, putting aside all claim for reparations and all desire to punish Germany for the ferocious manner in which she had waged the war? Germany

staked all on her policy of ruthlessness. In pursuit of it, she rendered modern warfare more horrible than any civilized imagination had supposed to be possible; she proclaimed in words and in actions, that her policy was "Weltherrschaft oder Niedergang."<sup>1</sup> Can we blame France if, in the interests of her own future existence, she declares that Germany, having failed to achieve *Weltherrschaft*, must accept *Niedergang*?

But all such questions of justification or blame for past policy and action are beside the mark. France, rightly or wrongly, or rather inevitably, has chosen her policy and has acted vigorously. Germany has resisted and suffered. We have to deal with the future that will arise out of the present. Can any reasonable man doubt that, if Germany could be restored to full economic prosperity to-morrow, France would be destroyed the day after to-morrow, unless some means of protecting her could be found? France does not doubt it; and it is useless to call upon her, with Signor Nitti and other well-meaning philanthropists, for a change of heart, until *secure protection* can be

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Bausman, in his apology for German policy before the war, attributes her militarism wholly to fear of hostile encirclement and especially to Russian aggression. This fear no doubt played a great part in enabling the military party to retain its dominance. But he ignores almost completely the one outstanding damning fact, namely, the popular success of the German Navy League and the upbuilding of the German navy. That navy was utterly useless to a peaceful Germany; without it Germany could have cultivated with ease and success a firm and lasting friendship with Great Britain.

provided for her. When, and only when, such protection can be absolutely assured the change of heart will come. Once more I insist it is before all things necessary to have some knowledge of human nature and to make intelligent use of it in international problems; and, as Mr. Filene has said, the French are a sensible people; though there are among them militarists who thirst for military glory and empire, the bulk of the people would be glad to be liberated from their military burdens. And the change of heart would come the more readily by reason of the fact that now at last Germany has suffered severely; for such suffering was a natural and inevitable demand of those who in their turn had suffered the torments imposed by the ruthless invader. Whatever theory of punishment we may hold, whether the retributive, the reformatory, the preventive, the warning-to-others theory, or whether we hold that all punishment is always in all circumstances wrong or harmful, we must yet recognize that human nature is so constituted that it naturally and inevitably demands that he who has committed great wrongs and wantonly imposed great sufferings for his own selfish ends shall in turn suffer. Let us not then reproach the French people with harbouring vengeful feeling; let us recognize that that desire which by their critics is called the spirit of revenge, and by them held up for the reprobation of the world, is a natural and inevitable outcome of the sufferings which have been inflicted on them, a desire which

under similar circumstance would inevitably work in the minds of any and every people. Let us further recognize that the sufferings of the German people during the year 1923, largely self-imposed as they were, have in some degree satisfied this natural, this inevitable, desire of the French, and in so far have prepared the way for reconciliation : in other words, the element of anger in the French people's hatred has been partially satisfied, assuaged, and therefore greatly diminished ; but the fear remains.

We must apply psychological thinking to the German nation also. When we do that, we shall find a truer view of German responsibility for the war than any of those current. We shall not regard all Germans as natural footpads, for ever thirsting for the blood and treasure of other nations ; nor shall we entirely dissociate in our minds a mild-mannered, peace-loving populace from a dynasty and a ruling aristocracy impelled by insensate and ruthless ambition. We shall accept Mr. Bausman's demonstration that Russia, more than any other one Power, was responsible for the outbreak of the Great War. For we shall sympathetically appreciate the fact that Germany's history and her geographical position combined to render the German people chronically fearful of simultaneous aggression from east and west, and abnormally apprehensive of all European movements and affinities that might be interpreted by their fearful imaginations as tending to hostile encirclement. We shall



understand that, owing to these unfortunate historical and geographical circumstances, the German nation was a chronic sufferer from a fear-complex. We shall remember that a man who suffers in a similar way is apt, in his natural endeavour to maintain his self-respect and the respect of others, to compensate for his repressed fear by a boastful aggressive behaviour that makes him appear to be a natural swashbuckler and fire-eater. And we shall understand that Germany, the great bulk of whose people are anything but warlike by nature, has long over-compensated her fear-complex in a similar way. We shall understand that it was this fear-complex, pervading the mass of the people, that made it possible for the German Government to maintain its autocratic regime, to impose upon the mass of the people the burdens of militarism, and made it impossible for even the four millions of Socialists to oppose effectively the aggressive gestures and actions of the Emperor, the Junkers, and the big business-men. At the same time we shall understand that the responsibility of a great nation cannot be dissociated from that of its government; that, if a people allows its government to drag it into unfortunate and reprehensible undertakings, it must bear the consequences of such national actions. And, above all, we shall realize that, no matter how sympathetically we may regret the unfortunate nature of Germany's historical and geographical conditions, those conditions remain, and in fact have been aggravated immensely by the

war. On her eastern side is the vast potential military power of Soviet Russia, whose intentions remain obscure but threatening, and a formidable chain of smaller powers, all potentially aggressive. On her western flank is France, embittered by her cruel sufferings and by her failure to obtain the compensations to which she feels herself justly entitled—a failure which she attributes to the wilful duplicity of Germany and to the bad faith of her allies and of America; France haunted by the spectre of a Germany re-established in an economic dominance more irresistible than ever and arming steadily for revenge, for a final annihilation of her ancient enemy, a death-blow to France as a great power.

Here, then, is a terrible European situation which, when we regard it psychologically, is clearly amenable to one solution only. One measure and one only is capable, if it can be instituted, of bringing even a fair prospect of peaceful development to the suffering nations of Europe. That one indispensable measure for the salvation of the tortured and decaying civilization of Europe <sup>1</sup> is *the establishment*

<sup>1</sup> This is no over-statement of the case. Prosperous American business-men run over to Europe and see there new factories, improved modernized plants, and a laborious population struggling to regain its former standards of comfort. And they return, saying that Europe is recovering and will soon be more prosperous than ever. But they ignore the fact that the middle classes, the chief bearers of civilization, are in rapid process of extermination, and that, even though the industrial revival may be all they describe, the outbreak of the next war will sweep it all away and plunge Europe into depths of misery exceeding all that it had as yet suffered—a misery, an impoverishment of

*of some adequate protection of nations against unjustified aggression.* For fear of aggression, of military invasion, is the tap-root of all the trouble; that which alone renders possible and inevitable the flourishing of militarism, the maintenance of armaments, and the imminent risk of war, in spite of the strong desire for peace of the vast majority of Europeans of all nations. And this fear, which

men and of spiritual and material resources, so extreme that the renaissance of civilization must be improbable and, at the best, long delayed.

An American observer recently returned from a long stay in Europe, one whose vision is not wholly limited by the blindness of the economic fallacy, has painted a less rosy and truer picture than that of the business-men: "Poverty and disillusionment are working havoc in the stamina of the great race which once dominated the world. A decade of massacre and under-nourishment has blasted its physique; the *continuing insecurity* is undermining its moral poise. The ethic of escape is in possession of men and women of all social classes. Never, I think, has the spiritual tone of Christendom been at such a low level. Sex irregularity, commercial dishonesty, crass materialism are rampant. The commercial esprit de corps has disappeared. Political indifferentism among the masses and corruption among the starving, underpaid officials are prevalent from sea to sea. There is faith in nothing—neither in God nor in man, neither in religion nor in science, neither in art, nor in nature, neither in the established order nor in revolution. The moorings of civilization are severed, the bonds of society are in a state of dissolution. Economically and politically Europe is receding to the disintegration of the Middle Ages. Morally and spiritually it is retreating to the edge of the jungle. Each for himself and the devil take the lot of us, is the universal philosophy. Eat and drink what you can get to-day, be merry at all costs, for to-morrow, as sure as death, there comes another war. . . . The unburied ghost of the late disorder still stalks abroad to infect the air of Europe. There are a dozen points of friction in three continents capable at any moment of enveloping the whole world in fire."—(Mr. M. E. Ravage, in "The Malady of Europe." New York, 1923.)

was the fundamental cause of the Great War, has been magnified a hundred-fold by that disaster. Before the war the nations of Europe looked upon war as a strenuous adventure in which each nation would submit a part of its young manhood to the risk of suffering, death, and mutilation, and would itself run the risk of diminished economic prosperity and political prestige, and even of diminished territory. But now each nation knows that war, unless it be attended by immediate and overwhelming success, means death in hideous forms for great masses of its population and untold sufferings and tortures for those who are not so fortunate as to be killed outright. Hence the old fear works more strongly than ever in the minds of men and nations ; and the old competition in armaments is renewed with a more feverish energy and a more desperate hope, a more urgent and insistent fear.<sup>1</sup> The new terrors added to warfare by recent

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Ravage here also speaks the unpalatable truth : " The soul of Europe is haunted by the evil spectre of its past. The air of Europe is charged with suspicion and fear, with mistrust and hatred. The mind of every people is scarred with bitter memories of invasions and devastations, of subjection and oppression. There is not a corner on the Continent or on its islands which has not time and again been overrun by one or another of its neighbours. There is not a nation, great or small, whose lands have not been violated, its freedom extinguished, its pride humbled under the trampling feet of the conqueror. Nearly every nation has been both offender and victim. . . . It is this spirit of discord that stalks through the fair halls and courtyards of Europe. Its poison has filtered into every chamber of European life. It has soured and curdled its ideals and aspirations, its generous emotions, its loyalty, and its human impulses. It has infected the instinct of fellowship and made nationalism a sickly craving for revenge and self-sufficiency.

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inventions—the submarine, the tank, the poison-gas, the long-range gun, the immensely destructive bombs, the airship and the aeroplane—the new ruthlessness in the application of these terrible agencies to civilian populations (which we owe to German logic)—these modern developments have magnified the fears of all nations, rendering them more than ever nervous, anxious, defensive, apt to undertake offence as the best mode of defence, and therefore more aggressive. Fortunately, the increased horribleness of war and the exposure of all civilians to its horrors have produced a further effect, namely, they have disposed all peoples to seek some way of preventing war, some way of ensuring nations against aggression, have made this an urgent personal problem for every intelligent European.

Self-preservation is Nature's first law and function for men and animals. In the service of this function, Nature has endowed men and animals alike with the immensely powerful instinct of fear. It is useless to offer the most tempting food to hungry men if you seat them on a powder-barrel and flourish a torch about it. It is vain to spread a banquet before them if each one fears that his neighbour will stab him in the back at the first opportunity. They cannot enjoy the viands, still less can they add to them a feast of reason and a

It has made every little people in Europe see in its neighbour across the frontier an enemy, a potential master and despoiler, a demon who will not let other people live their own lives as they choose "

flow of soul, if they cannot be assured of security. It is equally futile to suppose that the unrest of Europe can be allayed by any economic or financial adjustments so long as the first essential of harmonious co-operation is lacking, namely, *security*.

Idealists, the whole world over, are putting their trust and their hopes for the future in the League of Nations. But we hear the most diverse estimates of its power to remedy the present evils. While many men speak of it as a dismal failure, an abortive effort, a mere gesture of international idealism, others acclaim what it has already accomplished and profess to see in it a surely growing power in which we may justly place all our hopes. Both parties, no doubt, overstate their case. It is, I think, beyond dispute, even by the best friends of the League, that as at present constituted it is incapable of guaranteeing the world against disastrous and most terrible wars. It is true that if America and all the other nations still outside the League shall join it, and if all nations within it shall scrupulously live up to the ideals implied by it, its power for good may become very great. But, even so, its power to prevent war, under its existing Covenant, is and must be woefully inadequate; and there is imminent danger that the disaster shall break upon the world while the League is still struggling for existence and influence.

Professor Irving Fisher has published a most effective appeal to America for her participation in

the League<sup>1</sup>; he has stated the case most persuasively and forcibly, with a full knowledge of the situation. Yet it must be confessed that his appeal seems to be failing to secure the effect he so nobly desires. There is but too much truth in the criticism of a recent reviewer,<sup>2</sup> who, after praising the book, goes on to say: "But in the realm of the philosophy of the League and of America's relationship to it, Professor Fisher is less happy. He lays down the principle that the world needs regulation and law, and that these are enough to insure order and preserve peace. Apparently he makes no allowance for a 'yegg' nation, which, like Germany in 1914, is willing to play the part of a world high-wayman. Although he quotes liberally from Theodore Roosevelt's writings to emphasize that any league of nations, in order to be effective, must have the sanction of force, of the policeman with the club, back of it, he fails sufficiently to stress the truth that lacking such sanction the entire scheme may be shattered by a 'yegg' nation. He admits that Article X was meant to provide this force, but it is not clear from his writing that he believes that it will do so."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "League or War." New York, 1923.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. N. Roosevelt in the "New York Times," May 20, 1923.

<sup>3</sup> The relevant passages in Prof. Fisher's book are the following, and since they strongly re-enforce the argument of this essay, I cite them here: "Even more inadequate than calling conferences is the project to 'outlaw war,' without backing up that sentiment by penalties or even by an organization. One might as well, as in the early California days above referred to, pass a resolution outlawing murder and theft and expect an automatic obedience to the resolution. It might do no good, but

Articles X and XVI of the Covenant of the League were meant to provide the force needed for the protection of nations. But these articles, as Mr. Roosevelt insists, are not sufficient guarantees of would have little influence with desperadoes. Similarly inadequate, though likewise praiseworthy in purpose, are the passing of resolutions and parading the streets with placards inscribed 'No more war,' or fraternizing through the Sulgrave Institute, or campaigning for 'International Friendship through the Churches', and no one realizes their inadequacy better than these organizations themselves.

"For anyone to put undue confidence in these inadequate remedies is mischievous; for such efforts satisfy unthinking minds, while the 'barriers' disappear as quickly as a fog bank when gusts of passion arise. . . . There is no intention of sneering at such efforts. They are good so far as they go. They are first steps or foundation-stones; the cultivation of a strong peace sentiment is a very essential preparation for an international organization to maintain peace, and an equally essential force in making that organization function after it is established. But merely to create sentiment and do nothing more is the height of futility; for there will often be some States and people that will not conform to the sentiment—Turks, for instance, and Junkers, whether in or out of Germany.

"As Roosevelt says, there must be a policeman back of the judge. Some ardent pacifists leave the 'fist' out of the 'pacifist,' and think that the abolition of war is the abolition of force. It is the abolition of lawless force by the substitution of lawful restraint. This lawful restraint, while chiefly that of public opinion and economic pressure, has a small residuum of physical force. In short, some soldiers must continue not as soldiers, but as policemen. Not all of the sword becomes the ploughshare. Part becomes the policeman's club.

"Enforcing peace is not, as some pacifists have thought and said, a 'contradiction in terms.' On the contrary, the only peace mankind enjoys is a peace enforced as against its disturbers and enforceable against its would-be disturbers.

*"If the whole idea of force is eliminated, the League will be immensely weakened, and the injury thus done to it will some day have to be repaired; otherwise we shall pay dearly, in wars, for such pacifism. A forceless pacifism is no substitute for a league.*

"Thus far the League has had its success through public



the protection of nations. These articles are woefully inadequate for the purpose. They entitle the League merely to advise, to recommend to its member-nations, co-operation in military or economic pressure for the prevention of aggression. They do not bind the member-nations to any effective action on behalf of threatened States.<sup>1</sup> Yet America refuses to participate in the League, just because the bulk of her people are strongly averse from assuming the shadowy obligations imposed by these two Articles, fearing that these might involve

opinion, not through physical force. It did start creating an international police force for the Vilna territory, but decided not to use it. [Others assert it found itself unable to put the scheme into execution.] . . . Nor has any actual use of the boycott yet been made, although the threat of a boycott has had a salutary influence in at least two cases. *The Blockade Commission, after long labour, could not devise a practicable method of boycott.*

"The quick conferences of the League rely upon the waiting force of public opinion and that force is enough *so long as the Great Powers are willing to respect it.*" (Italics mine.)

<sup>1</sup> We have seen that a great advocate of the League, Prof. Irving Fisher, admits the need for physical force as a sanction of the League's rulings. But we have seen also how he admits that Article XVI, authorizing the boycott, has already proved impracticable, and admits also that the League has in practice to rely on public opinion, which "is enough as long as the Great Powers are willing to respect it." He does not examine the question of the efficiency of Article X, beyond pointing out that "the only obligation in Article X is the obligation of the Council to advise the individual nations, who are free to follow or reject this advice as they see fit." In fact, in this connexion his reasoning is sadly at fault. While insisting strongly that the sanction of force is necessary to the efficiency of the League, he admits by implication that the League is provided with no such sanction. It is necessary to indict Prof. Fisher in his own words: "For anyone to put undue confidence in these inadequate remedies is mischievous."

her in participation in European war. It is futile for the friends of the League to hope that this objection of the American people may be overcome. The recent publication of the Bok Peace Plan does but make this clearer than ever. The Plan owes its success to the fact that it proposes America shall join the World Court and shall unofficially co-operate with the League—a co-operation intended to lead up to membership, but only on condition that Articles X and XVI shall be expunged from the Covenant. The able author of the Bok Peace Plan writes: "Experience in the last three years has demonstrated probably insuperable difficulties in the way of fulfilling in all parts of the world the large promise of Article X in respect to either its letter or its spirit. No one now expects the League Council to try to summon armies and fleets, since it utterly failed to obtain even an international police force for the Vilna district." He points out also that the proposal (inserted in Article XVI) to make use of international boycott has proved equally impracticable. He writes: "Articles X and XVI, in their original forms, have therefore been practically condemned by the principal organs of the League and are to-day reduced to something like innocuous desuetude." And so his Plan proposes to drop these articles and frankly to assert the principle that "the only kind of compulsion which nations can freely engage to apply to each other in the name of Peace, is that which arises from conference, from moral judgment,

from full publicity, and from the power of public opinion." And he offers to the nations of the League the choice between, on the one hand, retaining these articles as "a form of words" and on the other hand "the presence of the United States at the council table of the family of nations."

If the League, under its present Covenant, obviously and admittedly lacks the sanctions that should secure the observance of its rulings, what hope can we have that, when Articles X and XVI shall have been expunged from its Covenant, nations will look to it for sure protection against aggression, that it will be able to provide that security which alone will allay their fear, the tap-root of all armaments and of all modern war. Even the benign presence of the United States at its council table, ready to join in moral censure of aggression, will leave the League totally unable to induce the nations to disarm, because unable to protect them, and equally powerless to prevent war.

I have said above, and it has often been said by others, that it is the aversion from "entangling alliances," from the risk of becoming involved in European wars, that prevents the entry of America into the League. But though this is one strong ground of the American refusal to join the League, it is, I feel sure, unjust to the American people to assert that it is the sole ground. There is a vast number of Americans who are not indifferent to Europe's difficulties and who are willing to make sacrifices to help her, but who yet are not advocates

of joining the League, just because they see that the League has not the power to achieve the prime object which they and its advocates alike have in view, namely, the protection of nations against aggressive war. If this large part of the American people can be invited to co-operate, even at some sacrifice, in an institution which would both avoid obligation to participate in European wars and would at the same time provide sure protection to unoffending nations, they would warmly accept it and actively support such a plan.

It is, then, wise to advocate the dropping of Articles X and XVI ; for experience has shown (as indeed might confidently have been foreseen by those who think psychologically) that they are useless and worse than useless, pretending, as they do, to provide sanctions, and yet providing no effective sanctions. But fortunately there remains a possibility of providing effective sanctions, namely, by a plan which will commit no nation to the use either of armed forces or of trade boycott—a plan which is perfectly practicable and which would provide absolutely sure protection for unoffending nations ; a plan which, therefore, would render general voluntary disarmament in the highest degree probable, and would make war a remote contingency with which any nation would need to reckon only if it should persist in offensive expansionism and offensiveness, inspired, not by fear (like most national offensives of modern times), but by greed or by lust for power and “glory.”

Such a plan I have sketched in the present volume. Its essence is the proposal to arm the Court of International Justice with an exclusive and highly efficient air-force, and, at the same time, to suppress by international agreement all other aerial navigation. In this way, and, so far as I can see after much reflection, in this way alone, can International Justice be endowed with an effective sanction, the fears of nations laid to rest, and the era of general disarmament and lasting peace be instituted in all the earth.

## POSTSCRIPT

"The Atlantic Monthly" has published in its February number an article which, in two respects, enforces very strongly the argument of the foregoing address and of Appendix I. The author of the article, entitled "For France to Answer," is Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves, one of the highest living authorities on the use of air-force. In the first place, General Groves shows very impressively the overwhelming nature of air-force, and points out how at the present time the development of European air-forces, especially that of France, is adding greatly to the risk of the outbreak of war in Europe. He writes: "The Treaty of Versailles is in danger of crumbling, and the League of Nations which it created is far from being that

great barrier to conflict which its promoters intended. A survey of these sombre facts and of the developments in European armaments results in the conclusion that the post-war chapter of history bears the same heading as all previous chapters, namely, 'armed force is the dominant factor in human affairs.' To appreciate the increasingly sinister significance of air-power in Europe it is necessary to note an inevitable corollary to this axiom. This corollary, which is often overlooked, is that the 'diplomatic value' of force is proportional not merely to the size of that force, but also to its readiness for action. . . . The value of force as a diplomatic counter is also proportional to its nature, that is, to its war value in terms of speed, range, and potentials for destruction. *Clearly the nature of air-power renders it the perfect instrument for diplomatic pressure.*"

General Groves cites the opinion of Marshal Foch to the effect that "air-force alone may be decisive at the outset in any future European conflict. The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable, but it is clear that such attack, owing to its crushing moral effect on a nation, may impress public opinion to the point of disarming the Government and thus become decisive. . . . The predominance of air-power is warranted by an array of facts the mere enumeration of which would fill a volume." And he states concisely some of the most impressive of such facts, among which I cite the following: "On the whole, the offensive

has gained on the defensive in the sphere of aerial armaments."

"In the future war of areas, the only effective defence against aircraft attack will be the aerial counter-offensive, and the only effective safeguard against aerial aggression will be the threat of reprisals in kind." This fact obviously renders the future war peculiarly horrible, in that its destruction will fall chiefly upon the civilian populations of large cities, especially the capital cities. Further: "These defences (attempted during the Great War) were found to be inadequate to protect London against the Lilliputian air-raids of that period, the largest of which was carried out by only thirty-six aeroplanes. . . . The experiences of all the belligerents during the Great War proved that ground defences are of little value against aircraft." "The efficiency of sea-power in European waters is dependent primarily upon command of the air." And again: "The actual position of air-power in the sphere of armaments has been summed up by Admiral Sims in a single sentence, 'The command of the air means the command of the surface, whether it be sea or land.'"

After showing how greatly France has developed her air-force, General Groves adds: "It has been estimated that the French air policy will force British air estimates, which total £23,000,000 for 1923, to £100,000,000 per annum within a decade." From all of which he concludes: "It follows that a 'war of areas' between two or more of the lead-

ing European nations would involve incalculable damage to the common fabric of civilization. Certain it is that a danger of such a war is growing ; the explosion may be delayed for a decade or more, or it may flare up earlier ; but it is clearly inevitable unless the Great Powers make a concerted effort to prevent it."

But instead of drawing the only rational conclusion from all these impressive facts, namely, that air-force must be made without delay the exclusive instrument of International Justice, General Groves merely reproaches France with the magnitude of her aerial armament. He points out, truly enough, that that armament is far greater than France needs to protect her against any possible aggression from Germany, and indicates that it is being developed as an instrument of diplomatic pressure upon England. Thus he illustrates the thesis of Appendix II of this volume. The British Government, supported by the mass of the people, Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour alike, has shown a strong disposition to insist upon the most rapid and complete economic restoration of a united Germany. France regards such restoration as a dire threat to her existence ; and in order to be able to defy British insistence in this direction she is developing her instrument of diplomatic pressure. And in face of this obvious situation our men of war can think of nothing better than to demand a vast increase of British air-force and to cry aloud, with the pacifists, " Let France explain."



At the same time the British Labour Party takes over the reins of government, pledged to more energetic action in pursuit of that policy which France regards as a threat to her existence ; and British financiers and economists play with the idea of bringing financial pressure to bear upon France by attacking the exchange value of the franc. Thus labour and finance are combining to create in France a state of feeling which at any moment may send a thousand air-planes to destroy a defenceless London.

## NOTE ON THE BOK PEACE PLAN

THE announcement of the award of the Bok Peace Prize and the publication of the selected plan,<sup>1</sup> while this book is in the press, lead me to make the following comments re-enforcing the argument in favour of the plan sketched in the foregoing Appendix.

The essence of the Bok Peace Plan is the suggestion that the United States shall enter the Permanent Court of International Justice and shall co-operate with the League of Nations without full membership at present. The plan proposes also that Articles X and XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations be either dropped altogether or so amended and changed as to eliminate any suggestion of a general agreement to use coercion for obtaining conformity to the pledges of the Covenant.

The Plan might well provoke me to many comments, but I desire only to comment upon it in so far as it affords further ground for urging my own plan, not as a rival or alternative, but as a necessary supplement.

First, I would point out that the Bok Plan, if it were accepted by the United States in its present form, would inevitably suggest to the other nations that the United States desires to reap the benefits of co-operation with the League of Nations without sharing in the responsibilities, the burdens, and the sacrifices which full

<sup>1</sup> Chosen by a jury of eminent persons as "The best practicable plan by which the United States may co-operate with other nations to achieve and preserve the peace of the world."

membership in any effective League must impose on all its member-nations and more especially upon the more powerful of them. This would be an unfortunate impression from every point of view. It might lead other nations to regard somewhat cynically that American "idealism" of which they have heard so much and so often.

Secondly, the fact that the jury, eminent persons known to represent all that part of the American public which favours International Co-operation, has chosen this plan, out of some 22,000 plans submitted to it, shows very clearly that even the most internationally minded and idealistic part of the American people entertains no hope that the United States can be induced to commit itself to participation in either the use of national forces or the application of international boycott for the protection of unoffending nations against unjust aggression. For the obligations of this kind laid upon its members by the existing League of Nations (defined in Articles X and XVI of the Covenant) are of a vague, ill-defined nature; they are very far from being of such clearly defined and binding a nature as would ensure effective co-operation from all or any of its members.<sup>1</sup> Yet the Bok Peace Plan requires that these

<sup>1</sup> Article X runs: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." And Article XVI, as amended, reads: "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article XII, XIII, or XV, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between persons residing in their territory and persons residing in the territory of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal

two Articles (X and XVI) shall be struck out of the Covenant of the League; and the eminent jury, in approving of this proposal, show a very lively sense of the aversion with which the bulk of the American people regard any proposal to involve them, however vaguely and conditionally, in any obligation to take up arms, intercourse between persons residing in the territory of the Covenant-breaking State and persons residing in the territory of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

"It is for the Council to give an opinion whether or not a breach of the Covenant has taken place. In deliberations on this question in the Council, the votes of Members of the League alleged to have resorted to war and of Members against whom such action was directed shall not be counted.

"The Council will notify to all Members of the League the date which it recommends for the application of the economic pressure under this Article."

It is to be noted that the Council is charged merely with the duty of *advising*, of giving an *opinion*, of *recommending*, of piously suggesting to the Members of the League that the time for action has arrived. In its original unamended form Article XVI prescribed: "It shall be the duty of the Council in such case [breach of covenant] to *recommend* to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League." But this right and duty of "recommending" was found to be too strong meat for the babes of international co-operation and was therefore amended away.

If we remember that decisions of both the Council and the Assembly of the League must be unanimous and if we duly weigh the considerations urged by Justice J. H. Clarke (cited in the footnote on p. 171) is it not obvious that, even if the United States should join the existing League, the prospect of the League's obtaining the co-operation of American forces in the prevention of aggression would be vanishingly small? Is not probable in the highest degree that the United States would refuse any such co-operation and would, at the most, co-operate in the expression of moral censure upon the threatening of actual aggression? And is there any reasonable prospect of an effective enforcement of the proposed boycott upon traders and manufacturers who have learnt that war provides the greatest opportunity for the rapid acquirement of great wealth?

or to impose the self-denying ordinance of trade-boycott, in defence of any other nation against aggression.

Now Articles X and XVI, though they do little more than involve the Members of the League in a pious avowment of a moral obligation to censure unjustified aggression upon any nation, contain or constitute whatever of effective sanction, whatever "teeth," the existing League can claim. Yet, weak and untrustworthy as are the teeth, it would seem that they must be drawn from the League, before it may reasonably hope for the adhesion of the United States. When the League shall have been emasculated to this degree, its power to protect nations against aggression and to inspire them with the confidence essential to disarmament (which power is, under the existing form of the Covenant woefully inadequate) will have been reduced to a negligible quantity.

All the more necessary is it, therefore, to adopt the International Air-force plan sketched in the foregoing Appendix, in order to give to the World Court the sanction, the power of enforcing its rulings, without which neither the Court nor the League, nor both together, can hope to bring about general disarmament and enduring peace.

The International Air-force plan is, then, in no sense in conflict or rivalry with the Bok Peace Plan. It is rather a much needed, an indispensable supplement to it. Without the adoption of this supplementary plan, without the effective sanction of the World Court's rulings which this plan would provide, the League and the Court will remain little more than a glorified Red Cross Society and a pious gesture deprecating war and aggression. And, since the adoption of this supplementary plan would avoid involving any nation in the obligation to take up arms or to maintain armed forces of its own, it is difficult to see how the most extreme

pacifist or the most convinced opponent of anything that can involve the United States in direct intervention in the affairs of other nations could entertain any serious objection to it.

The only reasonable ground of objection that any sincere and public-spirited person could find would be, I think, the extreme Tolstoian doctrine that in no conceivable circumstances is the use or the threat of force morally permissible. Such persons must, if they were consistent, oppose all police action, domestic as well as international; they must be prepared to look on with what equanimity they can summon, while women and children are brutally assaulted by footpads or murdered wholesale by the hundred thousand in the wars of the future which even now are looming darkly above the international horizon.

I add one word upon the plan actively urged by the "Christian Science Monitor" and now finding widespread support, the plan, namely, of a constitutional amendment which would render obligatory the conscription of all wealth as well as of all persons, in the event of the United States engaging in war. This plan would, if it were adopted, render it more than ever difficult, in fact practically impossible, to secure the co-operation of the United States in any International action for the prevention of unjust aggression. In so far it might prove to be of great injury to the world. But, if it were combined with the adoption of the International Air-force plan, this grave objection to it would be wholly removed, and we might hope to see it adopted with a good conscience by the United States and imitated by other nations.



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